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Home > Issues & Initiatives > Predatory Mortgage Lending
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Predatory Mortgage Lending
See also Foreclosure Prevention
Predatory mortgage lending is stripping billions of dollars in precious assets from low-income communities across the nation. Seeking to exploit vulnerable and unsophisticated borrowers, predatory lenders charge more in interest and fees than is required to cover the risk of making the loan. Unfortunately, many predatory practices are perfectly legal under the current regime of federal laws and most state laws.
The subprime lending market, where predatory lending primarily takes place, has exploded by 795 percent over the last decade, from a roughly $43 billion market in 1994 to a $385 billion market in 2003. Due in part to abusive terms and practices, the foreclosure rate for subprime loans is much higher than prime loans: 1 of every 12 subprime mortgages will go to foreclosure, compared to 1 in 100 for the prime market. According to a number of studies, predatory lending disproportionately affects minority homeowners and communities.
Monday, October 5, 2009
Sunday, October 4, 2009
i contacted my Senator And Comptroller of banks
I Wrote letters to my state senator and filed a complaint with the comptroller of banks .here is the comptroller info any one should do this not sure if it helps but hey
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you want us to communicate with your attorney or other legal representative directly, please provide the information below. Your submission of this portion of the form authorizes our office to release information to your attorney or other legal representative if requested. Relationship: Attorney ___ Representative ___ Not Applicable (Skip Section) _X_ Please indicate the type of authorization you have granted to your Attorney or Representative : Power of Attorney ___ Letters Testamentary ___ Court Appointed Executor or Administrator ___ Other ___ Name of Representative: First Name: Middle Name: Last Name: Street Address: City: State: Zip: Phone: E-mail: What is the best way to contact your representative? When is the best time to contact your representative? FINANCIAL INSTITUTION OR COMPANY INFORMATION THAT IS SUBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Helpful Hint: If you don't know the name of your bank, check your bank or credit card statement. The bank's name will be indicated on the statement. Name of Financial Institution or Company: HSBC MORTGAGE COMPANY Street: 577 LAMONT ROAD City: ELMHURST State: IL Zip: 60126 Phone: 6306177000 Type of Account(s): (If you are unsure of the type of account(s), please contact your financial institution for assistance.) Deposit Account (Checking, Savings) ___ Credit Card ___ Loan Product(Consumer, Mortgage, Home Equity) _X_ Insurance ___ Asset Management (Trust Accounts) ___ Consumer Leasing ___ Insurance ___ Non-Deposit Account (Investments) ___ Other ___ Have you tried to resolve your complaint with your financial institution or YES If Yes, when? 06/06/2009 How? Has the financial institution responded to your complaint? YES If Yes, when? 07/01/2009 How? Mail Contact Name: TRUSTEE SHAPIRO AND SUTHERLAND LLC Title: TRUSTEE COMPLAINT INFORMATION
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Describe events in the order they ocurred, including any names, phone numbers, and a full description of the problem with the amount(s) and date(s) of any transaction(s). Be as brief and complete as possible to make the explanation clear. Do not include personal or confidential information such as your social security, credit card, or bank accounts numbers. Ibought my house in 1989 through oregon dept of veterans assumable loan for 39,000.00 . in 1998 i refinanced with Beneficial Finance Of Oregon now owned by hsbc bank. Beneficial paid off my mortgage with ODVA For less than 39,000.00 plus I BORROWED ABOUT 20,000 TOTAL THATS IT MAKES MY BALANCE OF OWED MONEYS AT THAT TIME MAYBE ABOUT 60,000.00 - + .Since that first refinance with beneficial THEY BENEFICIAL HaVE refinanced my home at least 5 times never any money out for me, just their idea according to them to save me money. I Was not real smart about these things back then (still not) but everytime they did this it added about 12,000.00 to my loan balance even though they were paying themselfs off each time they charges me a huge fee for early payoff each time, thus totally eating my equity with out my knowledge, I DID NOT UNDERSTAND the whole picture of what they were doing or even how I Got to owe them 144,000.00 on my 39,000.00 house untill it was way too late. now about 10 - 12 years later they are forclosing on my home of 20 years, Because I GOT INTO A HARDSHIP , With a broken neck and had to be placed on a hardship program back in 2001 . Since that time as i became aware of what they were doing to me I 3 TIMES TRIED TO REFINANCE to get my home away from them, But after each time i got approved for a loan . Beneficial would either raise the payoff and kill the loan or the last time they said they lost my file for over 2 weeks, Forced me to file chapter 13 bankruptsy while they tried to locate my files.Now they are forclosing again this time my house is to be sold on November 12 2009 because of the hardship program they put me on in 2001 they beneficial finance have not recorded even one of my monthly payments to my account in the positive column all payments for ten years have gone to interest and late fees, because of their hardship program puts you in constant default.Due to this dishonest operating practice we are losing our home only because they can get away with it.Why dont you folks here and other gov. agency`s do something to protect the comsumer even if we are not very educated in mortgage laws. do we deserve to loose everything we have in our lifes?To some huge bank with more money than god? This is appalling whats going on in this country to people every day. This statement is absolutely true I Swear to god and I`m asking for help now please. Before another defenseless family ends up homeless for what? Please be advised that the issues described in this complaint will be shared with the financial institution or company in question. PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The solicitation and collection of this information is authorized by 15 U.S.C. - 57a(f) and 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The information is solicited to provide the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) with data that is necessary and useful in reviewing requests received from individuals for assistance in their interactions with national banks. The provision of requested information is voluntary. However, without such information, the ability to complete a review or to provide requested assistance may be hindered. It is intended that the information obtained through this solicitation will be used within the OCC and provided to the national bank that is the subject of the complaint or inquiry. Additional disclosures of such information may be made to: (1) other third parties when required or authorized by statue or when necessary in order to obtain additional information relating to the complaint or inquiry; (2) other governmental, self-regulatory, or professional organizations having: (a) jurisdiction over the subject matter or the complaint or inquiry; (b) jurisdiction over the entity that is the subject of the complaint or inquiry; or (c) whenever such information is relevant to a known or suspected violation of law or licensing standard for which another organization has jurisdiction; (3) the Department of Justice, a court, an adjudicative body, a party in litigation, or a witness when relevant and necessary to a legal or administrative proceeding; (4) a Congressional office when the information is relevant to an inquiry initiated on behalf of its provider; (5) Other governmental or tribal organizations with which an individual has communicated regarding a complaint or inquiry about an OCC-regulated entity; (6) OCC contractors or agents when access to such information in necessary; and (7) other third parties when required or authorized by statute.
Date: 10/5/2009 1:40:43 AM
I certify that the information provided on this form is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I Certify _X_ I Do Not Certify ___ If a valid OMB Control Number does not appear on this form, you are not required to complete this form.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you want us to communicate with your attorney or other legal representative directly, please provide the information below. Your submission of this portion of the form authorizes our office to release information to your attorney or other legal representative if requested. Relationship: Attorney ___ Representative ___ Not Applicable (Skip Section) _X_ Please indicate the type of authorization you have granted to your Attorney or Representative : Power of Attorney ___ Letters Testamentary ___ Court Appointed Executor or Administrator ___ Other ___ Name of Representative: First Name: Middle Name: Last Name: Street Address: City: State: Zip: Phone: E-mail: What is the best way to contact your representative? When is the best time to contact your representative? FINANCIAL INSTITUTION OR COMPANY INFORMATION THAT IS SUBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Helpful Hint: If you don't know the name of your bank, check your bank or credit card statement. The bank's name will be indicated on the statement. Name of Financial Institution or Company: HSBC MORTGAGE COMPANY Street: 577 LAMONT ROAD City: ELMHURST State: IL Zip: 60126 Phone: 6306177000 Type of Account(s): (If you are unsure of the type of account(s), please contact your financial institution for assistance.) Deposit Account (Checking, Savings) ___ Credit Card ___ Loan Product(Consumer, Mortgage, Home Equity) _X_ Insurance ___ Asset Management (Trust Accounts) ___ Consumer Leasing ___ Insurance ___ Non-Deposit Account (Investments) ___ Other ___ Have you tried to resolve your complaint with your financial institution or YES If Yes, when? 06/06/2009 How? Has the financial institution responded to your complaint? YES If Yes, when? 07/01/2009 How? Mail Contact Name: TRUSTEE SHAPIRO AND SUTHERLAND LLC Title: TRUSTEE COMPLAINT INFORMATION
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Describe events in the order they ocurred, including any names, phone numbers, and a full description of the problem with the amount(s) and date(s) of any transaction(s). Be as brief and complete as possible to make the explanation clear. Do not include personal or confidential information such as your social security, credit card, or bank accounts numbers. Ibought my house in 1989 through oregon dept of veterans assumable loan for 39,000.00 . in 1998 i refinanced with Beneficial Finance Of Oregon now owned by hsbc bank. Beneficial paid off my mortgage with ODVA For less than 39,000.00 plus I BORROWED ABOUT 20,000 TOTAL THATS IT MAKES MY BALANCE OF OWED MONEYS AT THAT TIME MAYBE ABOUT 60,000.00 - + .Since that first refinance with beneficial THEY BENEFICIAL HaVE refinanced my home at least 5 times never any money out for me, just their idea according to them to save me money. I Was not real smart about these things back then (still not) but everytime they did this it added about 12,000.00 to my loan balance even though they were paying themselfs off each time they charges me a huge fee for early payoff each time, thus totally eating my equity with out my knowledge, I DID NOT UNDERSTAND the whole picture of what they were doing or even how I Got to owe them 144,000.00 on my 39,000.00 house untill it was way too late. now about 10 - 12 years later they are forclosing on my home of 20 years, Because I GOT INTO A HARDSHIP , With a broken neck and had to be placed on a hardship program back in 2001 . Since that time as i became aware of what they were doing to me I 3 TIMES TRIED TO REFINANCE to get my home away from them, But after each time i got approved for a loan . Beneficial would either raise the payoff and kill the loan or the last time they said they lost my file for over 2 weeks, Forced me to file chapter 13 bankruptsy while they tried to locate my files.Now they are forclosing again this time my house is to be sold on November 12 2009 because of the hardship program they put me on in 2001 they beneficial finance have not recorded even one of my monthly payments to my account in the positive column all payments for ten years have gone to interest and late fees, because of their hardship program puts you in constant default.Due to this dishonest operating practice we are losing our home only because they can get away with it.Why dont you folks here and other gov. agency`s do something to protect the comsumer even if we are not very educated in mortgage laws. do we deserve to loose everything we have in our lifes?To some huge bank with more money than god? This is appalling whats going on in this country to people every day. This statement is absolutely true I Swear to god and I`m asking for help now please. Before another defenseless family ends up homeless for what? Please be advised that the issues described in this complaint will be shared with the financial institution or company in question. PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The solicitation and collection of this information is authorized by 15 U.S.C. - 57a(f) and 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The information is solicited to provide the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) with data that is necessary and useful in reviewing requests received from individuals for assistance in their interactions with national banks. The provision of requested information is voluntary. However, without such information, the ability to complete a review or to provide requested assistance may be hindered. It is intended that the information obtained through this solicitation will be used within the OCC and provided to the national bank that is the subject of the complaint or inquiry. Additional disclosures of such information may be made to: (1) other third parties when required or authorized by statue or when necessary in order to obtain additional information relating to the complaint or inquiry; (2) other governmental, self-regulatory, or professional organizations having: (a) jurisdiction over the subject matter or the complaint or inquiry; (b) jurisdiction over the entity that is the subject of the complaint or inquiry; or (c) whenever such information is relevant to a known or suspected violation of law or licensing standard for which another organization has jurisdiction; (3) the Department of Justice, a court, an adjudicative body, a party in litigation, or a witness when relevant and necessary to a legal or administrative proceeding; (4) a Congressional office when the information is relevant to an inquiry initiated on behalf of its provider; (5) Other governmental or tribal organizations with which an individual has communicated regarding a complaint or inquiry about an OCC-regulated entity; (6) OCC contractors or agents when access to such information in necessary; and (7) other third parties when required or authorized by statute.
Date: 10/5/2009 1:40:43 AM
I certify that the information provided on this form is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I Certify _X_ I Do Not Certify ___ If a valid OMB Control Number does not appear on this form, you are not required to complete this form.
Saturday, August 22, 2009
ALWAYS REMEMBER THIS
Here's some other information
You have the right to demand to see the ORIGINAL BLUE INK paperwork you signed. If the NOTE can't be produced with your blue ink signature, there is no note that can be lawfully collected against. Never acknowledge your signature on a mortgage document unless it is your signature in the blue ink you used at the closing. Anything less than the ORIGINAL document is a forgery and not admissible as legal tender.
You have the right to demand the alleged holder of the note prove the loan was closed lawfully.
You have the right to rescind your mortgage up to three years later under certain circumstances.
You have the right to question anything that you don't understand.
You have the right to back out of the loan if the "Good Faith Estimate" you received a minimum of 3 days prior to the closing does not match the one at the closing.
bad link I`ll check on that
You have the right to demand to see the ORIGINAL BLUE INK paperwork you signed. If the NOTE can't be produced with your blue ink signature, there is no note that can be lawfully collected against. Never acknowledge your signature on a mortgage document unless it is your signature in the blue ink you used at the closing. Anything less than the ORIGINAL document is a forgery and not admissible as legal tender.
You have the right to demand the alleged holder of the note prove the loan was closed lawfully.
You have the right to rescind your mortgage up to three years later under certain circumstances.
You have the right to question anything that you don't understand.
You have the right to back out of the loan if the "Good Faith Estimate" you received a minimum of 3 days prior to the closing does not match the one at the closing.
bad link I`ll check on that
This Is Excactly whats happening to us right now
e number of frauds that can be committed by your lender is limited only by the lender's imagination and their estimation of education and financial ability. If they peg you as financially uneducated and of limited means, your lender is likely to use whatever means he can get away with to force you into foreclosure.
Mortgage fraud is more common than you'd like to believe. Even large, well known, mortgage companies have been prosecuted by the Federal Trade Commission for unlawful practices. Google 'Mortgage Fraud' and you'll be shocked out of your chair with the number of hits you get. You'll find them all, GMACM (which is also Ditech), Countrywide and a host of others.
Here are some of the names or descriptions of the various frauds mortgage companies/brokers use:
Formulated foreclosure/mortgage servicing fraud/closing fraud. Where the lender rechecks your credit information and your payment history to put you into a situation where you can't afford the monthly payment. Examples are:
Yield Spread Premium - This practice was originally intended as a way to avoid charging the borrower any out-of-pocket fees. However, many feel the intentions have been misguided, and have ended up as just another fee the borrower gets stuck with. Be careful to review your HUD-1 or Good Faith Estimate to see what this fee is, and why it’s being charged. You shouldn’t be charged both a YSP and an origination fee. This would mean the broker is charging you twice. Please also note that the verbiage can vary, and may read as “par-plus pricing”, “rate participation fee”, “service release fee” and so on. Make sure you go over each fee to ensure you don’t get duped!
Brokers will also charge a YSP as a way of providing a “No Closing Cost” loan. Basically the broker will charge a YSP large enough to offset any upfront fees the borrower would have to pay, and still end up with enough to make a decent commission. An example would be a broker that charges no points, but charges a YSP of 2% on a $400,000 loan. The total compensation to the broker is $8,000, and the fees associated with the loan may be $3,500. The borrower won’t have to pay the $3,500 as it will be subtracted from the broker’s YSP of $8,000, still leaving the broker with $4,500 commission. It sounds alright, but the rate the borrower receives will be substantially higher than it would be at par.
Yield Spread Premium or YSP are fees paid by the mortgage lender to a mortgage broker in return for the delivery of a loan that carries a higher interest rate. The higher interest rate is the interest rate above the par rate. A par rate is a rate at zero points. Points are expressed as a percent of the loan. Each point is typically one percent of the loan amount. One point for a $300,000 loan is $3,000.In other words, YSP is the money paid to the mortgage broker. This is one way mortgage brokers receive more money for each loan. The mortgage broker will quote a higher (than par) rate and in return receive money back from the mortgage lender. In this case, the lender will pay the broker points for booking the borrower into a higher interest rate.Conversely, lenders charge the points to the borrower for rates below the par rate. For example, borrowers will pay points when they buy down the rate. The excess points charged by the mortgage broker go to the lender so that they can receive a lower rate.
Yield spread premium is a major issue in the mortgage industry. Some interest groups call them “illegal kickbacks” stating yield spread premium is a referral fee from the mortgage lenders to the mortgage brokers. Other critics charge that mortgage brokers steer their clients to lenders who pay yield spread premium so the broker can reap bigger fees. There are some brokers who "price gouge" unsuspecting borrowers. However, mortgage brokers don’t need YSP to price gouge borrowers. The mortgage broker can simply charge more points to the borrower.According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, yield spread premiums serve a purpose by helping to reduce closing costs. In return for a higher interest rate, yield spread premium allow borrowers to pay lower fees at closing. This option helps low-income borrowers to be able to buy a house without having to worry about the huge closing costs. The majority of loans with yield spread premium, the fees are used to offset the borrower’s closing costs. The mortgage broker pays the borrower’s closing costs with the YSP. The difference is what the mortgage broker earns.Borrowers are not aware about the yield spread premium until they sign the loan documents. The broker is not required to disclose the amount until the HUD-1 Settlement Sheet is prepared which is a day or so before closing. To avoid a surprise closing, ask for a good faith estimate. The good faith estimate should include all transaction fees – direct and indirect – and the specific services earning those fees. Don’t be afraid to ask questions if you are unsure of anything on the good faith estimate. You should be able to shop from broker to broker and compare total fees and rates.
There is a lot of controversy surrounding this practice, and an ongoing fight between mortgage brokers and institutional lenders. Brokers must disclose the YSP, whereas institutional lenders can avoid disclosing it as their yield spread may not be determined until a later date when the loan is sold on the secondary market.
Escrow shortages - where each year your escrow account is short the money needed to pay your taxes and insurances. At the end of the year they will give you a choice of adding the shortage to your monthly loan payment if you don't pay the shortage in one lump sum.Most people wind up having the shortage cut up and pay it monthly. But while you're making these larger payments, the servicer isn't collecting enough to pay your escrow items again. You wind up short again the next year and your payment goes up again. After a couple of years, you can't afford the payment any longer. Boom they foreclose and take your home.
Escrow padding - Adding charges to your escrow that were not agreed upon at the time of closing. This is where they charge you for insurances they claim you need, your taxes went up, your insurance went up or late fees where they held your payment until it was late. When the late fee kicks in, that's when they apply the payment and create a shortage in your escrow account.
Suspended payments - This is where you make your payment every month but they fail to apply the payment to your account. After 3 months they begin to foreclose on the house. They know you most likely can't afford an auditor or an attorney to go over your account and determine what the lender did with your payment.You can even show them the canceled checks but they'll ignore and foreclose on your home. This will add thousands of dollars in costs to your loan. Then once they've sold your home they find those payments but use them to pay the costs of the foreclosure.Without the aid of an attorney, you're screwed. Most people can't afford the $2,500.00+ retainers.You can even file a complaint with your State's Attorney General, but the chances of them coming to your rescue, even though you have all the proof in the world the lender set you up to fail, are very slim.
Force placed insurance - This is where a lender will buy an insurance you either already have or they claim you need. A perfect example of an insurance that most servicers try to tack on to your monthly payment is "Flood Insurance." You'll get a letter that says the National Flood Insurance Act of 1994 says you have to carry flood insurance. They expect that you'll take their word for it an pay the extra amount. Most times they know the insurance is not available for your property because you're not in a flood zone and it's purchase is voluntary or your town/city is not a participant in the National Flood Insurance Program.Since they can't buy the insurance, they are really just pocketing the money. If you ask them for a copy of the insurance policy they will tell you they don't have to show it to you. They will refuse to supply you with any information regarding the policy. Why? Because the chances are they didn't buy anything.Another scam servicers use is the force placing of hazard insurance. The premium for hazard insurance is usually included in your monthly escrow payment. Once a year your lender sends your insurance company a payment for a hazard policy and you get a receipt from the insurance carrier along with a policy number and a copy of the new policy. Even though you've received that from the insurance company the lender claims you're not covered and, like the flood insurance, force place the hazard insurance on your account. After a couple of months, they notify you that you failed to carry the policy and are now charging you for an additional policy.Even if you're luck enough to get them to acknowledge the fact you already had the insurance, good luck getting them to refund the unearned premiums. If you ask them for information regarding the insurance they claim was purchased, you'll get nothing. Your out a couple of hundred dollars and no where to turn because chances are you can't afford an attorney and in most cases it's an odds on bet your state won't help you, even if you hand them the smoking gun.
Unlawful foreclosure - this is where the lender or its servicer create the circumstances of your alleged default. Above are some examples of how they do that. There are strict laws in each state regarding the tracking of mortgage documents and who owns the mortgage note.If you happen to find yourself in foreclosure and you see a company listed on the paperwork called Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) the foreclosure is not going to be valid. Only the owner/holder of the NOTE, not the mortgage contract, can foreclose on a mortgage. If you separate the mortgage contract from the mortgage note (both have two different names as the owner/holder) in most states the loan does not exist.Here's some other information
You have the right to demand to see the ORIGINAL BLUE INK paperwork you signed. If the NOTE can't be produced with your blue ink signature, there is no note that can be lawfully collected against. Never acknowledge your signature on a mortgage document unless it is your signature in the blue ink you used at the closing. Anything less than the ORIGINAL document is a forgery and not admissible as legal tender.
You have the right to demand the alleged holder of the note prove the loan was closed lawfully.
You have the right to rescind your mortgage up to three years later under certain circumstances.
You have the right to question anything that you don't understand.
You have the right to back out of the loan if the "Good Faith Estimate" you received a minimum of 3 days prior to the closing does not match the one at the closing.
Mortgage fraud is more common than you'd like to believe. Even large, well known, mortgage companies have been prosecuted by the Federal Trade Commission for unlawful practices. Google 'Mortgage Fraud' and you'll be shocked out of your chair with the number of hits you get. You'll find them all, GMACM (which is also Ditech), Countrywide and a host of others.
Here are some of the names or descriptions of the various frauds mortgage companies/brokers use:
Formulated foreclosure/mortgage servicing fraud/closing fraud. Where the lender rechecks your credit information and your payment history to put you into a situation where you can't afford the monthly payment. Examples are:
Yield Spread Premium - This practice was originally intended as a way to avoid charging the borrower any out-of-pocket fees. However, many feel the intentions have been misguided, and have ended up as just another fee the borrower gets stuck with. Be careful to review your HUD-1 or Good Faith Estimate to see what this fee is, and why it’s being charged. You shouldn’t be charged both a YSP and an origination fee. This would mean the broker is charging you twice. Please also note that the verbiage can vary, and may read as “par-plus pricing”, “rate participation fee”, “service release fee” and so on. Make sure you go over each fee to ensure you don’t get duped!
Brokers will also charge a YSP as a way of providing a “No Closing Cost” loan. Basically the broker will charge a YSP large enough to offset any upfront fees the borrower would have to pay, and still end up with enough to make a decent commission. An example would be a broker that charges no points, but charges a YSP of 2% on a $400,000 loan. The total compensation to the broker is $8,000, and the fees associated with the loan may be $3,500. The borrower won’t have to pay the $3,500 as it will be subtracted from the broker’s YSP of $8,000, still leaving the broker with $4,500 commission. It sounds alright, but the rate the borrower receives will be substantially higher than it would be at par.
Yield Spread Premium or YSP are fees paid by the mortgage lender to a mortgage broker in return for the delivery of a loan that carries a higher interest rate. The higher interest rate is the interest rate above the par rate. A par rate is a rate at zero points. Points are expressed as a percent of the loan. Each point is typically one percent of the loan amount. One point for a $300,000 loan is $3,000.In other words, YSP is the money paid to the mortgage broker. This is one way mortgage brokers receive more money for each loan. The mortgage broker will quote a higher (than par) rate and in return receive money back from the mortgage lender. In this case, the lender will pay the broker points for booking the borrower into a higher interest rate.Conversely, lenders charge the points to the borrower for rates below the par rate. For example, borrowers will pay points when they buy down the rate. The excess points charged by the mortgage broker go to the lender so that they can receive a lower rate.
Yield spread premium is a major issue in the mortgage industry. Some interest groups call them “illegal kickbacks” stating yield spread premium is a referral fee from the mortgage lenders to the mortgage brokers. Other critics charge that mortgage brokers steer their clients to lenders who pay yield spread premium so the broker can reap bigger fees. There are some brokers who "price gouge" unsuspecting borrowers. However, mortgage brokers don’t need YSP to price gouge borrowers. The mortgage broker can simply charge more points to the borrower.According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, yield spread premiums serve a purpose by helping to reduce closing costs. In return for a higher interest rate, yield spread premium allow borrowers to pay lower fees at closing. This option helps low-income borrowers to be able to buy a house without having to worry about the huge closing costs. The majority of loans with yield spread premium, the fees are used to offset the borrower’s closing costs. The mortgage broker pays the borrower’s closing costs with the YSP. The difference is what the mortgage broker earns.Borrowers are not aware about the yield spread premium until they sign the loan documents. The broker is not required to disclose the amount until the HUD-1 Settlement Sheet is prepared which is a day or so before closing. To avoid a surprise closing, ask for a good faith estimate. The good faith estimate should include all transaction fees – direct and indirect – and the specific services earning those fees. Don’t be afraid to ask questions if you are unsure of anything on the good faith estimate. You should be able to shop from broker to broker and compare total fees and rates.
There is a lot of controversy surrounding this practice, and an ongoing fight between mortgage brokers and institutional lenders. Brokers must disclose the YSP, whereas institutional lenders can avoid disclosing it as their yield spread may not be determined until a later date when the loan is sold on the secondary market.
Escrow shortages - where each year your escrow account is short the money needed to pay your taxes and insurances. At the end of the year they will give you a choice of adding the shortage to your monthly loan payment if you don't pay the shortage in one lump sum.Most people wind up having the shortage cut up and pay it monthly. But while you're making these larger payments, the servicer isn't collecting enough to pay your escrow items again. You wind up short again the next year and your payment goes up again. After a couple of years, you can't afford the payment any longer. Boom they foreclose and take your home.
Escrow padding - Adding charges to your escrow that were not agreed upon at the time of closing. This is where they charge you for insurances they claim you need, your taxes went up, your insurance went up or late fees where they held your payment until it was late. When the late fee kicks in, that's when they apply the payment and create a shortage in your escrow account.
Suspended payments - This is where you make your payment every month but they fail to apply the payment to your account. After 3 months they begin to foreclose on the house. They know you most likely can't afford an auditor or an attorney to go over your account and determine what the lender did with your payment.You can even show them the canceled checks but they'll ignore and foreclose on your home. This will add thousands of dollars in costs to your loan. Then once they've sold your home they find those payments but use them to pay the costs of the foreclosure.Without the aid of an attorney, you're screwed. Most people can't afford the $2,500.00+ retainers.You can even file a complaint with your State's Attorney General, but the chances of them coming to your rescue, even though you have all the proof in the world the lender set you up to fail, are very slim.
Force placed insurance - This is where a lender will buy an insurance you either already have or they claim you need. A perfect example of an insurance that most servicers try to tack on to your monthly payment is "Flood Insurance." You'll get a letter that says the National Flood Insurance Act of 1994 says you have to carry flood insurance. They expect that you'll take their word for it an pay the extra amount. Most times they know the insurance is not available for your property because you're not in a flood zone and it's purchase is voluntary or your town/city is not a participant in the National Flood Insurance Program.Since they can't buy the insurance, they are really just pocketing the money. If you ask them for a copy of the insurance policy they will tell you they don't have to show it to you. They will refuse to supply you with any information regarding the policy. Why? Because the chances are they didn't buy anything.Another scam servicers use is the force placing of hazard insurance. The premium for hazard insurance is usually included in your monthly escrow payment. Once a year your lender sends your insurance company a payment for a hazard policy and you get a receipt from the insurance carrier along with a policy number and a copy of the new policy. Even though you've received that from the insurance company the lender claims you're not covered and, like the flood insurance, force place the hazard insurance on your account. After a couple of months, they notify you that you failed to carry the policy and are now charging you for an additional policy.Even if you're luck enough to get them to acknowledge the fact you already had the insurance, good luck getting them to refund the unearned premiums. If you ask them for information regarding the insurance they claim was purchased, you'll get nothing. Your out a couple of hundred dollars and no where to turn because chances are you can't afford an attorney and in most cases it's an odds on bet your state won't help you, even if you hand them the smoking gun.
Unlawful foreclosure - this is where the lender or its servicer create the circumstances of your alleged default. Above are some examples of how they do that. There are strict laws in each state regarding the tracking of mortgage documents and who owns the mortgage note.If you happen to find yourself in foreclosure and you see a company listed on the paperwork called Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) the foreclosure is not going to be valid. Only the owner/holder of the NOTE, not the mortgage contract, can foreclose on a mortgage. If you separate the mortgage contract from the mortgage note (both have two different names as the owner/holder) in most states the loan does not exist.Here's some other information
You have the right to demand to see the ORIGINAL BLUE INK paperwork you signed. If the NOTE can't be produced with your blue ink signature, there is no note that can be lawfully collected against. Never acknowledge your signature on a mortgage document unless it is your signature in the blue ink you used at the closing. Anything less than the ORIGINAL document is a forgery and not admissible as legal tender.
You have the right to demand the alleged holder of the note prove the loan was closed lawfully.
You have the right to rescind your mortgage up to three years later under certain circumstances.
You have the right to question anything that you don't understand.
You have the right to back out of the loan if the "Good Faith Estimate" you received a minimum of 3 days prior to the closing does not match the one at the closing.
Friday, August 7, 2009
HOPE A LITTLE HOPE
AUGUST 7 2009 I WROTE A LETTER TO A GUY I MET IN A ONLINE FORUM AND TODAY HE ANSWERED ME WITH SOME I HOPE VERY GOOD ADVICE SO I1M GOING TO START ON THIS MONDAY MORNING. HERE IS HIS LETTER
====================================================================
Thanks for your concern. Go to your local county recorder office and give them your name and home address. Ask them to show you how to locate your trust deed informantion on the computer. View these documents to determine how much you borrowed, what the interest rate is, how much your ballon payment is and the cost associated with not paying the ballon payment on time. If this does'nt add up to the $133,000.00. Contact your Mortgage Bankers Association department, BBB, Consumers Affair for your area and file a complaint and ask them to help you resolve the situation. Last but not lease, if it gets down to the wire. File chapter 13 and make your payments on time as best as possible! DO NOT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES DISMISS THE BK AT THE REQUEST OF YOUR LENDER. UNLESS YOU GET IN WRITING FROM THEM THAT THEY WILL FIX THE PROBLEM! GOOD LUCK!
==========================================================================
BELOW IS THE LETTER I SENT TO HIM
=====================================================================
====================================================================
Thanks for your concern. Go to your local county recorder office and give them your name and home address. Ask them to show you how to locate your trust deed informantion on the computer. View these documents to determine how much you borrowed, what the interest rate is, how much your ballon payment is and the cost associated with not paying the ballon payment on time. If this does'nt add up to the $133,000.00. Contact your Mortgage Bankers Association department, BBB, Consumers Affair for your area and file a complaint and ask them to help you resolve the situation. Last but not lease, if it gets down to the wire. File chapter 13 and make your payments on time as best as possible! DO NOT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES DISMISS THE BK AT THE REQUEST OF YOUR LENDER. UNLESS YOU GET IN WRITING FROM THEM THAT THEY WILL FIX THE PROBLEM! GOOD LUCK!
==========================================================================
BELOW IS THE LETTER I SENT TO HIM
=====================================================================
Life In Hell With A Beneficial Finance Mortgage
On Fri, Aug 7 2009> . My name is Rudy Gentry I Live in Milwaukie, Oregon I am having> big problems trying to hang onto my house i have missed some payments> and now in forcloser on my home of 20 years, I`ll try to make this> brief just give you the important issues and maybe you can give me a> little advice. Back in 1988 i bought a house by assuming a va loan for> aprox. 39,000.00 then in 1997 i wanted to make some home approvemants> and pay a few bills so i refinanced my 39,000.00 aprox mortgage to> Beneficial Oregon Finance company they loaned me about 15 thousand and> paid off some bills thats it.I Went on with my life, well the next year So I Called Beneficial and they said they would write up the paperwork> and we could come by and sign them. I said Great so we did that<> i will always regret 2 years later I broke my neck and was put out of work due to my injuries, later to find out I WOULD BE DISABLED FOR LIFE. And at the time of my injuy we realised we were going to have> some financial troubles so we contacted Beneficial mortgage and my> wife setup some deals that would move a few payments to the back of> the loan and modify the loan to give us a chance to readjust to our> new income as i was devastated about my physical condition and trying> to concentrate on a recovery that was not happening, My wife took the> financial problems for awhile. Well after about a year i decided to> start checking our finances again to see if we could maybe start> living a little less stressfull financially. What I figured out was SHOCKING> After all these refinances and changing the loans and things like this (not really sure what they did)> But we now owe Beneficial 133,000.00 approx. this is for my refi of> 39,000.00 VA mortgage in 1997 ? Like I Said I DID Borrow about 15 thousand and> i think we charged another 7000.00 to our credit line AT THE MOST PROBABLY NOT THAT MUCH AT ALL.around the time> of my injury so that would put my balance on the high side at about 60-65 thousand> i figure with fees as i never checked the loan docs like I Said> earlier but NO WAY WE BORROWED THIS MONEY TO EQUAL 130,000.00 NOW THEY ARE Forclosing Any way how they got to this amount is totally criminal in nature it has to be because we simply did notborrow that money and they are forclosing on us because we fell behind and they wanted a 31,000.00 baloon payment that I Could not or will not pay. Is There any help for me that you know of? we have a sale date of nov.7 2009 any advice will be appreciated thank you> PS I Am stating these facts with estimates of actual price values but they are very close to actual amounts.And this is the truth. We have constantly asked this company for records as we never got monthly or yearly statements though we have requested many many times in writing.
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STATE AND LOCAL
FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION
PROGRAMS
Can They Save Homes?
September 2009
NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW
CENTER®
State and Local Foreclosure
Mediation Programs:
Can They Save Homes?
Written By
Geoffry Walsh
Staff Attorney
National Consumer Law Center
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank Carolyn Carter, Margot Saunders, and John Rao and Arielle
Cohen of NCLC for valuable guidance, feedback, and editorial assistance in the preparation of
this report. Particular thanks to Juala Smythe, James Kwok, and Rick Jurgens for research and to
Julie Gallagher for graphic design.
This report was funded in part by the Open Society Institute. We thank them for their support but
acknowledge that the findings and conclusions presented in the report are those of the authors
alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Institute.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Geoff Walsh has been a legal services attorney for over twenty-five years and is presently a staff
attorney with National Consumer Law Center in Boston. Before that, he worked with the housing
and consumer units of Community Legal Services in Philadelphia and was a staff attorney with
Vermont Legal Aid. His practice has focused upon housing, foreclosure, and bankruptcy issues.
He has served as a panelist and instructor at trainings and legal education seminars on foreclosure
prevention and bankruptcy topics. He is co-author of NCLC’s recent report, Foreclosing a
Dream: State Laws Deprive Homeowners of Basic Protections (2009) and writes for NCLC’s
legal practice manuals, including Foreclosures, Foreclosure Prevention Counseling, Student
Loan Law and Consumer Bankruptcy Law and Practice.
Executive Summary v
The Promise of Foreclosure Mediation Programs v
Separating Facts from Fiction v
Recommendations for Improving Foreclosure Mediation Programs vi
Foreclosure Mediations Are Not a Substitute for Effective Federal Legislation
to Require Loan Modifications vii
Introduction 1
Variation in Foreclosure Mediation Programs and Authority to Set Them Up 1
The Goals of Foreclosure Mediation and How They Are Being Achieved 3
Other Federal Loan Modification Efforts 6
Preserving Servicer Control at the Federal Level 6
Incentives and Standards for Modification—the Making Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) 7
Foreclosure Mediation Programs Have the Potential to Enable the Making
Home Affordable Modification Program to Succeed 10
Bringing Standards to Foreclosure Mediation—Successes and Failures
in Recent State Legislation 11
Evaluation and Recommendations for Improving Foreclosure
Mediation Programs 12
Views from Advocates 12
The Existing Foreclosure Mediation Programs Lack Standards for
Servicer Accountability 13
Recommendations: Five Necessary Servicer Obligations 14
Recommendations: Enforcing Compliance With Servicer Obligations 20
Recommendations: Improving Homeowner Participation and Procedural
Aspects of Programs 24
Conclusion 29
Appendix: Constitutional Issues Related to State Foreclosure Mediation Laws 31
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Promise of Foreclosure
Mediation Programs
In the ongoing struggle to control the ravages of
the foreclosure crisis, mediation programs have
emerged as an increasingly attractive option.
Many consumer advocates and community
groups have supported the implementation of
foreclosure mediation programs and continue to
do so. In a little over a year, from mid-2008 to
mid-2009, more than 25 distinct foreclosure mediation
programs were launched in fourteen different
states. State legislatures, state supreme
courts, and local courts all played roles in creating
these programs.
Foreclosure mediations hold out the hope of
removing major obstacles that have hindered efforts
to slow the spread of the foreclosure epidemic.
In particular, the securitization of
mortgage debt has erected significant barriers between
homeowners and the owners of their mortgages.
When homeowners want to negotiate over
a loan modification or other alternative to foreclosure,
they often cannot find a person authorized
to negotiate with them. With homeowners
cut off from effective negotiations, foreclosures
move ahead and losses to investors mount with
each completed foreclosure. Today, the rate at
which loans are being modified remains extremely
low in relation to the high numbers of
ongoing foreclosures
Separating Facts from Fiction
In preparing this report we interviewed legal ser -
vices attorneys, court officials, and other advocates
who have been working directly with the 25
foreclosure mediation programs we considered.
Our review raised concerns about the kind of expectations
that these programs may be encouraging.
For example, there is as yet no data to
confirm that foreclosure mediation programs
anywhere have led to a substantial number of affordable
and sustainable loan modifications.
Such data would be very helpful in building support
for more mediation programs. However,
thus far this information is uniformly lacking.
Foreclosure mediation programs have the potential
to play an important role in preventing
needless loss of homes. However, we found that
the existing programs routinely fail to impose
significant obligations on mortgage servicers.
Without the imposition of these obligations, it is
unlikely that mediations will lead to fewer foreclosures.
The programs we considered often lack
mandatory rules and fail to impose sanctions for
non compliance with what minimal rules exist.
The programs do not require servicers to provide
information substantiating a right to foreclose.
They do not mandate analyses of loan modification
alternatives. Many set unreasonable procedural
barriers that restrict large numbers of
homeowners from participating.
Ultimately, under most of the existing foreclosure
mediation programs servicer discretion prevails.
If the programs continue to demand little
or no accountability from servicers, they will
likely go the way of other efforts to control foreclosures
that relied on voluntary compliance by
the lending industry. They will become another
piece of imagery the industry uses to support its
claims that voluntary efforts work, that statutory
and other government mandates for loan modifications
are unnecessary, and that jargon about
the benefits of communication can solve the
foreclosure crisis.
v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Servicer Discretion in Foreclosure
Mediation and Other Efforts to Control
Foreclosures through Voluntary Efforts
by Servicers
The popularity of foreclosure mediation programs
is built upon some major assumptions.
The arguments in support of the programs tend
to portray the lack of movement on loan modifications
primarily as a “communication” problem.
The assumption seems to be that servicers
want to modify loans, they want to make payment
terms more affordable for homeowners,
and they want to avoid foreclosures on a large
scale. According to this view, the problem has
been that homeowners simply have not been able
to find the right people to talk with and the right
setting for a talk.
While homeowners have definitely encountered
barriers in trying to communicate with
their mortgage holders, these barriers have
clearly not been the only impediment to more
loan modifications. To begin with, there is the
undeniable track record of the lending industry
over the past two years. Since the beginning of
the foreclosure crisis the industry has tried systematically
to defeat and evade every enforceable
obligation related to implementation of loan
modifications that anyone has attempted to impose
upon it. The industry has consistently fought
to preserve servicers’ discretion to refuse loan
modifications whenever they wished to do so.
Foreclosure mediation programs must be
viewed in the context of other federal and state
actions that were intended to encourage affordable
loan modifications. Early initiatives at the
federal level stressed cooperative efforts among
servicers and federal agencies. These programs
invariably allowed servicers to exercise complete
discretion in deciding whether to modify a particular
loan. As a result, very few loans were modified
under these programs. At the same time, the
industry opposed efforts to make loan modifications
mandatory. Earlier this year the mortgage
lending industry succeeded in a well-financed
campaign to defeat legislation that would have
required loan modifications in bankruptcy without
servicers’ consent.
With the industry’s encouragement, crucial elements
of accountability have been omitted from
the Treasury Department’s Home Affordable
Modification Program (“HAMP”). Now, over six
months after its inception, this new federal initiative
serves only a small percentage of eligible
homeowners. At the state level the lending and
servicing industries have opposed efforts to
strengthen mediation programs by requiring
that servicers document their loan modification
calculations.
Today most servicers operate under a duty to
comply with federal guidelines requiring that
they perform a loan modification review before a
foreclosure sale. HAMP and similar government
sponsored initiatives impose loan modification
obligations upon servicers responsible for more
than 80% of all home loans. Mediation programs
can play a vital role in ensuring that servicers comply
with these federal obligations. The data released
so far on servicers’ compliance with HAMP
guidelines reveals a pressing need for more oversight.
Mediation programs should play an important
role in this review. However, as most foreclosure
mediation programs are structured today,
few are capable of performing this role. Substantial
changes are needed before they will be effective.
Recommendations for Improving
Foreclosure Mediation Programs
Imposing Necessary Servicer Obligations
Court-supervised mediation programs will benefit
homeowners only if they impose meaningful
obligations on servicers. This report reviews a
number of these obligations and recommends
that programs impose the following requirements
on all servicers:
1. Require that the servicer give the homeowner a
document showing its affordable loan modification
calculation and net present value
calculation.
vi STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
2. Require that the servicer produce specified
documents, such as a pooling and servicing
agreement, loan origination documents, an
appraisal, and loan payment history.
3. Require that servicers comply with all mediation
obligations in good faith—negotiate in
good faith and be subject to sanctions for the
failure to do so.
4. Require that servicers establish proof of the
mortgage holder’s standing and status as the
real party in interest.
5. Require that the servicer document that it has
considered specific alternatives to foreclosure,
such as loan modifications, applications
for state and federal financial assistance
programs, workout agreements, short
sales, etc.
Enforcing Servicer Obligations
In addition, programs should document and enforce
compliance with these obligations by:
1. Not permitting a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure
to proceed unless a mediator or court
has certified the servicer’s compliance with the
five basic requirements set forth above;
2. Requiring documentation of all outcomes, including
the nature of loan modifications arrived
at through mediation.
Increasing Homeowner Participation
and Improving the Process
Assuming that there are meaningful servicer obligations
in place, then it becomes appropriate to
consider how to structure a program so that it
will bring in as many homeowners as possible.
The final part of this report reviews procedural
and structural options for increasing participation
in programs. The report recommends several devices
that can lead to effective participation by
the greatest number of homeowners. These recommendations
include:
1. Establish procedures for automatic participation
by homeowners subject to foreclosure
proceedings;
2. If participation is not automatic, allow requests
for mediation to be made up to the
time of a foreclosure sale;
3. Stay all foreclosure proceedings until a mediator
or court determines that the servicer has
complied in good faith with all participation
obligations;
4. Provide for direct court supervision over the
enforcement of servicer obligations to mediate,
including the imposition of sanctions
when necessary. Sanctions must include dismissal
of judicial foreclosure actions and orders
barring non-judicial proceedings;
5. Provide funding for outreach, housing counselors,
and qualified counsel for homeowners;
6. Prohibit the servicer from shifting to the
homeowner its attorney’s fees or other costs of
participating in the mediation process;
7. Require junior lienholders to be notified of
and allowed to participate in mediations.
State Authority
States clearly have the authority to impose the
servicer obligations and procedural requirements
outlined above. Implementing a program with
these features is well within the scope of the
states’ police power, particularly during a period
of economic crisis. Based on this report’s analysis
of constitutional issues, it is apparent that the
states have been vastly under-using their authority
to act in this area.
Foreclosure Mediations Are Not
a Substitute for Effective Federal
Legislation to Require Loan
Modifications
Finally we conclude that it would be a mistake to
pass up any opportunity to regulate servicers and
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS vii
lenders at the federal level based on a belief that
states will somehow deal effectively with the
problem of servicers’ who fail to implement sustainable
loan modifications. This is particularly
true with respect to ensuring that servicers comply
with their obligations under HAMP and similar
federal programs. Congress and federal agencies
have the primary responsibility for creating and
enforcing strong standards for these federal programs.
Servicers have already demonstrated their
ability to exert substantial control over state
mediation programs. At best, well structured
state mediation programs can play a limited role
as a check on servicers’ compliance with federal
standards. However, if there are no mandatory
federal standards requiring truly affordable loan
modifications, it is unlikely that state and local
governments will create effective enforcement
tools. Federal policy makers should not look to
states, and particularly to state and local mediation
programs, as a substitute for strong federal
mandates.
viii STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Introduction
As the foreclosure crisis deepened over the past
eighteen months and counter measures at the
federal level proved ineffective, state and local
governments struggled to come up with responses
of their own. Many advocates for homeowners
urged the adoption of foreclosure
mediation programs as reforms that could be implemented
promptly, often with considerable
community support. As a result of these efforts
there are now at least 25 foreclosure mediation
programs in operation in fourteen states around
the country. Programs requiring mediations or
conferences before foreclosure sales are underway
in several states with the most severe levels of
foreclosure, including California, Florida, Nevada,
Michigan, and Ohio.
Foreclosure mediation programs are still a relatively
new phenomenon. The oldest programs
have been in effect for just over one year. Meanwhile,
the implementation of new programs has
been accelerating. During the month of July 2009
alone, new statewide foreclosure mediation programs
began to operate in five states. At the local
level during the same month new programs went
into effect in states ranging from Pennsylvania to
New Mexico.
Variation in Foreclosure Mediation
Programs and Authority to Set Them Up
Foreclosure mediation programs have come in
many forms. They have appeared in both judicial
and non-judicial foreclosure states. In some programs
courts refer residential foreclosures to the
court’s existing alternative dispute resolution
system where parties follow established mediation
protocols. Other programs provide a special
court-supervised settlement conference for parties
to a foreclosure. Some programs do not involve
formal mediation or mediators at all. Instead, they
merely direct mortgage servicers to contact
homeowners to discuss settlement options before
the servicers proceed with foreclosures.
In states with primarily non judicial foreclosures
there are invariably judicial foreclosure
statutes still on the books. Although not frequently
used, these judicial foreclosure statutes
can create the basis for a court role in supervising
mediations in non judicial foreclosure states. For
example, mediation statutes may refer non judicial
foreclosures to the state judiciary’s alternative
dispute resolution system or provide for referral of
disputes arising during mediation to the courts.
Nevada and Michigan are non judicial foreclosure
states that recently implemented conference
or mediation legislation that provide for judicial
involvement under certain circumstances in foreclosures
that otherwise would proceed without
court involvement.
Programs Reviewed in this Report
For purposes of this report we will use the term
“mediation” very loosely to mean any program
that requires a mortgage holder or servicer to have
some contact with a homeowner for the purpose
of considering alternatives to foreclosure before
1
STATE AND LOCAL
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION
PROGRAMS
Can They Save Homes?
September 2009
proceeding to a foreclosure sale. The programs
themselves may use various terms to describe
these procedures, including mediation, foreclosure
diversion, conferences, or simply “meetings.”
They may or may not require personal
appearances by borrowers or lenders in one place
at the same time. Under certain programs a conference
can take place between a homeowner and
a servicer without third party oversight.
We have attempted to review program operations
and have conducted personal interviews
with individuals involved in all existing foreclosure
mediation programs. The 25 state and local
programs we reviewed are listed on pages 4 and 5.
An Appendix released simultaneously with this
report provides a detailed analysis of each of the
programs. We may have omitted some local programs.
For example, in Ohio there are a number
of smaller county programs that have adopted
variations on a state model foreclosure mediation
protocol. We have not included all of the
Ohio counties, focusing instead on four counties
with well established programs. We also do not
include programs in which the servicer’s participation
is voluntary. Thus, we do not include programs
in which both the servicer and the
homeowner may elect to opt out entirely. Finally,
there are new programs in development in a
number of localities, including in Pennsylvania,
and we do not yet have the final details on these
programs.
The authority to set up foreclosure mediation
programs has come from three basic sources.
First, state statutes have created many programs.
These include the programs now underway in
California, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New
York, and Oregon. Second, state supreme courts
have taken the lead in developing programs in
2 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
JUDICIAL AND NON JUDICIAL FORECLOSURES
The states are fairly evenly divided in whether they
require mortgage holders to go through a formal judicial
proceeding in order to foreclose against a
home. About half the states allow lenders to conduct
a foreclosure without direct court supervision.
These non-judicial foreclosures are called by various
names, including foreclosure by “power of sale” or
“foreclosure by advertisement.” In non judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions a state statute typically sets out
the procedures a lender must follow to conduct an
auction sale that leads to transfer of the property to
a high bidder. Because a lender does not initiate a
court proceeding to start a non judicial foreclosure,
the homeowner must file a lawsuit for an injunction
to stop the sale. Absent such a lawsuit by the homeowner,
the courts do not supervise non judicial foreclosures.
By contrast, a judicial foreclosure proceeds
as a civil lawsuit through the court system, with the
court entering a judgment for foreclosure, ordering
a sale, and typically reviewing a report of the sale.
In the following states judicial foreclosures are
the predominant method of foreclosure.
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Vermont, Wisconsin
In the following states non judicial foreclosures
are the typical method of foreclosure.
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona,
California, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming
In a few states, there is a mixed procedure that
combines elements of both:
Oklahoma, North Carolina, South Dakota
two states, New Jersey and Ohio. Finally, local
courts have acted on their own to create programs
in various localities in Pennsylvania, Florida,
Kentucky and New Mexico. In the latter type of
program the local courts act under a general
state statute on the judiciary or a state supreme
court rule that delegates substantial authority to
local courts to manage cases as they see fit.1
The Goals of Foreclosure Mediation
and How They Are Being Achieved
It is not surprising that foreclosure mediation
programs have been an attractive option at the
state and local level. Policymakers have emphasized
the need to modify mortgage loans as a way
to reduce the number of foreclosures, particularly
where loan balances exceed the current market
value of homes.2 Given the realities of today’s real
estate market, investors lose substantial value with
every foreclosure. For example, a national survey
of mortgages in foreclosure during November
2008 indicated that lenders were incurring losses
averaging $124,000 in each foreclosure.3 With the
loans in foreclosure having an average value of
$212,000, this meant that the lenders were losing
57% of their investment each time they completed
a foreclosure. Average losses on second mortgages
subject to foreclosures were nearly 100%.4
A June 2009 update of the same study found
that investors’ losses from foreclosures of first
mortgages had risen even higher, to 64.65% of
the value of the loans.5 At the same time servicers
were rarely modifying loans to make payments
more affordable to homeowners. According to
the same survey, in the relatively few instances
when servicers agreed to write off a portion of
loan principal in order to make payments more
affordable, the servicers wrote off amounts averaging
only $14,353. The loss severities from these
loan modifications averaged just 6.4% of the original
loan amounts. In the overwhelming majority
of cases lenders did not modify loans at all. They
pursued foreclosures instead, incurring average
losses of $143,987, or nearly two thirds of the
value of their investments.6 It would thus appear
obvious that if the homeowner and lender could
negotiate an affordable and sustainable loan
modification in place of a foreclosure, all parties
would almost always be better off.
The potential for incurring these overwhelming
losses would appear to give servicers and
homeowners much to talk about. Mediation programs
typically require the servicer’s attorney to
appear by phone or in person together with a representative
of the current holder of the mortgage.
The representative must have authority to modify
the loan. To the extent that mediations can facilitate
this direct communication, cutting
through the barriers created by securitization
and loan servicing bureaucracies, they should
perform a valuable service.
Because they have such great potential to promote
rational conduct as an alternative to massive
destruction of value, foreclosure mediation
programs have appeared as one of the few
bright spots in the otherwise gloomy media coverage
of the foreclosure crisis. The launching of
some programs has been accompanied by optimistic
forecasts of thousands of homes to be
saved. For example, in announcing the implementation
of the New Jersey foreclosure mediation
program in January 2009 the state Attorney
General’s office indicated that “planners anticipate
as many as 16,600 homeowners will participate
in the foreclosure mediation program this
year.”7 As will be discussed later in this report,
this estimate turned out to be wildly optimistic.
8 After Nevada’s assembly passed the
state’s foreclosure mediation bill by a 41–0 vote
in May 2009, the assembly speaker announced
that the law could keep 17,700 families from
losing their homes to foreclosure.9
Lack of Reporting and Evidence of Results
The growing popularity of foreclosure mediation
programs cannot be disputed. Yet, despite this
popularity, one fact is common to all the programs.
Although the goal of these programs has
been to produce long term settlements that will
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 3
4 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
SUMMARY OF 25 FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
California
Authority: Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2923.5
Structure: Unsupervised conference between servicer
and homeowner before filing notice of default in
non judicial foreclosure.
Eligibility: Servicer must attempt to initiate
conference in all residential foreclosures
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Connecticut
Authority: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-265ee
Structure: Court sponsored mediation in judicial
foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner must file appearance after
receiving summons and complaint
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Florida 1st, 11th, and 19th Judicial Circuits
Authority: Administrative orders by circuit chief
judges
Structure: Judicial foreclosures: formal mediations
managed by private non profit: Collins Center
Eligibility: Automatic referral of residential
foreclosures to mediation
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Florida 9th Judicial Circuit
Authority: Administrative order by circuit chief judge
Structure: Judicial foreclosure, servicer must schedule
formal mediation with certified mediator
Eligibility: Automatic unless servicer asserts
exemption
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Florida 12th Judicial Circuit
Authority: Administrative order by circuit chief judge.
Structure: Servicer to attempt phone conference with
homeowner
Eligibility: Automatic, homeowner need not formally
request.
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: none
Florida 18th Judicial Circuit
Authority: Administrative order by circuit chief judge
Structure: Formal mediation with court or parties
choosing mediatior
Eligibility: Residential foreclosures referred
automatically to mediation
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: none
Indiana
Authority: Senate Enrolled Act 492 effective July 1, 2009
Structure: Homeowner may ask to participate in
conference with servicer after served with
summons and complaint in judicial foreclosure.
Mediator optional, not required
Eligibility: Homeowner must notify court of intention
to request conference.
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Kentucky (Jefferson County—Louisville)
Authority: Local court’s general ADR authority
Structure: Notice of settlement conference with court
issued with each judicial foreclosure
Eligibility: Applies automatically to residential
foreclosures
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Maine
Authority: 14 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6321-A
Structure: Court sponsored mediations in judicial
foreclosure
Eligibility: Case referred to mediation upon
homeowner’s request
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: Mediations must
use FDIC loan modification calculation
Michigan
Authority: Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 3205, 3205a-3205e
Structure: Opportunity for homeowner to engage in
unmediated conference with servicer
Eligibility: Borrower can request conference and have
90 day pre foreclosure negotiation period before
non judicial foreclosure can begin
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: Servicer must
provide a loan modification calculation but does
not include net present value analysis
Nevada
Authority: Assembly Bill 149 effective July 1, 2009
Structure: referral of non judicial foreclosures to
court supervised mediation
Eligibility: Homeowner must elect participation
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: Servicer must provide
mediator with “evaluative methodology” used
to determine eligibility for loan modification.
New Jersey
Authority Program of New Jersey Judiciary Jan. 2009
Structure: Court supervised mediation in judicial
foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner must make timely election to
participate
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 5
SUMMARY OF 25 FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS (continued)
New Mexico
Authority: Administrative order of county court
Structure: Formal mediation of judicial foreclosures
administered as part of court’s ADR system
Eligibility: Homeowner must return a request for
mediation form
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
New York
Authority: N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3408
Structure: Mandatory court supervised settlement
conferences in judicial foreclosures
Eligibility: Applicable automatically to foreclosures
involving “high cost,” subprime, and
“non-traditional” loans.
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Ohio—Cuyahoga County (Cleveland)
Authority: County program adopted under state
supreme court guidelines
Structure: Formal ADR type mediation in judicial
foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner must request mediation and
court must approve request
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Ohio—Franklin County (Columbus)
Authority: County program adopted under state
supreme court guidelines
Structure: Court and county organize mediations
with certified mediators
Eligibility: Homeowner must request during limited
time frame
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Ohio—Lucas County (Toledo)
Authority: County program adopted under state
supreme court guidelines
Structure: Magistrate and court supervised
mediation in judicial foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner may request mediation after
receiving summons and complaint
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Ohio—Summit County (Akron)
Authority: County program adopted under state
supreme court guidelines
Structure: Court reviews, refers for ADR process
supervised by magistrate
Eligibility: Applicable to cases with answers filed
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Oregon
Authority: Senate Bill 628 effective July 1, 2009
Structure: Homeowner may have unsupervised
meeting with lender representative to discuss loan
modification
Eligibility: Homeowner must make timely request for
meeting
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Pennsylvania—Allegheny County
Authority: Administrative order of local court acting
under state statute authorizing local courts to
make administrative rules
Structure: Court supervised conciliation conferences
in judicial foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner must make timely request for
conference
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Pennsylvania—Bucks County
Authority: Administrative order of local court acting
under state statute authorizing local courts to
make administrative rules
Structure: Conciliation conferences before court
appointed mediators
Eligibility: Homeowner must make timely request to
for conference
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Pennsylvania—Northampton County
Authority: Local court acting under state law
authorizing local courts to make administrative
rules
Structure: Court supervised conciliation conferences
Eligibility: Case management order set automatically,
homeowner must certify met with housing
counselor
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Pennsylvania—Philadelphia County
Authority: Administrative order of local court acting
under state statute authorizing local courts to
make administrative rules
Structure: Court supervised conciliation conferences
in judicial foreclosures
Eligibility: Residential properties automatically
scheduled for conciliation conference
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
preserve homeownership for households facing
foreclosures, there is no concrete evidence showing
that any of these programs is truly achieving
this goal. Regardless of their location and structure,
none of the 25 existing foreclosure mediation
programs has offered any concrete data on the nature
of the outcomes it has achieved.
We do not know, for example, whether foreclosure
mediation programs bring about more loan
modifications than would occur in a given locality
if the program did not exist. We also know nothing
about the quality of loan modifications that
come about through these programs. In most localities
officials do not keep any data on outcomes.
Programs that release data on outcomes
do so only under the vaguest categories, typically
designed to place the programs in a favorable light.
Data on the manner in which a loan has been
modified is particularly important in assessing
the success of any foreclosure prevention effort.
The tendency of many loan modifications to increase
the homeowner’s monthly payment has been
well documented. In 2008, 58% of loan modifications
nationally either increased monthly payments
or left them unchanged.10 Modifications
that capitalize arrearages and raise payments redefault
quickly. For example, according to the
2008 data, about half the modified loans that
raised payments or kept payments the same redefaulted
within nine months of modification.11
More recent surveys of modified loans on a national
basis show payment reductions occurring
more frequently, while principal write-offs have
been almost non existent and declining overall as
a form of modification.12 We do not know how
modifications achieved through mediation programs
compare with these general national trends.
This lack of data raises a number of questions
about the role foreclosure mediation programs
are playing in the current crisis. Is the hope the
public has placed in them justified? Do they significantly
alter the balance of power that typically
allows servicers to dictate the manner in which a
foreclosure is resolved? Are the programs a distraction
from facing the need for substantive
changes to laws that might be truly effective in
leveling the playing field and creating sustainable
alternatives to foreclosure?
This report will address these questions, and
others. We will look first at mediation programs
in the larger context, considering features they
have in common with plans developed at the national
level to prevent foreclosures by encouraging
loan modifications. We will then look at state
and local foreclosure mediation programs to see
whether these initiatives are likely to bring about
results that are fundamentally different from
what has occurred so far as a result of the federal
efforts. To the extent there are weaknesses in existing
foreclosure mediation programs, the report
will consider how they can be strengthened
in order to play a more effective role in preserving
homeownership.
Other Federal Loan
Modification Efforts
Foreclosure mediation programs have not been
the only effort undertaken to encourage loan
modifications as an alternative to foreclosure. A
number of initiatives at the federal level were
launched with a similar objective.
Preserving servicer control at
the federal level
Voluntary Modification and
Refinancing—Hope Now and
Hope for Homeowners
Over the past two years policymakers at the federal
level promoted several programs designed to
control the rising tide of home foreclosures. For
the most part these efforts stressed voluntary cooperation
from loan servicers. The hope was that
servicers and investors would recognize their
own interests in choosing alternatives to value
destroying foreclosures. Instead, they would
make less costly loan modifications.
6 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Two highly publicized initiatives along these
lines were the HOPE NOW and Hope for Homeowners
programs. A provision to require loan
mod ifications regardless of servicers’ consent
appeared in proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code.
HOPE NOW. In late 2007, the Treasury Department
and HUD announced “HOPE NOW,” a voluntary
industry plan to modify home mortgages.
Applicable only to a small portion of subprime
borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages who
were current in their loan payments, the program
allowed servicers discretion to eliminate borrowers
even though they otherwise fit the narrow criteria.
Despite promises of millions of workouts,
the program failed. 13
Hope for Homeowners. In July 2008 Congress
created the “Hope for Homeowners” program,
intended to allow large number of homeowners
to refinance into FHA conforming fixed rate
loans. Publicity surrounding the implementation
of the program announced that it would save
400,000 homes14 Again, the program relied upon
voluntary efforts by servicers to assist homeowners
in making applications. In the first half year
of its operation a total of 373 applications were
processed and 13 approved.15
Modification of Home Loans in Bankruptcy. The
mortgage lending industry ran a well-financed
campaign to defeat legislation which would have
allowed bankruptcy courts to modify home mortgages
without mortgage holders’ consent.16 The
industry pursued this anti-modification agenda
despite the views of many prominent economists,
academics, and bankruptcy experts who argued
persuasively that widespread modifications imposed
through the courts were the only measures
likely to slow down the loss of homes in the foreclosure
crisis. Proponents of the legislation made
numerous concessions to the servicing industry
in the course of the legislative process. Yet, the industry
opposition persisted, leading to defeat of
the measure on April 30, 2009.
Incentives and Standards for
Modification—the Making Home
Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP)
The Adoption of the HAMP Program
In February 2009, the Obama Administration announced
its own plan to encourage loan modifications.
17 The Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) consists of Treasury Department
guidelines designed to encourage loan
modifications on a large scale. The program allocated
$75 billion in financial incentives for servicers,
investors, and borrowers who modify
loans.18 A separate program announced at the
same time, the Home Affordable Refinance Program,
focuses on incentives for refinancings into
FHA loans.19
On paper the HAMP program mandates certain
actions by participating servicers. Servicers
who have signed participation contracts with the
Treasury Department must conduct reviews for
an affordable loan modification for qualifying
homeowners who are in foreclosure or at imminent
risk of foreclosure.20 Significantly, if the review
shows that the homeowner qualifies for an
affordable loan modification under the program’s
standards, the servicer must modify the
loan terms.21 According to the Administration’s
estimates, by the end of 2012 the HAMP program
will save three to four million at risk homes from
foreclosure. Over 38 servicers, including the five
largest, are now signatories to HAMP contracts
and obligated to service loans and conduct foreclosures
in compliance with the program guidelines.
22 The GSEs and the Federal Housing
Agency (FHA) have implemented their own
streamlined loan modification programs with
guidelines similar to those of HAMP.23 The
guidelines for HAMP and the related GSE
programs now apply to more than 80 percent of
the home mortgages in the country.
How HAMP Is Supposed to Work
At the heart of the HAMP program is a requirement
that servicers conduct a formal “net
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 7
present value” calculation for each loan in
foreclosure to determine whether a loan modification
is required. The outcome of this net present
value test tells the servicer whether an
affordable loan modification will better serve the
mortgage holders’ financial interests than a foreclosure.
24 The securitization industry has favored
the use of these net present value models as a
means to arrive at the most informed decisions
on how to maximize recoveries for investors in
mortgage-backed securities.25 In early 2008 the
FDIC announced a model net present value program
and spreadsheet for use in the review of
loan modifications for IndyMac loans that it held
in receivership.26 This FDIC model serves as the
prototype for others, including, with certain
modifications, the net present value analysis required
under the HAMP program.
Under the HAMP guidelines participating servicers
must evaluate all borrowers in their portfolio
who are more than 60 days in default to see if
they are eligible for an affordable loan modification.
29 Servicers must also screen borrowers who
are current or less than 60 days delinquent if they
inquire about a modification and appear to be at
risk for imminent default.30 The guidelines further
require that a foreclosure sale be stayed
pending review for a loan modification. The stay
of sale must continue during the three-month
trial payment period before final confirmation of
a HAMP modification.31
A HAMP servicer may properly deny an affordable
modification only in specific circumstances
defined in the guidelines.32 For example, properties
that are not occupied as the owner’s principal residence
may be excluded. The property must be a
single family (1-4 units) property with a maximum
unpaid principal balance on the first mortgage of
8 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
THE HAMP “NET PRESENT VALUE” CALCULATION
The HAMP loan modification analysis uses a calculation
made up of two distinct parts.27 The first part
of the analysis runs data through a sequence of loan
modification options to arrive at a new affordable
monthly payment for the borrower. As applied in sequence,
these options include the capitalization of
arrears, an interest rate reduction in steps to as low
as 2%, extension of the loan repayment term, and
then forbearance of a portion of the outstanding
principal.28 Each option is applied in sequence until a
monthly payment for principal, interest, taxes and insurance
is reached that takes up no more than 31% of
the household’s current gross monthly income.
After the program has modified the loan terms as
needed to arrive at an affordable monthly payment,
it produces a dollar figure that tells the servicer the
“net present value” to investors of the loan as modified.
The net present value of the modified loan is
figured using a percentage discount. This discount
factors in the delay in receipt of the reduced scheduled
payments under the modified loan. It also takes
into account the possibility of a cure by the borrower
and the likelihood and cost of a re-default.
Once it has come up with a figure for the net
present value of the modified loan, the HAMP calculation
then compares this value with the estimated
recovery the investors will obtain if a foreclosure is
completed. In calculating the value to be received
from a completed foreclosure, the model takes into
account the current market value of the property
and typical foreclosure losses, including the cost of
delays in re-sale, the distressed REO value, and foreclosure
costs.
After completing all entries on the net present
value calculation, the servicer has two figures to
compare: the estimated loss investors will incur from
the loan modification and the estimated loss investors
will incur from a completed foreclosure. The servicer,
acting on behalf of investors, must choose the option
producing the smaller loss. The calculation format
allows for quick, streamlined analysis of the data
needed to make this decision. From the homeowner it
requires the input of limited information, primarily recent
income figures. From the servicer it requires some
readily available servicer-specific and industry-wide
data on costs and losses associated with loan modifications
and foreclosures. The calculation also factors
in data on the current market value for the property.
less than $729,750. The loan must have been
originated on or before January 1, 2009. Before
consideration for a loan modification the homeowner’s
payments toward the first mortgage
must be more than 31 percent of the homeowner’s
gross monthly income. A modification
for an eligible homeowner may not be required if
the terms of a controlling pooling and servicing
agreement between a servicer and an investment
trust prohibit the modification. However, in
order to claim this exception, the servicer must
first negotiate “to remove those obstacles” created
by the pooling and servicing agreement.33
If a foreclosure involves an eligible homeowner,
participating servicers must follow the
Treasury Department’s HAMP guidelines, including
completion of an approved net present
value calculation. Servicers must implement the
outcome of the net present value test. If the foreclosure
will produce a greater loss to investors
than the affordable loan modification, the
HAMP contract and guidelines require that the
servicer modify the loan.
Congress has specifically approved the use of
these types of net present value loan modification
models as the industry standard for residential
mortgage servicing. Section 129 of the
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009
provides that servicers comply with their duty to
investors by selection of the most reasonable option
shown under the HAMP or similar net present
value test.34
HAMP Implementation Problems and
Lack of Oversight
Neither the Treasury Department nor its agents
charged with implementing HAMP (Freddie Mae
and Freddie Mac) have provided adequate supervision
of servicers. Yet, it is servicers who play the
key role in admitting homeowners into the
HAMP program.35 During the first months of its
operation the HAMP program has been plagued
by persistent problems. The Treasury’s press releases
indicate that as of the end of July 2009
only 9% of the homeowners eligible for reductions
in payments under the HAMP program had
begun trial modifications.36 Although intended
to meet a pressing economic emergency, the full
implementation of the program has been delayed
by ongoing negotiations with servicer representatives.
Servicers have demanded that the program
include features that will ensure their control
over significant aspects of the loan modification
process. From the homeowners’ perspective the
primary benefit of the program appeared to be
that it obligated servicers to follow an objective
and transparent standard in evaluating a homeowner’s
eligibility for an affordable loan modification.
Unfortunately, servicers have thus far
succeeded in delaying the implementation of any
clear and verifiable standards. Others abuses have
been common.37
Many aspects of HAMP’s implementation
have been chaotic. Individuals who are eligible
for the program’s benefits because their servicer
signed a HAMP contract may not receive any formal
notice of this fact. Homeowners are not informed
of how they can be considered for a
modification. HAMP has no clear application
rules, and as yet there is no structure for effective
review of eligibility decisions. Government officials
have thus far acceded to major servicers’ demands
that their net present value calculations
be kept secret as “proprietary” information.
“Rules,” as the term is generally understood in
the context of federal agency law and government
benefit programs essentially do not exist
for the HAMP program.
Whether through design or as a result of bureaucratic
inertia, servicers’ practices have led to
widespread evasion of their obligations under
HAMP contracts.38 These practices have included:
Soliciting eligible homeowners to waive their
right to be considered for a loan modification
under the HAMP guidelines;
Offering homeowners loan modifications that
do not comply with the HAMP affordability
guidelines, including modifications with unaffordable
payments, impermissibly high interest
rates, and modifications for short time
periods not authorized by the guidelines;
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 9
Falsely informing eligible homeowners that
the servicer does not participate in the HAMP
program;
Proceeding with sales and commencing foreclosure
actions while delaying decisions on requests
for a loan modification;
Charging fees to consider or implement loan
modifications despite HAMP guidelines prohibiting
such charges;
Refusing to inform homeowners of the
grounds for denial of a HAMP modification,
including refusal to disclose how a payment
level was calculated, what NPV test was performed,
and failing to provide any documentation
related to denial or approval decision;
Altering terms of trial modifications when it is
time to implement the permanent modification;
Adding improper late fees and other post-default
fees;
Demanding excessive documents from homeowners
beyond what HAMP requires, and
denying modifications for lack of documentation;
Denying any review or appeal from denial decisions,
and failure to inform the homeowner of
decisions;
Extensive delays in deciding modification requests
or requiring homeowners to sign documents
on short notice without a chance for
review;
Failing to coordinate modification negotiations
with second lienholders.
Servicer practices like these have been endemic
since the announcement of the HAMP program.
If allowed to continue unchecked they may fatally
undermine HAMP’s most promising elements.
These servicer practices pose a significant
risk that HAMP will go the way of the other federal
efforts that depended upon servicers’ voluntary
efforts to control foreclosures.
Foreclosure Mediation Programs
Have the Potential to Enable the
Making Home Affordable
Modification Program to Succeed
Foreclosure mediation programs at the state and
local level can play a critical role in ensuring that
the HAMP program does not fail. So far the federal
government appears to be content with
glossing over the program’s chaotic implementation.
This chaos benefits servicers. The servicers’
goals are simple: they want to move foreclosures
as quickly as possible to sale, just as they always
have done. Confused homeowners and lack of
oversight are what servicers need to keep the current
pace of foreclosures going.
Servicers’ business models and staffing decisions
favor quick foreclosures over the labor intensive
and less lucrative work involved in
modifying a loan.39 The fee incentives under
which servicers are paid similarly favor foreclosures
over modifications.
An effective mediation program could identify
participating servicers and ensure that foreclosure
proceedings are stayed pending a review of
HAMP eligibility. They could require production
of net present value calculations, review data included
in them, and ensure that modifications
comply with HAMP guidelines. Mediation can
set the groundwork for a court to deny foreclosure
when a servicer violated the obligations of a
HAMP contract.40 For the overwhelming majority
of homeowners in foreclosure who are not represented
by attorneys, these checks on servicer conduct
can be critical. Finally, mediation programs
can be another resource for collection of data on
servicer practices related to the HAMP program.
On the other hand, if foreclosure mediation
programs cannot deal effectively with the blatant
errors occurring routinely in the implementation
of the HAMP program, the mediation programs
themselves will go a long way toward
demonstrating their own irrelevance. As will be
discussed in the following sections, many foreclosure
mediation programs are simply not
structured in a way that allows them to deal
10 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
effectively with uncooperative servicers. Judicial
oversight is often weak or simply non-existent.
Patterns of servicer control have fallen into place
over time. Still, in many instances the imposition
of some basic obligations on servicers and improvements
in structure of the programs could
make a difference. The next section of this report
will consider some recent legislative efforts to establish
these obligations.
Bringing Standards to
Foreclosure Mediation—
Successes and Failures in
Recent State Legislation
In July 2009 statutes creating mediation and conference
programs for foreclosures went into effect
in four states, Oregon, Michigan, Nevada,
and Maine. In each of these states the opportunity
arose during the legislative process to require that
before every foreclosure a servicer produce evidence
that it had conducted a formal analysis for
an affordable loan modification. The outcomes
of these efforts say much about the servicing industry’s
attitude toward loan modifications, the
HAMP program, and mediation systems.
As of March 2009, pending Oregon Senate Bill
628 mandated foreclosure mediations and required
that in mediations in which the homeowner
was not represented by counsel, the
mediation must produce a formal loan modification
analysis using a net present value spreadsheet,
either the FDIC spreadsheet or “a formula
that is consistent with the Making Home Affordable
guidelines issued by the United States Department
of the Treasury.”41 The Bill would have
effectively prevented a lender from using the
state’s non judicial foreclosure procedure if it
had rejected a loan modification shown to be feasible
under HAMP rules or a similar federal
guideline. Oregon’s financial lobby mounted a
vigorous campaign against this proposed legislation.
42 In the end, the industry succeeded in removing
all provisions of the Bill requiring
mediators to review loan modifications under
any objective or verifiable standards. The Bill as
enacted leaves the servicers with complete discretion
to apply any standards they wish in evaluating
a homeowner for a loan modification.43
The Michigan bill as originally passed by the
state’s House and Senate during the first half of
2009 required that the servicer produce a specific,
transparent loan modification model whenever
the parties had not arrived at a settlement. A conference
committee later amended the bill, striking
the requirement that the parties produce a
specific net present value spreadsheet in all cases.
Under the version of the bill that eventually became
law, the homeowner does not receive an assessment
of the cost of the modification
compared to the cost of a foreclosure, as the legislation
in its earlier version required.44
Nevada is another non judicial foreclosure
state that implemented a foreclosure mediation
program in 2009.45 As part of the implementation
of the new law, the State’s Supreme Court
promulgated a rule stating merely that the servicer
must “under confidential cover, provide to
the mediator the evaluative methodology used in
determining the eligibility or noneligibility of the
[homeowner] for a loan modification.” 46 It is not
clear what the term “evaluative methodology” as
used in the Rule means. The requirement for disclosure
only to the mediator is problematic, particularly
because mediation rules typically
require that all aspects of the mediation be kept
confidential. Whatever it is that the servicer must
disclose, the rule effectively keeps the homeowner
and the homeowner’s counsel from seeing it.
Unlike the three states described above, Maine
recently enacted a foreclosure mediation statute
with a provision that expressly requires documentation
of a complete loan modification
analysis prior to foreclosure.47 The Maine law
requires that parties to a mediation complete the
FDIC’s net present value spreadsheet.48
The Maine mediator’s report must show that
the parties completed the spreadsheet, and the
positive or negative result of the test must be included
in the mediator’s report. 49 The new law
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 11
also requires ongoing public reporting of data
about the program, including the number of
loans restructured in mediation, the number of
principal write-downs, and the number of interest
rate reductions.50
Only one of the four states, Maine, succeeded
in imposing a requirement that effectively checks
a servicers’ compliance with a specific federal
modification program. Whether servicers control
the Nevada procedures will depend on the courts’
and mediators’ willingness to use their power to
impose sanctions. The Michigan program provides
only partial transparency and no direct
court supervision. The Oregon law provides no
transparency and no direct court supervision.
Evaluation and Recommendations
for Improving Foreclosure
Mediation Programs
Views from Advocates
In preparing this report we interviewed attorneys
and housing counselors who have appeared with
homeowners in nearly all the foreclosure mediation
programs that were in operation as of the
end of June 2009. Participants’ observations obviously
varied from program to program. None
were in a position to estimate the number of
homes that may have been saved from foreclosure
through mediations. Housing counselors
generally found the programs more helpful than
did attorneys in the same jurisdiction. For housing
counselors the programs provided a structure
for negotiations. This structure saved time in
establishing lines of communication with servicers.
According to the counselors, some servicers
were more receptive to loan modifications
than others. From the housing counselors’ perspective
the degree to which the mediation
process affected the substantive results in a given
case was unclear.
Legal services attorneys who regularly represented
homeowners in foreclosures had mixed
views about the mediation programs. Attorneys
who were litigating substantive consumer claims
against lenders did not find the mediations particularly
helpful. Most mediation programs are
designed to focus on financial calculations for
workout agreements and loan modifications. The
programs are less well suited for the consideration
of complex consumer claims. Attorneys in
some locations found the mediations to be a
waste of time and would have preferred not to
participate in them at all.
Attorneys who found foreclosure mediation
programs helpful almost uniformly considered
their major benefit to be in giving the attorney
and the homeowner much-needed time to investigate
the facts of a client’s case. This respite led
to more informed decisions about potential legal
claims to assert.
Most foreclosure mediation programs require
servicers to designate an individual authorized to
settle a case and to have that person available for
negotiations. Attorneys and housing counselors
generally found this requirements helpful, although
enforced laxly. Many advocates reported
problems with servicers backing out of agreements
made by a person who participated in a
mediation session claiming to have authority to
negotiate on behalf of the mortgage holder. In
most mediation systems the person appearing
for the servicer could satisfy the “authorized representative”
requirement with a verbal assurance
of authority.
Advocates for homeowners reported that a
“take it or leave it” offer from a servicer satisfied
mediation requirements in most jurisdictions.
Occasionally the personal involvement of a judge
with a strong interest in the mediation program
could make a difference. In a few programs individual
judges took an active role in making servicers
produce documents such as payment
history records and loss mitigation protocols.
Judges or mediators sometimes ordered sessions
continued several times until the servicer produced
the requested documents. More often, the
programs did not routinely require servicers to
produce documents, or accepted at face value servicers’
statements that certain documents, such
12 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
as detailed payment records or loan origination
documents, were not available.
In statewide mediation programs advocates
described a significant lack of uniformity in procedures
from county to county and court to
court. In statewide programs some courts freely
tolerated token participation by lenders, while in
neighboring counties courts adhered to stricter
standards for appearances, production of documents,
and good faith participation. Here again
the personalities and interests of individual
judges seemed to play a decisive role in creating
these differences. Some judges invested enormous
time and personal energy in their court’s
program. Many other judges viewed the programs
as a docket control matter and took little
interest in their day to day functioning.
Attorneys and housing counselors working with
all programs reported mixed results in obtaining
loan modifications through mediations. Virtually
no one reported agreements to write off any loan
principal. To the extent servicers agreed to loan
modifications that reduced payments, these
modifications most often involved interest rate
reductions after capitalizing arrears, sometimes
combined with a term extension. Forbearance of
principal seldom occurred. The systems servicers
used to arrive at these loan modifications were arbitrary.
Few servicers seemed familiar with the
HAMP program guidelines. No advocates reported
seeing any net present value spreadsheets.
Few servicers provided any form of detailed explanation
for a refusal to modify a loan in a particular
way. Servicers often claimed that there
were barriers to modification under pooling and
servicing agreements. However, these servicers
did not produce the agreements, and mediation
systems were not helpful in making them do so.
The Existing Foreclosure Mediation
Programs Lack Standards for
Servicer Accountability
Based on the interviews with participants in
the 25 existing foreclosure mediation programs
and review of the procedures in use, it is clear
that most of these programs place few meaningful
obligations on servicers. Many do little to
hold servicers accountable for decisions to foreclose.
They do not require that servicers demonstrate
that they considered loan modifications
under a reasonable and objective standard. Servicers
effectively control the terms of discussion
in most programs.
In this section we will focus on five specific servicer
obligations and two basic program requirements
that can bring some accountability to a
foreclosure mediation program. We will also look
at how various existing programs are dealing
with these issues and outline measures the programs
could take to address them more effectively.
The criteria we will consider are:
1. The mediation program should require that
the servicer give the homeowner a document
showing its affordable loan modification calculation
and net present value calculation
under one of the recognized federal guidelines.
2. The mediation program should require that
the servicer produce specified documents,
such as a pooling and servicing agreement,
loan origination documents, an appraisal, and
payment history.
3. The mediation program should require that
servicers comply with all mediation obligations
in good faith—negotiate in good faith and be
subject to sanctions for the failure to do so.
4. The mediation program should require that
servicers establish proof of the mortgage
holder’s standing and status as real party in
interest.
5. The mediation program should require that
the servicer document that it has considered
specific alternatives to foreclosure, such as
loan modifications, workout agreements, short
sales, and applications for refinancings and
other forms of financial assistance available
under federal and state programs.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 13
In addition, programs should document and
enforce compliance with these obligations by:
1. Forbidding a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure
to proceed unless a mediator or court has
certified the servicer’s compliance with the five
basic requirements set forth above, and
2. Documenting all outcomes, including the nature
of loan modifications arrived at through
mediation.
Recommendations:
Five Necessary Servicer Obligations
The obligations placed on servicers need to be
clear and objective. They should not be dependent
of the predilections of an individual judge or
mediator. They should be straightforward
enough so that they can be enforced in cases in
which the homeowner has no attorney.
1. Does the Program Require That the
Servicer Give the Homeowner a
Document Showing its Affordable
Loan Modification and Net Present
Value Calculations?
The obligation to calculate a modified loan with
affordable payments and to offer the modified
loan to the homeowner now applies to about 85%
of the home mortgages in foreclosure today. As
discussed above, the HAMP program guidelines
require that participating servicers refrain from
foreclosure sales while they calculate the modified
loan for each borrower.51 After calculating
the modified loan, the servicer must determine
whether the modification passes a “net present
value” test. This test compares the estimated loss
the investors will incur from the affordable loan
modification with the estimated loss the investors
will incur from the completed foreclosure.
HAMP guidelines require that the servicer
implement the loan modification if it will be less
costly to investors than a foreclosure.
Under the terms of the HAMP contracts that
most servicers have signed with the Treasury Department,
the servicers receive financial incentives
to implement loan modifications. At the
same time the servicers are obligated to offer and
implement the loan modifications for all homeowners
who qualify under the net present value
test. An exception applies only when a contractual
agreement, a “pooling and servicing agreement,”
between the servicer and an investment
trust prohibits the modification. Although this
kind of barrier can exist, true restrictions on
modifications in pooling and servicing agreements
are fewer than many servicers have
claimed.52 The obligation to calculate the affordable
loan modification applies not only to servicers
who have signed formal HAMP contracts
with the Treasury Department; similar mandatory
loan modification requirements apply to
loans serviced for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
and for federal agencies, including the FDIC,
FHA, and the VA.
Existing foreclosure mediation programs have
had ample opportunity to adapt their rules to
take into account the obligations that most servicers
now have under the new federal loan modification
programs. The mediation programs should
be requiring that servicers show how they are fulfilling
their obligations to modify loans. Ensuring
compliance with HAMP can give a clear focus to
mediations. As discussed above, the federal entities
charged with implementing the loan modification
programs have not been providing effective oversight.
Foreclosures are taking place in violation
of federal program rules. Without additional and
strict oversight at the state and local levels where
these improper foreclosures are taking place, the
HAMP program will not fulfill its promise of preventing
millions of foreclosures.
Despite the clear need for a mediation rule requiring
that servicers show their compliance with
HAMP guidelines, surprisingly few programs
have actually implemented such a rule. Of the 25
existing foreclosure mediation programs, only
the Maine program obligates a servicer to produce
a physical copy of an affordable loan modification
calculation and net present value test.
14 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Maine’s statute requires production of a loan
modification and net present value spreadsheet
completed under the FDIC “loan mod in a box”
model. This calculation is similar to and provides
much of the same data as the requirements
under the guidelines of HAMP and other GSEs.53
Only the Maine program requires that a lender
consider a loan modification in a manner that allows
for objective review by the homeowner and a
mediator. The servicer must use the calculations,
assumptions, and forms that are established by
the FDIC and published in its program guide.54 The
mediator’s report at the conclusion of each mediation
must show that the parties completed the net
present value worksheet under the FDIC loan modification
program. If the foreclosure action is not
settled or dismissed, the report must include the
outcome of the net present value worksheet.
While the Maine program focuses on production
of the FDIC loan modification calculation,
no foreclosure mediation program specifically
mandates production of a HAMP calculation. As
described above, industry lobbyists successfully
opposed the creation of such a requirement
when it was proposed for statutes in Oregon and
Michigan. Except for Maine, servicers under all
other foreclosure mediation programs retain
complete discretion to review loan modification
requests under any standard they wish, or under
no standard at all. 55 An effective mediation program
should mandate the use of a recognized
loan modification model with a net present value
test for all cases, not just for those involving
HAMP or a related federal program. This will
focus the mediations on the considerations that
are truly relevant to the financial interests of investors
and homeowners.
2. Does the Program Require That Servicers
Produce Specified Documents, Such as
Pooling and Servicing Agreements, Loan
Origination Documents, an Appraisal,
and Loan Payment History?
An effective negotiation environment requires
that the parties have access to objective, verifiable
data on all relevant topics. Only with such information
available can there be a record of what
the parties considered and did not consider.
While many programs set out specific documentation
requirements for homeowners, few impose
similar obligations upon servicers. Homeowners
must often complete multi-page forms, sometimes
under oath, documenting their income, liabilities,
and assets, and list other alternatives for
assistance they have considered. When homeowners
do not comply with these documentation
requirements, they typically lose the right to participate
in the mediation program.
A common complaint from homeowners participating
in mediation programs is that servicers
do not produce even basic payment history
records and other basic loan documents. A typical
scenario is for the lender to wait for the borrower’s
proposal, then verbally reject it. The
servicers often assert that the homeowner cannot
“afford” a particular settlement option. Homeowners
find themselves disqualified from various
options for not meeting some undisclosed and
amorphous standard.
Many programs place no obligation on lenders
to produce relevant documents before or at a
conference. This is true for the statewide conference
programs in California, Connecticut, and
New Jersey. Similarly, the programs in the
Twelfth and Eighteenth, judicial circuits of
Florida and local programs in Kentucky, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania set no explicit guidelines requiring
lenders produce any specific documents
for conferences or sessions. The absence of these
requirements leaves homeowners without a basis
for asserting that a servicer participated in bad
faith. Servicers feel no real incentive to participate
in good faith.
Several programs take a more balanced approach,
although their requirements are far from
comprehensive. The recent administrative orders
for several judicial circuits in Florida require that
servicers bring a copy of the applicable pooling
and servicing agreement to mediation if the servicer
contends that the agreement affects its abil-
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 15
ity to implement any settlement option. A court
rule for the mediation program in Santa Fe, New
Mexico requires the servicer to complete an information
form ten days before the mediation. The
form requires a listing of loan data, including the
dates of all loan assignments, whether recorded
or not, and a statement of options for settlement
the lender will consider.
The new Indiana statute requires that the
lender bring to the settlement conference a copy
of the original note and mortgage, a payment
record substantiating the default, an itemization
of all amounts claimed due, and any other documents
the court determines are needed. The Nevada
rules for foreclosure mediations require
that the servicer provide a current appraisal. As
discussed above, the Maine and Michigan
statutes require production of documentation
related to the calculation of the homeowner’s eligibility
for a loan modification. The Maine
statute requires the disclosure of a complete net
present value analysis, while the Michigan law allows
a more general partial disclosure. The Cuyahoga
County, Ohio mediation program provides
a “lender form” for servicers to complete. This
form includes payment history and other lender
data, but allows the lender to substitute an information
form of its own.
Foreclosure mediation programs cannot depend
on a few servicers who may voluntarily disclose
necessary documents. Nor can they rely on
the occasional judge who has a penchant for enforcing
standards. Most homeowners will be appearing
for mediations without counsel of their
own. Therefore, mediation programs need to
publish clear checklists of documents that servicers
must produce. The list must include the
complete net present value spreadsheet or data
entry field, and any loan modification eligibility
calculation for a government program related to
the loan. The list must include the note and mortgage,
the complete payment history, any applicable
loss mitigation guidelines, the HUD 1 and
Truth in Lending disclosures from the original
transaction, and a current appraisal. As discussed
below, the servicer must also produce documents
establishing the standing and real party in interest
status of any foreclosing entity, as well as documentation
of the designated representative’s
authority to settle for a trust owning the underlying
obligation. There are already mediation programs
that require servicers to produce one or
more of these documents. An effective program
should mandate a comprehensive list and enforce
production of all the listed items.
3. Does the Program Require That
Servicers Negotiate in Good Faith and
Mandate Sanctions for the Failure
to Do So?
Any effective foreclosure mediation program
must apply a requirement for good faith participation
to all servicers. The consequences for not
complying with program obligations must be
meaningful. Dismissal of judicial foreclosure actions
should follow when servicers show bad
faith by not complying with program rules.
Statutes governing non-judicial foreclosures
should bar transfer of title without a mediator’s
certification of the servicer’s good faith compliance
with mediation obligations.
Requiring lenders to show good faith in foreclosure
proceedings is not a novel idea. A good
faith standard has always applied to mortgage
holders who seek to foreclose. For centuries the
courts have exercised their authority to apply a
“clean hands” standard and other equitable considerations
in determining whether a mortgage
holder could foreclose.56 Similarly, courts have
power to enforce standards for good faith participation
in settlement conferences and in any alternative
dispute resolution proceeding. Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embodies
this requirement for federal courts, and all or
most state courts have similar rules.57
Most existing foreclosure mediation programs
do not incorporate an express requirement for
good faith participation into their rules. Programs
without a good faith requirement include
those for California, Connecticut, New Jersey,
16 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
New York, and Indiana. Similarly, the local programs
in New Mexico, Kentucky, Ohio and Pennsylvania
have no such requirement. At most,
these programs provide for the possibility that a
servicer’s judicial foreclosure action may be dismissed
if the servicer fails to appear or send an
authorized representative to a mediation session.
Even upon the servicer’s failure to appear, most
programs provide only that dismissal of the foreclosure
is an option that may be considered at
that point. For example, several Florida programs,
58 the local programs for Cuyahoga and
Franklin counties of Ohio, and the programs in
Allegheny and Northampton counties in Pennsylvania
provide for optional consequences at the
court’s discretion if the servicer does not appear.
The recently implemented Maine and Nevada
foreclosure mediation programs are the only
ones that expressly impose a good faith requirement
on lenders. The Maine statute provides that
the parties and attorneys in a mediation must
“make a good faith effort to mediate all issues.”59
A Maine court may impose “appropriate sanctions”
if a party or attorney fails to attend or to
make a good faith effort to mediate all issues.
The mediator’s report to the court must indicate
whether a party failed to negotiate in good faith.
Given that the Maine statute mandates use of a
specific loan modification model and requires
that the session address reinstatement of the
mortgage, modification of the loan, and restructuring
of the debt, the statute facilitates the development
of a record that can lead to the
imposition of sanctions in appropriate cases. The
mediation record could also support the homeowner’s
equitable defense to foreclosure in an ongoing
judicial proceeding.60
The Nevada mediation statute requires that a
servicer file a certification of completion of mediation
before it may proceed with a non-judicial
foreclosure.61 The certificate must include the
mediator’s finding that the parties acted in good
faith and that the mediation was properly terminated.
Without this certification, the trustee may
not proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure sale.
The Nevada statute also provides that the mediator
must prepare and submit to the court’s mediation
administrator a petition and recommendation
for the imposition of sanctions if the lender does
not participate in the mediation in good faith.
The mediator must seek sanctions if the servicer
does not bring required documents to establish
standing, or does not have a representative authorized
to modify the loan available at all times
during a session. The Nevada statute specifically
grants the court reviewing a motion for sanctions
the authority to grant appropriate orders, “including,
without limitation, requiring a loan
modification in the manner determined proper
by the court.”
State courts act well within their authority in
imposing sanctions against servicers who obstruct
court-sponsored proceedings. Taken together,
the Maine and Nevada statutes show an
effective way to structure the imposition of sanctions.
The Maine statute defines good faith to include
compliance with the requirement to
demonstrate completion of an appropriate affordable
loan modification analysis. A servicer
that has not produced physical evidence of this
analysis will have participated in mediation in
bad faith. Under the Nevada statute, instances of
servicer bad faith in mediation must be referred
to the court for sanctions. As a sanction the court
can modify the loan in an appropriate way. This
combination of substantive standards and remedies
for enforcement can be an effective counterbalance
to servicer evasion of obligations under
HAMP and other federal modification programs.
4. Does the Program Require That Servicers
Establish Proof of the Mortgage Holder’s
Standing and Status as Real Party in
Interest?
An attractive feature of foreclosure mediation
programs has been the expectation that they will
help homeowners cut through the barriers created
by securitization of home mortgage obligations.
Mediation programs typically require that servicers
appear in person or by phone, through a
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 17
person “with authority” to negotiate a settlement.
While this requirement has a definite appeal,
in practice the obligation is often satisfied
by mere verbal assurances that an individual is
authorized to negotiate a settlement on behalf of
the owners of the obligation. Beyond these verbal
assurances, most programs require little in the
way of documentation to substantiate the claim.
As a result, complications may arise when it is
time to finalize or enforce agreements reached
through mediation. Other programs simply do
not enforce the appearance requirement at all.
Mediation programs often fail to address a
more significant issue than the question of
whether a designated person has authority to negotiate.
This is the question of whether the entity
that claims to own the obligation actually does
own it. If the entity that authorizes a representative
to negotiate on its behalf is not in fact the
owner of the obligation, the authorization is
meaningless. For many unrepresented homeowners
proceeding through mediation, issues of the
standing and real party in interest status of the
foreclosing party are never considered.
In judicial foreclosures the courts have inherent
authority to review questions of standing and
real party in interest pertaining to the parties
who appear before them. This authority clearly extends
to alternative dispute resolution and other
proceedings that take place under the courts’ supervision.
Similarly, state legislatures and state
agencies have ample authority to define who may
use the state’s non-judicial foreclosure mechanism.
Today, with multiple assignments of mortgage obligations
and multiple securitizations often related
to the same debt, the legislatures and courts
are scrutinizing the status of parties who claim
the right to enforce mortgage obligations.62 Questions
of standing often go to the court’s jurisdiction.
If the entity bringing the foreclosure does
not in fact own the obligation, the court may require
the true owner to be joined as a party.63
Without standards and requirements to establish
that the proper party is pursuing the foreclosure,
there is a risk that mediations will give the
judicial seal of approval to foreclosures against
unrepresented homeowners who have little understanding
of these issues. This is unfortunate
because mediations could serve the opposite purpose.
They could set clear requirements to establish
the standing of all parties seeking to foreclose.
A few existing mediation programs have
adopted procedures to address potential standing
questions. Under the Nevada law the beneficiary
of a deed of trust must bring to the mediation
the original or a certified copy of the deed of
trust, the mortgage note and each assignment of
the deed of trust or mortgage note.64 The Nevada
Supreme court’s rules implementing the mediation
statute set out further requirements for the
certification of loan documents and verification
of lost notes in connection with mediation.65
Two local court mediation programs have instituted
detailed requirements to show standing.
These are the programs in Santa Fe, New Mexico
and Summit County (Akron) Ohio. The Santa Fe
program rules require servicers to provide copies
of all filed and unfiled assignments in connection
with the mediation.66 A court-created Summit
County Ohio foreclosure mediation program requires
that plaintiffs file a “certificate of readiness”
with the court.67 This certificate requires
production of copies of all assignments made
since origination, with a declaration of custody
and control of the original note and mortgage
and the availability of documents for inspection
upon order of the court. All assignments and
name changes must bear a date prior to the filing
date of the complaint.
Requirements under other programs, if any
exist at all, are much more limited. Courts in
Seminole county in Florida’s Eighteenth Judicial
Circuit require lenders to file the original note
with the clerk before any hearings or else satisfy
lost note requirements under state law.68 While
the Cuyahoga County rules require the lender to
fill out a form disclosing all assignments and
explaining why any documents are missing, the
rule allows lenders to substitute forms of their
own. Under the Indiana statute the plaintiff
18 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
lender must bring to the settlement conference a
copy of the original note and mortgage.
Maine and New York recently enacted statutes
that amend their foreclosure laws to require that
pleadings or documents filed in land records
contain some general information related to the
lender’s standing to foreclose. These laws were
enacted simultaneously with the mediation statutes
in each state and apply to all foreclosures.
The New York law applicable to high cost loans,
requires that the plaintiff aver in the complaint
that it owns and holds the note and mortgage,
or has been delegated authority by the owner to
foreclose.69 The Maine statute requires that the
plaintiff commencing a foreclosure action “shall
certify proof of ownership of the mortgage and
note and produce evidence of the mortgage note,
mortgage and all assignments and endorsements
of the note and mortgage.”70 A requirement
similar to this Maine provision should
apply to all servicers in foreclosure mediation
programs. 71
5. Does the Program Require That the
Servicer Document its Consideration of
Specific Alternatives to Foreclosure,
Such as Loan Modifications, Workout
Agreements, Short Sales, and
Applications for Refinancings and Other
Forms of Financial Assistance Available
Under Federal and State Programs?
As discussed above, the HAMP program creates
obligations, not just to consider loan modifications,
but to implement them. For homeowners
who do not meet the program’s eligibility requirements
for a loan modification, the HAMP
guidelines still direct the servicer to “explore
other foreclosure prevention alternatives prior to
resuming or initiating foreclosure.”72
In addition to mandating consideration of
HAMP eligibility, mediations can set agendas.
They can require that lenders review all options
to avoid foreclosures and document that they
considered these options in each case. Under
their police power states have inherent authority
to set these requirements, particularly when
foreclosures are undermining state and local
economies.73 While states may not postpone foreclosures
arbitrarily or indefinitely, their authority
to regulate foreclosure procedures certainly encompasses
mandating serious, not token, consideration
of alternatives to foreclosure.74
Serious consideration of alternatives does not
occur when a homeowner is required to make a
proposal, which a lender can simply reject without
explanation before it proceeds with a foreclosure.
Many existing foreclosure mediation
programs operate on essentially this model. For
example, the statewide programs in New Jersey
and New York do not mandate that parties consider
specific alternatives to foreclosure. Local
court-operated programs in Ohio,75 Florida,76
Pennsylvania,77 New Mexico, and Kentucky have
no such requirement. In some programs the servicer
may be required to respond to a proposal of
the homeowner. In rare instances the servicer
must make a proposal of its own, but most program
guidelines do not mandate that the servicer’s
proposal address any specific options. The
programs fail to place the servicer’s exercise of
discretion within any objective framework.
A few foreclosure mediation statutes describe
a very general purpose for the program. For example,
the New York statute requiring settlement
conferences for cases involving high cost loans
states that the purpose of the conferences is to
consider “whether the parties can reach a mutually
agreeable resolution to help the defendant
avoid losing his or her home, and evaluating the
potential for a resolution in which payment
schedules or amounts may be modified or other
workout options may be agreed to, and for whatever
other purposes the court deems appropriate.”
78 The Indiana law states that the purpose of
conferences is to “attempt to negotiate a foreclosure
prevention agreement.” A servicer who adamantly
refuses to consider any options to avoid foreclosure
would arguably fail to comply with the spirit of
these statutes. Otherwise, these general statements
of purpose have limited usefulness.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 19
The guidelines published by the Cuyahoga
County, Ohio program state that lenders should
consider loss mitigation options listed on a form
provided by the court, but lenders are free to use
their own model forms and standards, and there is
no requirement for disclosure of how those options
were considered. The Brevard County Florida Administrative
Order provides a model foreclosure
mediation agenda. The agenda lists options that
parties may consider at a session. However, the
only requirement is that the servicer consider one
option from the list, which includes repayment
forbearance, loan modification, short sale, deed
in lieu of foreclosure, or consent to judgment.
A few foreclosure mediation programs have set
out more specific guidance for options the parties
must consider. Connecticut’s statute provides
that “[M]ediation shall . . . address all issues
of foreclosure, including, but not limited to, reinstatement
of the mortgage, assignment of law
days, assignment of sale date, restructuring of
the mortgage debt and foreclosure by decree of
sale.” Under the Florida Eighteenth Judicial Circuit
program the servicer’s representative must
be authorized to make agreements on “alternatives
to litigation, including refinancing, partial
forgiveness of debts, approving sale to third parties,
clarifying amounts owed, requirements to
reinstate or discharge the loan, requesting a deed
in lieu of foreclosure, procedures for protecting
premises and establishing mutually agreeable
date for relinquishing possession.”
The Maine statute provides more specific direction
for the conduct of foreclosure mediations.
The law mandates the use of a wellestablished
loan modification and net present
value model. In addition, according to the
statute, the mediation “must address all issues of
foreclosure, including but not limited to reinstatement
of the mortgage, modification of the
loan and restructuring of the mortgage debt.”
Coupled with the law’s express requirement for
the servicer’s participation in good faith, the
Maine law creates a basic framework for serious
consideration of issues.
State laws can go further than the Maine
statute and mandate that servicers produce documentation
of consideration of a series of options
to avoid foreclosure. The programs should
impose sanctions for failure to produce this documentation.
The documentation should show,
for example, the data the parties considered in
evaluating potential workout and forbearance
agreements and what factors were evaluated in
looking at a short sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure.
Programs can require that the servicer document
efforts to assist the homeowner through
various federal, state, and local programs designed
to assist homeowners with refinancing
and other financial assistance. An appropriate
check list would show a triage of the options
ranging from those most likely to preserve homeownership
to those that allow for minimizing
long term financial consequences for borrowers
who are not keeping their homes. Requiring that
lenders clearly document the reasonable consideration
of all loss mitigation options before they
are allowed to proceed with a foreclosure is a
valid and necessary exercise of a state’s police
power.
Recommendations: Enforcing
Compliance with Servicer Obligations
1. Does the program forbid a judicial or
non-judicial foreclosure from proceeding
unless a mediator has certified the
servicer’s compliance with the
requirements listed as 1–5, above?
A final requirement should tie together the list of
obligations discussed above. Compliance with
the servicer obligations in mediation should be a
condition to allowing a foreclosure to proceed.
This requirement can be enforced in both judicial
and non judicial foreclosure states. In judicial
foreclosures the mediation is often characterized
as a referral from the regular trial docketing system
to an alternative dispute resolution program.
This referral should not terminate until
20 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
the mediator or other presiding official certifies
that the parties have complied in good faith with
their duties under the mediation rules. Similarly,
in non judicial foreclosure states, the mediator
should be authorized to issue a certificate indicating
that the mediation has terminated with
good faith participation by the parties and compliance
with all mediation rules. The servicer
should be required to file such a certificate before
proceeding with a non judicial foreclosure sale.
A non judicial foreclosure sale conducted without
such a certification would not convey valid
title to a purchaser at the sale.
2. Does the program document outcomes,
including the nature of loan modifications
arrived at through mediation?
a. The Need for Data on Outcomes
None of the existing foreclosure mediation
programs has kept reliable and complete data on
the outcomes of participating cases. This lack of
data can be problematic for several reasons. First,
it impedes self correction. Without accurate data
on outcomes, those responsible for the programs
can not know what works and what does not
work, and make adjustments accordingly. For
example does making homeowner participation
automatic as opposed to requiring homeowners
to opt in to mediation produce
significantly more affordable loan modifications?
Does mandating that servicers produce
various documents make a difference? A number
of programs, such as those in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut, have received funds for
outreach and other aspects of their mediation
systems. If this funding is justified by verified
positive results, these outcomes should inform
decisions of other states that are considering
funding similar programs.
Foreclosure mediation programs can also play
an important role in providing a needed check
on data about servicers’ compliance with the
HAMP program. Over the coming months we
will likely see inconsistent data offered by government
officials and servicers describing how
the federal programs are being implemented,
whether they are successful, and how many
homeowners they helped. The mediation programs
will be in a unique position to provide a
further control on this data based on actual
modification results.
Deficiencies in the data about loan modifications
and other loss mitigation actions have not
been limited to foreclosure mediation programs.
For example in its recent report on foreclosure relief
actions, the Congressional Oversight Panel
reviewed the state of data on loan modifications
and found the lack of reliable information nationwide
to be “distressing.”79 In the Panel’s view,
this lack of data has been a significant barrier to
formulating sound policy responses to the foreclosure
crisis. The Congressional panel summarized
its review of existing data as follows:
The result is that no comprehensive private or government
source exists for accurately tracking loan delinquencies
and loss mitigation efforts, including
foreclosures and modifications on a complete, national
scale. No federal agency has the ability to accurately
track delinquencies and loss mitigation efforts
for anything more than 60% of the market. The existing
data are plagued by inconsistencies in data collection
methodologies and reporting and are often simply
unverifiable. Worse still, the data being collected are
often not what is needed for answering key questions,
namely what are causing mortgage defaults and why
loan modifications have not been working.80
Following the Congressional Oversight Panel’s
urging, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) developed tracking systems for loan modifications.
These agencies review data for institutions
responsible for about 60% of home mortgage loans
nationally. The data from these surveys will be released
in quarterly reports, the first having appeared
in April 2009.81 These reports track loan
modification numbers and record general facts
about the nature of modifications. The surveys
record loan modification data focusing on several
categories of changed terms, including the
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 21
percentage interest rate reduction, the extent to
which a loan repayment period was extended, the
amount of principal forborne, and the degree to
which the arrearages were capitalized.
The HAMP program has its own reporting requirements
that apply to servicers.82 These reports
require servicers to provide extensive
information about loan modification activities.
Since most servicers are already under an obligation
to prepare this type of data, mediation programs
would not be requiring any additional
work from servicers if they require that they provide
similar data in connection with mediations.
The minority of servicers who do not participate
in HAMP or similar federal programs can
track data from cases in their systems using categories
similar to those used by the OCC and
OTS. This would require little more than a simple
checklist about characteristics of loan modifications
that would take a few minutes to
complete for each case. The OCC and OTS also
collect follow-up data on redefaults at quarterly
intervals after the modification. A foreclosure
mediation program that wished to demonstrate
its beneficial impact could record and publicize
follow-up data along these lines as well.
Data under the HAMP guidelines and OCS/
OTS metrics can be recorded in general categories.
Therefore, there cannot be any significant objections
raised on confidentiality grounds if foreclosure
mediation programs require that participants
record basic loan modification data in accordance
with these systems that are already being implemented
nationally to record the same data.
b. The data collection on outcomes by
existing programs is inadequate.
Statewide programs in California, Indiana,
Michigan, and Nevada have no formal systems
for tracking even the most basic data on the
outcomes of mediations or conferences. Most
local programs in Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
similarly use only the most general systems
for tracking numbers of cases and outcomes. The
Connecticut statewide program and a few local
programs, such as those in Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, Brevard County, Florida, and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania have kept some statistics on numbers
of cases mediated and outcomes. However
the categories under which they record outcomes
are so broad as to provide no concrete information
about the nature of settlements.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has released
figures covering the ten- month period from July
1, 2008 to April 30, 2009.83 According to its report,
during this time 21,251 foreclosures cases
were filed in the state. Of these, 16,851 involved
owner occupied properties eligible for mediation.
During the time in question, 5778 eligible homeowners
requested mediation. Mediations were
completed in 2545 cases. Of the completed mediations,
the report indicates that 1065, or 41% resulted
in loan modifications. Put another way,
loan modifications resulted in 6.3% of the foreclosure
cases eligible for mediation.
The Connecticut data does not define how the
terms of the 1065 modified loans were changed.
We do not know the degree to which these modifications
increased or decreased payments or increased
or decreased principal indebtedness. The
nature of loan modification needs to be defined
clearly so that comparisons will make sense. For
example, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) Mortgage Metrics Report for the first
quarter of 2009 indicated that in its national survey
of mortgages there were 844,389 mortgages
in foreclosure in the quarter. According to the
Report, lenders modified mortgages in 185,156
of those cases during the quarter.84 This would
represent loan modifications in about 22% of the
cases in foreclosure. As noted above, Connecticut
was reporting a rate of 6.3% of the loans in foreclosure
modified in mediations completed over a
ten month period. This is a level significantly less
than the national average for cases in foreclosure
as reported by the OCC/OTS data.
There can be several possible explanations for
this divergence. Due to conditions of its housing
market, it may have been harder to obtain a loan
modification in Connecticut than elsewhere in the
country. The systems may define the pool of
22 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
eligible mortgages differently. It is also likely that
OCC/OTS and the State of Connecticut courts
define loan modifications in different ways. The
OCC and OTS appear to be using a broad definition
of modification, which may include temporary
interest rate reductions. As indicated above, the
OCC/OTS database represents approximately
60% of residential loans nationwide and does not
purport to be an accurate statistical sample of all
mortgages. On the other hand, the Connecticut
data appears to represent all residential foreclosures
in the state. Ultimately, these data disparities
highlight the inconsistencies of much of the
national and local data on loan modifications.
During the first year of its operation Philadelphia’s
foreclosure diversion program did not
kept track of loan modifications, either by numbers
or by type. Residential foreclosures have been
filed recently in Philadelphia at the rate of about
6000 a year. In a June 30, 2009 press release the
Philadelphia court indicated that over the previous
year 4690 homeowners participated in its
foreclosure diversion program.85 According to the
press release, a sheriff sale was averted or the case
was removed from the sheriff sale list in 1400 of
those cases. These 1400 cases are considered successful
outcomes. However, the reported category
of cases with a sheriff sale averted or in
which the case was removed from the sheriff sale
list encompasses cases in which the underlying
foreclosure lawsuit was not dismissed. The figure
includes cases considered settled, including those
with agreements other than loan modifications.
For example a settlement may involve allowing a
foreclosure judgment entered in the case to remain
while the homeowner attempts to comply with a repayment
agreement. Under such an agreement the
lender may retain the right to enforce the judgment
by re-listing the property for sale in the same
foreclosure case upon a future default. Under the
categories used by the Philadelphia court, it is
not possible to tell loan modifications from repayment
agreements in the 1400 cases reported
as settled favorably for the homeowner. Nor is it
possible to know anything about the nature of
any loan modifications included in the group.
The Cuyahoga County Ohio foreclosure mediation
program has likewise provided limited
data for cases it handled during its initial year of
operation. Lenders filed approximately 14,000
foreclosure cases in Cuyahoga County during
each of the past two years.86 Under the Cuyahoga
County foreclosure mediation program homeowners
must request mediation. The court reviews
initial requests, and based on consideration of financial
and other data, may or may not refer a
case to mediation. Cases referred to mediation are
scheduled for a pre-mediation session and then
a formal session. The data for July 2008 to June
25, 2009 for Cuyahoga County were as follows:87
Requests for mediation 2914
Found unsuitable for mediation 441
Found suitable for mediation 2473
Had pre-mediation session 1575
Had full mediation 484
Settled 240
Dismissed for lender non appearance 58
Returned to foreclosure because
homeowner did not comply with
mediation rules 380
The figure for cases settled under the Cuyahoga
County program does not provide any information
on the nature of settlements.
Franklin County (Columbus), Ohio has a well
established foreclosure mediation program that
began to operate at the end of 2008. Approximately
9,000 foreclosure cases were filed annually
in the county over each of the past two years.88
The Franklin County program recently released
data for cases handled over the first half of 2009.
During this period there were 870 cases referred
to mediation, of which 863 were found suitable
for mediation. As of the end of June 2009, 566 of
these referrals were listed as pending, scheduled,
or rescheduled. In terms of outcomes, the report
lists 44 cases as having settled with a “loan modification/
loan workout.” The report lists many other
categories of outcomes, including “loan reinstatement
or full agreement” (19 cases), “forbearance
agreement” (24), and “partial agreement” (4).
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 23
Overall, this data is not clear on the number of
loan modifications reached or on the content of
the modifications.
New York has not been keeping statewide data
on its statutory mandatory conferences for foreclosures
involving subprime and other high cost
mortgages. Some limited data covers the New
York City boroughs, Nassau and Suffolk counties,
and the Buffalo and Syracuse areas for the
period from late January 2009 to mid June
2009.89 This data indicated that over this period
and in these courts there were conferences scheduled
for 2890 cases. Homeowners did not appear
in 1182 of these conferences. A total of 173 cases
settled at the conferences.90 Here, again, the data
does not track anything specific about outcomes.
New Jersey has averaged approximately 60,000
foreclosures in each of the past two years. The
New Jersey foreclosure mediation program
released data on numbers and outcomes of mediations
for the period from January 13, 2009
through June 30, 2009.91 Mediations (including
pre-mediations) were completed in 854 cases
statewide during this period. Of those 854 cases,
no settlements were reached in 390. Of the 445
cases described as settled in mediation, the report
lists 281 as allowing the homeowner to avoid
foreclosure and remain in the home. Of the rest,
35 involved settlements with agreements to
move, and 129 were settlement of unknown content.
The designation for settled cases involving
retention of the home likely includes loan modifications,
but the precise numbers and type of
modifications were not described in the data released.
A number of cases (1342) remain pending
with housing counselors and some of these may
eventually be subject to mediation.
Aside from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Columbus,
other foreclosure mediation programs have not
released even partial data on outcomes. Several
statewide and local programs are still new at this
time, and some of these may still decide to implement
systems for tracking outcomes. Other existing
programs may in the future develop more
detailed tracking systems.
The Maine foreclosure mediation statute contains
a requirement that data be submitted to the
state legislature on a regular basis so that the
program can be evaluated and modified as
needed. The information to be reported includes:
“The results of the mediation process, including
the number of loans restructured, number of
principal write-downs, interest rate reductions
and number of homeowners who default on
mortgages within a year after restructuring, to
the extent the court has information available.” 92
While the Maine statute directs that data on
numbers and types of modifications be tracked,
it does not on its face require data on the degree
of reduction occurring for each category. For example,
the statute seeks data on numbers of loan
modifications with interest rate and principal reductions.
It does not require data on the percentage
reduction in interest rates or the amount of
principal forborne or written off. The HAMP and
OCC/OTS metrics described above do require reporting
of this additional data. All of this information
can be recorded by foreclosure mediation
programs in order to evaluate their performance.
Recommendations: Improving
Homeowner Participation and
Procedural Aspects of Programs
It is certainly possible to design a foreclosure mediation
program so that it will encourage as
many homeowners as possible to participate in it.
High participation rates may lead to better outcomes
for more homeowners. However, this may
not always be true. If the procedures styled as
“mediation” leave servicers in substantial control
of the process, then sending large numbers of
homeowners, particularly unrepresented ones,
through these procedures may not preserve
homeownership for more individuals over the
long term. For example, an unsupervised conference
mechanism could easily become a system
for servicers to obtain waivers of rights from pro
se homeowners. If homeowners end up losing
statutory redemption rights or rights to fair market
appraisals when they participate in confer-
24 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
ences with servicers, these homeowners may be
better off in the long run not participating.
To the extent that mediations apply mandatory
standards and can protect homeowners from
overreaching by servicers, then procedures designed
to increase participation by homeowners
will likely keep more families in their homes. This
section will look at procedural aspects of foreclosure
mediation programs and consider which
features are likely to increase homeowner participation.
Again, reaching these considerations assumes
that there is some positive value to the
homeowner’s participation in the program at all.
The existing foreclosure mediation programs
come with a wide variety of structures. For example,
some programs apply automatically to all
owner-occupied homes in foreclosure. In other
programs the homeowner must take some formal
action to “opt in” to the mediation program.
For programs which require the homeowner to
take some affirmative step to opt in, the length of
time a homeowner has to exercise the option
varies. Once a homeowner is participating in a
program, the question of a stay of foreclosure
procedures becomes crucial. In some programs a
stay is automatic, while in others the homeowner
must actively seek out a stay from the court
pending mediation. These procedures are discussed
in more detail below.
1. Does the Program Establish Procedures
for Automatic Participation by
Homeowners Subject to Foreclosure
Proceedings?
a. Programs in which homeowner participation
is automatic.
Several mediation programs refer foreclosure
cases to an alternative dispute resolution system
automatically upon the filing of a complaint. In
these programs the servicers must certify in the
initial filing whether the case involves an owneroccupied
property. Certification that the property
is owner occupied triggers the application of
the foreclosure mediation rules. A number of
local court-initiated programs follow this general
practice. These include the programs in
Louisville, Kentucky, in four Florida judicial circuits
(the First, Eleventh, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth),
in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and in
Northampton and Philadelphia counties in Pennsylvania.
The New York State conference procedure
for high cost loans employs a similar system.
The automatic inclusion of residential foreclosures
in some type of conference system can
occur in non judicial foreclosures as well as in judicial
foreclosures. For example, while the phone
conference obligation under the California
statute has no meaningful substantive component,
the requirement applies across the board to
all residential foreclosures.
b. Programs which exclude homeowners who
do not opt in.
At the other end of the spectrum are programs
that set up certain procedural requirements for
homeowners to follow if they wish to participate
in a conference or mediation. Compliance with
these procedural thresholds is often mandatory.
If homeowners do not follow the procedures, they
do not participate. The statewide programs established
in Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Michigan,
Nevada, New Jersey, and Oregon employ this device.
The local programs in most Ohio counties
and in Allegheny and Bucks counties in Pennsylvania
set similar requirements.
The rules for these programs in which homeowners
must “opt in” typically include a requirement
that the court, a clerk, a housing agency,
the lender, or a trustee serve the homeowner with
a notice at the commencement of the foreclosure.
The notice describes the nature of the mediation
or conference opportunity that is available. The
notice may direct the homeowner to housing
counselors, a hotline, or a pro bono legal office.
It may include information on how to exercise
the option to have a conference with a lender
representative. The homeowner must complete
and send in the form as directed by a certain date.
In some programs the filing of an answer or a verbal
request is enough to secure the homeowner’s
right to participate. Under other systems, such as
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 25
the one for Bucks County, Pennsylvania, the
homeowner must contact a housing counselor,
who in turn submits the request.
2. Can Requests for Mediation Be Made Up
to the Time of a Foreclosure Sale?
Setting a time limit for submitting the request to
participate in a mediation may significantly limit
the number of participants. When programs set
time limits, the deadlines vary widely from program
to program. The range includes: Bucks
County, Pennsylvania (ten days from service of
summons and complaint), Michigan (14 days
after date notice sent), Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
(20 days from when notice received),
Connecticut (fifteen days after return date of
summons and complaint), Oregon (30 days from
date of notice), Indiana (30 days from date of
service), Nevada (30 days from date of service).
The Ohio counties generally require some action
by the borrower within a set time period, such as
before an answer is due.
Restrictions on participation in mediations
can take forms other than time limits. For example,
in several Ohio programs a judge or other
court official may conduct an initial review of a
request before making a referral for mediation.
Under the Maine and New Jersey guidelines the
procedures for opting in are more flexible. In
Maine the homeowner must file an answer, appear,
or otherwise request to participate in mediation.
In New Jersey there is not a fixed time limit
for making a written request for mediation.
However, under the New Jersey law foreclosure
proceedings are not stayed automatically by the
mediation request.
Creating these types of opt-in hurdles may
produce a set of homeowners who are strongly
motivated. These may be homeowners with the
financial resources to benefit the most from mediation
options. At the same time, these limitations
on access may unreasonably exclude homeowners
who simply misunderstand court procedures or
irrationally fear them. With some encouragement,
these homeowners might choose at some
point to participate. At a minimum, it is safe to
say that automatic inclusion of homeowners is
more likely to produce a greater number of
homeowners who will be in a position to learn of
their legal rights in the foreclosure and make informed
decisions about whether to follow up
with appearances and calls.
3. Are All Foreclosure Proceedings Stayed
Until a Mediator Or Court Determines
That the Servicer Has Complied in Good
Faith With All Participation Obligations?
A stay of entry of judgment and a stay of the foreclosure
sale are essential if servicers are to take
foreclosure mediations seriously. Without a stay,
foreclosure mills will proceed along at their automated
pace and sell the home. Mediation programs
implement stays of proceedings in various
ways. In some programs the homeowner’s eligibility
for mediation triggers a stay. In other programs
the homeowner must make a formal
request for a stay. In the latter type of program,
absent such an order, foreclosure proceedings
may go ahead. Programs also vary in the duration
of a stay. Some programs stay proceedings for the
duration of mediation or until a homeowner fails
to appear for a scheduled session, while others
set a fixed time by which mediation must be completed
and the stay will terminate. Occasionally,
if there are multiple sessions, a continuance
order must be entered at the end of each session
in order to clarify that the stay is continuing
until the next scheduled meeting.
Programs that refer foreclosures to alternative
dispute resolution upon the filing of a complaint
typically stay proceedings as long as there is a reasonable
basis for continuing the mediation
process. Under the Maine statute the court will
not enter judgment until mediation has concluded.
In Connecticut proceedings are stayed
pending mediation, although the defendant’s
time to file an answer is not stayed. The Indiana
statute provides for a stay of proceedings for 90
days to allow for conferences to take place. At the
local level, most court-initiated foreclosure mediation
programs provide for some form of automatic
stay of proceedings.93
26 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
The statewide programs in New Jersey and
New York and the local programs in Santa Fe,
New Mexico and Louisville, Kentucky, do not
provide for an automatic stay or delay of proceedings.
In these jurisdictions borrowers must
apply to the courts or a sheriff for a stay if mediation
is not completed by a pleading deadline or
the sale date.
In programs in non-judicial foreclosure states,
such as those in Oregon, Michigan, and California,
there is no court imposed stay of a legal proceeding.
Instead, the statutes require a delay of a fixed
period—thirty, sixty, or ninety days—before the
servicer may proceed with the next step in a nonjudicial
foreclosure. In Nevada, the trustee may
not proceed with a non judicial foreclosure sale
until the mediator certifies that the parties acted
in good faith and could not reach an agreement.94
4. Does the Court Have Direct Supervison
Over the Enforecement of Servicer
Obligations, Including the Power to
Impose Sanctions?
A number of programs styled as mediation or
conference programs do not involve any direct
court supervision over the interactions between
servicers and homeowners. These include the
programs in California, Michigan, Indiana, and
Florida’s Twelfth Judicial Circuit. These programs
do little more than require a servicer to
provide a statement that it attempted to contact
the homeowner to work out a settlement. Servicers
and their attorneys have unfettered control
over any procedures mandated by these programs.
For this reason the programs do not provide
any meaningful structure for serious
consideration of alternatives to foreclosure.
To be minimally effective a mediation program
must authorize some neutral official to impose
sanctions upon servicers who do not
comply with specific obligations under the program.
For example, someone acting in an official
capacity must have authority to require servicers
to comply with their obligations. A judge, court
official, or mediator must be able, consistent
with due process, to impose sanctions that include
dismissal of a judicial foreclosure action,
an injunction against non-judicial foreclosure,
and monetary sanctions. There is ample precedent
under F.R. Civ. P. 16 and similar alternative
dispute resolution rules for courts to impose
sanctions for a party’s non-compliance with mediation
rules.95
A common complaint of advocates working
with mediation programs is that servicers delay
responses and do not turn over documents, sometimes
proceeding with sales during these extended
delays. In addition to making stays of foreclosure
automatic, mediation programs must set clear
deadlines for servicers to respond to proposals
and produce documents. Cases must be dismissed
upon non-compliance with deadlines.
5. Is There Funding for Outreach, Housing
Counselors and Qualifed Counsel for
Homeowners?
Some states, including New York and New Jersey,
have authorized considerable financial support
for foreclosure mediations. This includes funding
for housing counselors, outreach, and in the
case of New Jersey, to pay for attorneys to represent
homeowners in foreclosure cases. Yet, both
the New York and New Jersey programs have garnered
relatively low levels of homeowner participation
so far. The low turnout may be due to
a number of factors, including some structural
restrictions on homeowners’ access to both
programs. For example, the New Jersey program
lacks an automatic stay of foreclosure proceedings
and requires that homeowners affirmatively
opt in to the program. The New York program
does not apply to all residential mortgage foreclosures.
On the other hand, public funding for counselors
and outreach, when combined with structural devices
that encourage homeowner participation, will
likely produce better participation rates. For example,
the local government funding for outreach
and counseling under the Philadelphia
program, combined with automatic participation
and stays of foreclosure sales, has likely contributed
to the high rate of participation there.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 27
Where there is a strong commitment to expanding
eligibility and bringing in as many
homeowners as possible, it is likely that expenditures
for outreach and counseling will produce a
higher turnout. However, if the programs place
no obligations on servicers, funding designed to
bring more homeowners into mediation may
produce few long term benefits for homeowners.
The Availability of Counsel for Homeowners
Having attorneys represent homeowners in foreclosure
mediations can help in a number of ways.
The presence of an attorney for the homeowner
can deter overreaching by servicers’ attorneys and
ensure that homeowners do not waive important
legal rights. Court directives to waive conflict
rules and allow limited attorney appearances in
mediations can increase the numbers of volunteer
attorneys available to assist homeowners.
However, limited appearances by inexperienced
attorneys may not provide substantial assistance
for homeowners in the long run. The best option
is obviously to have available free or low cost
counsel who are experienced in representing
homeowners in foreclosures and who can remain
as counsel for the homeowner throughout the
proceeding.
In most jurisdictions there are few attorneys
with the experience necessary to provide full representation
to homeowners in foreclosure, and
this situation is not likely to change during the
current foreclosure crisis. Housing counselors
and relatively inexperienced pro bono attorneys
will be appearing with homeowners in the vast
majority of mediations. Given this fact, having
strict standards for the conduct of the mediation
sessions, including procedures that can be reduced
to unambiguous checklists, forms, and
spreadsheets, will be helpful.
6. Are Servicers Prohibited from Shifting to
the Homeowner Attorneys’ Fees Or
Other Costs of Participating in the
Mediation Process?
Most foreclosure mediation programs do not
charge a fee to homeowners for participating in
the procedures. This is true for the statewide programs
in California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New
York, Maine, and Michigan, as well as for the local
court programs in New Mexico, Kentucky, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania. However, a few programs have
set payment requirements for homeowners. In
Nevada the borrower and the lender must each
pay $200 toward a total mediation fee of $400.
No mediation will be initiated if the borrower
does not pay his or her share of the costs on time.
Some programs, such as those in Maine and Nevada,
have added surcharges to the fees for filing
foreclosure complaints or notices of default as a
means to finance the mediation programs.96
Two Florida mediation programs are managed
by the Collins Center, a non-profit organization.
These programs require that the lender make an
up-front payment of $750 to be applied to mediation
expenses upon the filing of the complaint.97
Two other Florida programs set advance payment
fees for lenders of $250 and $350.98 The administrative
orders in these Florida districts
specifically allow the costs to be taxed as part of a
judgment against the homeowner should the
foreclosure proceed to a judgment.
The charges for mediation costs can be a deterrent
to participation for low income homeowners.
However, a related cost issue raises more serious
concerns. In almost all foreclosure mediation
programs servicers can shift their own attorney’s
fees incurred in mediation to the homeowner.
Servicers and their attorneys often treat the expenses
of mediation as simply another collection
cost to be charged to the borrower. None of the
programs appear to place a limitation on this
practice. Advocates report that servicers often
make express references to fee shifting liability in
the course of mediations. This has a clear impact
on homeowners’ willingness to stick with mediations,
particularly when repeated continuances
are needed due to servicers’ delays in producing
documents or responding to proposals.
States clearly have the authority to limit the
attorney’s fees shifting terms of consumer contracts.
99 State common law and statutory provisions
have placed limits on amounts and timing
28 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
of attorney’s fees shifting in connection with
mortgage foreclosures.100 All states should prohibit
fees shifting in connection with the foreclosure
mediation programs. Homeowners should
not have to fear that each continuance for the
lender to comply with its obligations will add
hundreds of dollars to their mortgage debt.
HAMP guidelines prohibit servicers charging
homeowners for any costs of implementing a
loan modification under the program.101 If the
mediation focuses upon implementing a loan
modification through a participating servicer,
the HAMP rule should be an additional basis for
prohibiting fees shifting.
7. Is There a Requirement That Junior
Lienholders Be Notified of and Allowed
to Participate in Mediations?
The presence of junior mortgages has been a
common obstacle encountered in modifying first
mortgages and in negotiating other settlements.
A second mortgage holder may be the same entity
that holds the first mortgage, or it may be a
completely separate entity. For some types of
mortgages, such as Alt -A loans, as many as half
the loans in this category included a second
mortgage at the time of origination.102
First lienholders may be reluctant to agree to
modifications that involve concessions from
them while second lienholders are unaffected.
From the homeowner’s perspective, the continuing
financial burdens from a second mortgage
may make re-default on a modified first mortgage
more likely.
The Treasury Department, through its HAMP
program, has announced a program for second
mortgages that allows either modification or “extinguishment”
of the second lien.103 The HAMP
second mortgage modification standards follow
a waterfall similar to the first lien modification
program. The Treasury Department provides
subsidies to servicers, investors, and homeowners
in connection with modifications of second liens.
The program also authorizes payments of a small
portion of the underlying debt in return for a second
lienholder’s agreement to extinguish its lien.
Most existing foreclosure mediation programs
have not established procedures for routine inclusion
of second lienholders in sessions and
conferences. A few programs have established
some minimal procedures for notification to second
mortgagees. The administrative orders for
two Florida circuit court programs provide that
junior lienholders who have not been defaulted
in the judicial foreclosure proceeding will be notified
of mediation hearings.104 The Louisville,
Kentucky administrative order expressly permits
junior lienholders to participate. Under the
Maine statute, the mediator may include any entity
deemed necessary for effective mediation.
The Nevada statute requires that the trustee notify
anyone with an interest in the property of the
homeowner’s election to mediate
Mediation rules should establish a clear requirement
that holders of second mortgages be
notified of all proceedings involving the property.
Second mortgage holders should be permitted
to participate in mediations. When a first
mortgage loan is modified can be the ideal time to
try to get rid of the second mortgage. The second
lien holder might be willing to accept pennies on
the dollar now when the likely alternative is to
lose everything if a foreclosure proceeds.
Conclusion
Our review of the status of foreclosure mediation
programs has shown that there can be a danger in
viewing them as an alternative to legislation that
directs servicers and mortgage holders to make
affordable loan modifications. For example,
bankruptcy code amendments allowing courts to
modify mortgages through reduction of principal
would markedly increase the numbers of affordable
modifications. Federal legislation setting out
clear directives for enforcement of the HAMP program
would be far more effective that expecting
state and local mediation systems to oversee enforcement
of this federal program.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 29
In the absence of strong federal legislation,
state foreclosure mediation programs could play
a role in enforcement of guidelines under the various
federal loan modification programs, including
the HAMP program. They can provide a
framework for more effective implementation of
these federal programs. In the overwhelming majority
of cases homeowners facing foreclosure
will not have attorneys who can assist them in
protecting their rights under the HAMP program.
Mediations using simple and quick net
present value calculations should be able to identify
cases that are clearly inappropriate for foreclosure.
Mandating mediation for all residential
foreclosures and scrutinizing all cases under
these tests can help to minimize unnecessary
foreclosures. Mediations have the added benefit
of requiring the appearance of a party responsible
for securitized loans. If there is a clear expectation
that courts will enforce sound equitable
standards, this should deter the responsible parties
from moving forward before a court with blatantly
wasteful cases.
Despite the potential to do so, the existing
foreclosure mediation programs have yet to establish
that they can exert any significant control
over servicer conduct. The performance of these
programs does not support hopes that voluntary
efforts by servicers will somehow slow the surge
in foreclosures. Thousands of preventable, irrational,
and highly destructive foreclosures are
being completed every week in the United States.
Continuing to treat this epidemic as primarily a
communication problem will ensure that it continues
unabated.
30 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Recent state regulation of
foreclosures has not approached
its full constitutional potential
Foreclosures have traditionally been the subject
of state regulation. There is little likelihood
that in the near future some new federal foreclosure
law will come to the rescue of distressed
homeowners and supplant the state laws that
now regulate foreclosures. Unfortunately, since
the onset of the current foreclosure crisis state
legislatures have done little to revise archaic foreclosure
procedures in ways that would reduce the
loss of homes. The nine foreclosure diversion
statutes enacted during 2008 and 2009 were
some of the few new state laws enacted in response
to the foreclosure crisis that were ostensibly
directed at modifying foreclosure procedures
for the benefit of homeowners. State courts and
legislatures have much greater power than they
have chosen to assert in this field.
No one would dispute that the current level of
home foreclosures has created a severe economic
crisis. Faced with this emergency, states have substantial
authority to enact remedial legislation to
protect the vital interests of their citizens and of
the state itself. State regulation can take the
forms of both modification of foreclosure procedures
and the creation of new substantive rights
for homeowners facing unreasonable and unfair
foreclosures. As will be discussed below, appropriate
foreclosure mediation laws can incorporate
many of these needed reforms, both
procedural and substantive.
States’ Police Power and Mediation
Procedures—Stay of Foreclosures
In the exercise of the state’s police power the
legislatures and courts of a state have the authority
to stay foreclosures for substantial periods of
time. The law on this point has been well settled
for more than half a century. For example, Depression
era statutes typically authorized stays of
foreclosure sales and extensions of post-sale redemption
periods for several years.105 Most states
enacted some form of moratorium legislation
during the early years of the Depression. Few of
these statutes were ever challenged on constitutional
grounds. When challenged, nearly all were
upheld as valid exercises of the states’ police
power in the prevailing economic crisis.
In a landmark decision Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell106 the United States Supreme
Court rejected a challenge to a Minnesota foreclosure
moratorium law brought under the Contracts
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.107 The Minnesota
statute allowed homeowners to petition a
court for a stay of foreclosure for up to two years.
Under the same law courts could also toll the
running of the post sale redemption period for
up to two years. According to the Blaisdell Court,
the state had authority to modify contract rights
in this manner under its police power. The potential
for states to act in this capacity had to be recognized
as an implied condition to any contract:
“[T]the reservation of the reasonable exercise of
the protective power of the State is read into
all contracts.”108 Protecting all citizens from an
31
APPENDIX
Constitutional Issues Related to
State Foreclosure Mediation Laws
economic emergency was thus a permissible basis
for limited impairment of private parties’ contract
obligations. Under the Blaisdell court’s test,
the pertinent question in assessing the validity of
an exercise of the police power became “whether
the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate
to that end.” 109
The Supreme Court revised its formulation of
the applicable Contracts Clause test in a 1983 decision,
Energy Reserves Group, Inc., v. Kansas Power
& Light Co.110 Here the Court rejected a Contracts
Clause challenge to a Kansas statute that set
price caps on intrastate natural gas sales. As articulated
in this decision, the Court’s current formulation
has three steps:
1. Is there in fact a substantial impairment of the
creditor’s contractual rights?
2. If yes, the state must have a significant and legitimate
public purpose behind the regulation,
such as remedying of a broad and general
social or economic problem.
3. If this is a significant and legitimate public
purpose, the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities
of the contracting parties must
be based upon reasonable conditions and of a
character appropriate to the public purpose
supporting the legislation.111
Under this standard, if a state law satisfies the
second and third prongs of the above test, a court
will uphold the law despite a substantial impairment
of contractual rights under the first prong.
The Energy Reserves test thus acknowledges that
state laws may impair substantive contract obligations
in a proper exercise of the police power.
Prior decisions had characterized state laws as acceptable
only when they regulated procedural
“remedies,” while unacceptable state laws impaired
substantive contact obligations. The price
controls imposed by the Kansas statute at issue
in Energy Reserves clearly regulated substantive
contract terms and did not merely alter enforcement
procedures. Thus the courts have retreated
from the strict remedy/obligation dichotomy.
The standards defined by the Blaisdell and Energy
Reserves rulings allow states to fashion laws
that stay foreclosures for extended periods of
time. For example, in 1945 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a New York foreclosure
moratorium law that had been in effect
since 1933.112 The New York law effectively stayed
foreclosures based on non payment of loan principal.
The law provided for some form of courtsupervised
payments by the homeowner during
the pendency of the stay. Typically the payment
would consist of some combination of interest,
taxes and insurance. Otherwise, for an extended
period of time the law substantially altered the
lender’s rights to collect regular contractual payments
and to foreclose.
Foreclosure moratorium laws enacted during
the nineteen-thirties typically required some payment,
such as a fair rental value, taxes and insurance,
or interest. These payment amounts were
generally subject to court review, with the stay
conditioned on the homeowner’s continuing to
make the payments. The court-ordered payments
were invariably less than the contractual amount
that the homeowner would otherwise be obligated
to pay.
In a time of economic crisis, states clearly have
the authority to set conditions on foreclosures,
including authorizing the delays necessary for effective
mediation. The stays of foreclosures that
extended over many years during the 1930s were
intended to delay foreclosures until the real estate
market improved. Foreclosure sales were
producing scandalously low prices. It was hoped
that an improved market would bring higher
prices or allow borrowers to refinance to avoid
foreclosure.
A stay of foreclosures pending court-supervised
mediations adds another strong rationale
for a delay of foreclosure sales—the role of the
mediation itself as an effort to arrive at a beneficial
outcome for all parties. Minnesota’s
Supreme Court, for example, flatly rejected a
Contracts Clause challenge to a mandatory foreclosure
mediation statute applicable to farm
properties during the 1980s.113 The court found
32 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
the impairment of contracts to be no more significant
than the extensive limitations imposed
by the 1930s Minnesota moratorium law upheld
in the Blaisdell decision.
As discussed elsewhere in this Report, many of
the current foreclosure mediation programs
defer significantly to servicers’ and mortgage
holders’ interests in the way they limit stays of
foreclosure pending a mediation. If there is no
stay or a very limited delay pending a mediation,
a servicer has little incentive to take the process
seriously. Setting fixed time limits, such as sixty
or ninety days has a similar effect. Servicers can
focus on the clock rather than on any obligation
imposed by a mediation rule.
The creditors’ demands for short time limits
for homeowners to request mediation seems to
be motivated by a fear that homeowners might
request mediation at a late stage in the foreclosure
proceeding, and this would encourage delay.
Given that legislation staying foreclosures for
several years has been held constitutional, the incidental
delays caused by a mediation at any time
before a foreclosure sale do not seem substantial.
When stays until the end of mediation are automatic,
servicers who comply promptly with their
obligations under the mediation law will not face
any unreasonable delay.
States’ Police Power and
Mediation—mandating consideration
of specific options and requiring
documentation
State legislatures and state courts not only have
broad authority to stay foreclosures. They can
also compel effective mediation under standards
that promote accountability. These standards
must require that the parties consider distinct
options and document that they have done so.
States have a legitimate interest in minimizing
the number of home foreclosures. They can set
standards to ensure that foreclosure is an option
of last resort. Mediation programs can be effective
tools for enforcing compliance with these requirements.
Unfortunately, most foreclosure
mediation programs do not obligate the parties
to consider anything.114 Many set standards that
are so general that they invite servicers to make
token “take it or leave it” efforts. Legislation or
court rules can require procedures that are much
more meaningful and require proof of consideration
of specific options.
Most servicers are now obligated by federal law
to perform a net present value analysis before
they proceed with a foreclosure. It is appropriate
for a mediation program to give teeth to this requirement
by requiring that a servicer explain
why it will not implement an affordable loan
modification that protects investors better than a
foreclosure. This is particularly true when the
servicer has signed a contract with the federal
government obligating it to implement the modification.
Further, there is no reason why a mediation
program cannot mandate this type of
analysis for all cases, regardless of whether the
servicer is signatory to a HAMP contract.
To be effective, a mediation program must
also require that the servicer produce documentation
showing the net present value calculation
related to the proposed foreclosure. Typically
this will require a disclosure of data submitted
for the calculation, often a spreadsheet or other
data entry record. Recent initiatives in Maine,
Nevada, and Michigan have set requirements for
some form of disclosure along these lines. However,
to date only the Maine program requires
complete disclosure of a specific net present
value test. The other programs allow servicers to
evade disclosure of this analysis with impunity.
Servicing guidelines for various government insured
and direct loan programs also set preconditions
to foreclosure. To the extent that servicers
and mortgage holders must comply with obligations
under any government program, including
compliance with FHA, RHS, and VA rules, mediation
programs can require that servicers document
compliance with those duties as well.
There are other documents that can be essential
to an effective mediation, and programs
must require that servicers produce them. As discussed
in section II, supra, these documents can
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 33
include appraisals, pooling and servicing agreements,
and documents necessary to establish
that that the foreclosing entity has standing to
foreclose. Requiring that servicers produce these
documents does not impair any contract rights.
The requirement comports with the state’s interest
in minimizing the numbers of foreclosures. It
is thus well within the state’s constitutional authority
to establish requirements to consider options
and produce documents.
States’ Police Power and
Mediation—mediation’s role in
enforcing bars on foreclosure
Mediation rules can set clear, mandatory standards
that a servicer must comply with as a condition
to the exercise of a right to foreclose.
Mediations can play a critical role in enforcing
the federal program guidelines that preclude
foreclosures by non complying servicers. In addition,
mediation programs can set the stage for
the application of courts’ inherent equitable
powers to limit foreclosures that are unfair and
unreasonable. Analytical tools such as net present
value tests can be produced through mediation.
These will highlight the cases in which
courts need to exercise their equitable powers to
bar a foreclosure. The following sections will consider
in more detail the impact foreclosure mediations
can have in preventing foreclosures that
violate equitable standards, both in relation to
government programs and as a matter of traditional
state law.
1. Barring foreclosure upon noncompliance
with rules of government
programs—the role for mediation
Federal agencies insure or originate home loans
through a number of programs. These include
programs under the Federal Housing Agency
(“FHA”), the Rural Housing Service (“RHS”—a
subdivision of the U.S.D.A.), and the Veterans
Administration (“VA”). In these programs the
federal agencies may hold the loans themselves,
as in the case of many RHS loans, or they may supervise
the activities of private mortgage holders
who own the insured loans. Federal agencies
such as FHA promulgate regulations that direct
activities of the insured private mortgage holders
and their servicers. The regulations often require
servicers to engage in specific loss mitigation activities
before they foreclose on a government insured
mortgage. For example, under the FHA
program servicers must provide written notices
to homeowners of certain options for avoiding
foreclosure. Under the RHS program the mortgage
holder may not foreclose without offering
the homeowner the opportunity to apply for a
moratorium, which is a temporary suspension of
the obligation to make payments.
Over the past 35 years there have been many
court rulings on the question of whether courts
may bar foreclosures when a government agency
or private mortgage holder owning one of these
government related loans seeks to foreclose without
complying with the federal agency’s loss mitigation
rules. Most courts have barred foreclosures
when mortgage holders have not complied with
these servicing regulations.115
In the recent decision in Wells Fargo Home Loan
Mortgage v. Neal, the Maryland Supreme Court affirmed
the continuing validity of this analysis.116
The homeowner in Neal contended that his servicer
had not performed certain loss mitigation
actions before accelerating his loan. These actions
included setting up a face-to-face meeting
between the borrower and lender before accelerating
the loan. The court agreed with the homeowner
that, under the doctrine of clean hands,
the servicer could not declare a default or accelerate
the loan until it “complies with the statutory
and regulatory imperative to pursue loss mitigation
prior to foreclosure.”117
As in many similar decisions involving allegations
of servicers not following FHA loss mitigation
rules, the Neal court applied general principles
of equity to bar the foreclosure. In upholding an injunction
to stay the non-judicial sale, the Neal court
stated:
34 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
A mortgagor seeking to raise a violation of the HUD
loss mitigation regulations as a defense to foreclosure
. . . is not required to pay his or her debt in full in
order to be granted an injunction. This is because,
under the principles of equity, a mortgagee’s commencement
of a foreclosure proceeding on an FHAinsured
mortgage, without first having adhered to the
mandatory HUD loss mitigation regulations, may
invalidate the mortgagee’s declaration of default.118
The HAMP program guidelines announced by
the Treasury Department in March 2009 placed
significant obligations upon servicers. These obligations
are at least as pervasive as those that
apply to servicers of FHA insured and similar
government- related loans.119 A servicer who has
signed a HAMP participation agreement must
comply with program guidelines and review
homeowners’ circumstances to see if they qualify
for affordable loan modifications. Participating
servicers must evaluate borrowers who are more
than 60 days in default for an affordable loan
modification.120 They must use an approved net
present value test. Servicers must also screen borrowers
who are current or less than 60 days delinquent
if they inquire about a modification and
appear to be at risk for imminent default. While
evaluating a homeowner for a HAMP modification,
the servicer must refrain from proceeding
to a foreclosure sale.121 A sale must not take place
during the three-month trial payment period
under the program.
Foreclosure mediation programs clearly could
assist in implementing the HAMP program effectively.
To do this, the programs must set certain
requirements. For example, servicers must be required
to disclose their roles as participants in
HAMP. Meaningful sanctions must be imposed
on servicers who misrepresent their status under
the servicer contracts. The mediation rules must
mandate that participating servicers produce the
net present value calculation required under the
HAMP guidelines. The mediator must refuse to
conclude the mediation for servicers who are participating
in HAMP but cannot document the required
affordable loan modification calculation
and net present value analysis. Either directly
through its scheduling powers or by referral to a
court, a mediator must have oversight powers
that can lead to a bar on foreclosing against a
homeowners who is eligible for a HAMP modification
or whose eligibility is under review.
2. Barring foreclosure on general equitable
grounds—loans outside the government
housing programs
As discussed above, courts have frequently barred
foreclosures when lenders did not comply with
loss mitigation rules established by government
housing programs. For loans that are not directly
subject to any governmental loss mitigation rules,
mediation can still play an important role in deterring
unfair foreclosures. There is a long tradition
of courts exercising a supervisory role over foreclosures
of property interests. When they deemed
it appropriate, courts have denied the harsh remedy
of forfeiture in order to prevent unfairness
and overreaching by lenders.122 The U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions upholding state laws that limited
foreclosing lenders’ remedies emphasized repeatedly
that the state legislatures did nothing more
than formalize a centuries- old practice of review of
the fairness of foreclosures by state courts.123
The tools for calculating the relative values of
foreclosures and loan modifications are new
mechanisms that add some precision to a review
of the fairness of foreclosures. When servicers
pursue foreclosures that are not in the best interests
of investors based on the net present value
analysis, courts should step in to prevent the
foreclosures. This may raise a potential constitutional
question: Does a servicer’s pursuit of a
demonstrably unwise and destructive financial
option implicate a contract right protected under
the Contracts Clause? This question moves into
uncharted territory of constitutional law.
Prior Supreme Court decisions upholding state
laws that limited mortgage holders’ deficiency
claims suggest that actions by state courts and
legislatures to bar blatantly unfair foreclosures
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 35
may not conflict with the Contracts Clause.124
Many state statutes limit or prohibit deficiency
claims after a foreclosure sale. These statutes effectively
limited lenders’ recovery to the value of
the security property. However, according to several
decisions of the Supreme Court, state
statutes that limited lenders’ deficiency claims
did not impair any significant constitutionally
protected property interests of lenders. Rather
the statutes merely placed reasonable limits on
the recovery of speculative monetary gains.125
In enacting anti-deficiency statutes the states
balanced the borrowers’ interest in being free
from burdensome debt repayment obligations
against the claims of lenders to a full monetary
recovery under their notes and mortgages. In the
Supreme Court’s view, the state law’s imposition
on lenders was a reasonable exercise of the police
power during an economic crisis. Whether implemented
by courts using their inherent equitable
powers or by state legislatures, limits on wealth
destroying foreclosures should be seen as a
proper exercise of states’ police power during the
current foreclosure crisis.
It may also be argued that barring foreclosures
when an affordable loan modification is a better
option for investors implicates the Takings
Clause of the Fourteenth amendment.126 The
Takings Clause jurisprudence recognizes two
types of “taking” by governmental action. One
form of taking occurs when the government
physically takes over property. The other involves
a “regulatory” taking.127 Control over foreclosures
potentially implicates a regulatory taking
of property rights.
In assessing the propriety of a regulatory impairment
under the Takings Clause, the courts
look at two factors: (1) the degree to which the
governmental action interferes with distinct “investment
backed expectations” of the owner, and
(2) the character of the government action, including
the purpose served128 Like the rule applied
for the Contracts Clause, the Takings
Clause analysis relies upon a standard of reasonableness:
is the goal of the state regulation reasonable
and are the regulatory burdens imposed
to meet that goal reasonable?
State action barring lenders from foreclosing
when the results of a net present value test show
that the monetary harm to investors from foreclosure
will exceed the cost of an affordable loan
modification should not violate the Takings
Clause. Many of the modification programs, such
as those used under the HAMP program and by
the FDIC, do not force lenders to write off any secured
debt. At most, under these programs a part
of the secured debt will be set aside and secured
by a separate non-interest bearing lien. Under a
Takings Clause analysis, preserving the lender’s lien
and allowing foreclosure upon a future default in
payments should be adequate safeguards to protect
the secured lender’s property interest.129
By way of analogy, in decisions dating back to
the World War I era, courts have rejected challenges
to rent control laws brought under the
Takings Clause.130 Rent control laws impose substantial
restrictions on property owners’ rights.
For example, the laws may bar owners from terminating
leases, recovering possession of their
properties, and collecting the full market rent
they would otherwise obtain. Nevertheless, in
most cases the courts have rejected Takings
Clause challenges to rent control laws and similar
types of property regulation so long as the
laws included reasonable protections to determine
the fair return on investment.131
36 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Notes
1 See e.g. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 325(e); Florida Rule of Judicial
Admin. No. 2215(b)(2). The Florida Supreme Court commissioned
a task force to evaluate restructuring its decentralized
system of circuit court foreclosure mediation
programs. The Florida Supreme Court Task Force’s Final Report
and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure
Cases (August 17, 2009), recommends moving toward a more
uniform statewide system.
2 e.g., Cheyenne Hopkins, Modification: Tentative Steps Toward
a Regulatory Consensus, American Banker (Nov. 27, 2007); The
Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on Wealth, Property
Values and Tax Revenues, and How We Got Here, Report and
Recommendations by the Majority Staff of the Joint Economic
Committee (October 2007); Remarks of FDIC Chairman
Sheila C. Bair, American Securitization Form (ASF)
Annual Meeting (June 6, 2007). Statement on Loss Mitigation
Strategies for Servicers of Residential Mortgages (Sept.
2007), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/
2007-38a.pdf; Associated Press, Paulson to Mortgage Industry:
Help Curb Defaults (Oct. 31, 2007), available at http://
money.cnn.com/2007/10/31/real_estate/paulson_housing.ap/;
American Securitization Forum, Streamlined Foreclosure and
Loss Avoidance Framework for Securitized Subprime Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Loans, Executive Summary (Dec. 6, 2007),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp706.htm.
3 Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner:
The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modification,
41 Connecticut Law Rev. 1107 (2009). Electronic copy
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325534 at 14
4 Id.
5 Alan M. White, June 25, 2009 Columbia Collateral File
Summary, Valparaiso University Law School, available along
with other monthly updates at http://www.valpo.edu/law/
faculty/awhite/data/index.php .
6 Id.
7 Statewide Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program Launched
Press Release Office of the Attorney General of New Jersey,
Jan. 6, 2009 http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases09/
pr20090109a.html
8 From January 2009 through June 2009 the program completed
854 mediations. See p. 23, supra.
9 Las Vegas Review-Journal May 6, 2009 Mortgage Mediation:
Bill Shifts to Senate http://www.lvrj.com/news/44445017.html
10 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Office of
Thrift Supervision, OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report
Fourth Quarter 2008 (April 2009) p. 7.
11 Id at p. 8.
12 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Office of
Thrift Supervision, OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report
First Quarter 2009 (June 2009) p. 25 (54.10% of modifications
during first quarter 2009 reduced payments; less than
2% of modifications wrote off any principal); Alan M. White,
July 27, 209 Columbia Collateral File Summary Statistics,
Valparaiso U. School of Law (data covering period June 25,
2009 to July 27, 2009) http://www.valpo.edu/law/faculty/
awhite/data/jul_09_summary.pdf ( 65% of loan modifications
reduced payments, frequency of principal write-offs
declined from previous survey periods).
13 HOPE NOW press releases claimed servicers made
2,911,609 “workouts” between July 2007 and November
2008. Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working
Toward a Solution: March Oversight Report, March 6, 2009,
pp. 38 (available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
030609-report.pdf). The majority of these “workouts” were
repayment agreements that increased homeowners’
monthly payments. Id. No hard data was ever provided on
the loan modifications under the program, and other data
have shown that most of the modifications during this period
increased payments for borrowers, which led to substantial
redefaults.
14 Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working
Toward a Solution: March Oversight Report, March 6, 2009, pp.
43 (available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
030609-report.pdf).
15 Id.
16 See generally Stephen Labaton, Ailing, Banks Still Field Strong
Lobby at Capitol, New York Times, June 4, 2009.
17 U. S. Department of Treasury, Making Home Affordable Fact
Sheet, March 4, 2009 (available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/housing_fact_sheet.pdf); see generally
Report to Congressional Committees, Troubled Asset Relief
Program: Treasury Actions Needed to Make the Home Affordable
Modification Program More Transparent and Accountable, U.S.
Government Accountability Office No. GAO-09-837 (July
2009).
18 U. S. Department of Treasury, Making Home Affordable Fact
Sheet, March 4, 2009 (available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/housing_fact_sheet.pdf).; Report to
Congressional Committees, Troubled Asset Relief Program:
Treasury Actions Needed to Make the Home Affordable Modification
Program More Transparent and Accountable, U.S. Government
Accountability Office No. GAO-09-837, July 2009 p. 9.
19 See HAMP refinance program description: http://www
.makinghomeaffordable.gov/refinance_eligibility.html.
20 HAMP program guidelines and directives, Servicer Participation
Agreement, and FAQ available at https://www.hmpadmin.
com/portal/programs/hamp_servicer.html.
21 See Home Affordable Modification Program Supplemental
Directive 09-01 April 6, 2009. p. 14 https://www.hmpadmin
.com/portal/docs/sd0901.pdf
22 HAMP Servicer Performance Report Through July 2009
(August 4, 2009) at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/
tg252.html; Testimony of Herbert M. Allison, Assistant Secretary
for Financial Stability before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, July 16, 2009.
23 Fannie Mae guidelines at https://www.efanniemae.com/
sf/mha/mhamod/ ; Freddie Mac guidelines at http://www
.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/service/mha_modification.html;
FHA/HUD guidelines at www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/
letters/mortgagee/files/09.23ml.doc.
24 See HAMP NPV Model Overview at https://www.hmpadmin
.com/portal/docs/hamp_servicer/npvoverview.pdf; HAMP
Reviewing and Interpreting NPV Test results at https://
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 37
www.hmpadmin.com/portal/support/training.htm
25 American Securitization Forum, Statement of Principles,
Recommendations, and Guidelines For the Modification of
Securitized Subprime Residential Mortgages June 2007. p. 6
(“In evaluating whether a proposed loan modification will
maximize recoveries to the investors, the servicer should
compare the anticipated recovery under the loan modification
to the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a
net present value basis. Whichever action is determined by
the servicer to maximize recovery should be deemed to be in
the best interests of the investors.”
26 FDIC Loan Modification in Box overview and guidelines
at http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/loanmod
guide.html
27 https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/docs/npvoverview
.pdf
28 In a major concession to servicers, the HAMP program
does not require reduction of principal or a write-down of
any part of the debt. The program may require forbearance
of a portion of the amortizing principal—allowing lenders
to retain a non interest bearing lien for any forborne principal.
This forbearance creates a future balloon payment due
at the end of the loan term or upon sale or refinancing.
29 HAMP Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra at p.4.
30 HAMP Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra p. 5–6.
31 HAMP Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra. p. 14 https://
www.hmpadmin.com/portal/docs/sd0901.pdf
32 Id at p. 2–3.
33 Id. at p. 4.
34 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009). The Act provides: Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, whenever a servicer of residential
mortgages agrees to enter into a qualified loss
mitigation plan with respect to one or more residential mortgages
originated before the date of enactment of [the Act],
including mortgages held in a securitization or other investment
vehicle—
(1) to the extent that the servicer owes a duty to investors
or other parties to maximize the net present value of such
mortgages, the duty shall be construed to apply to all such
investors and parties, and not to any particular party or
group of parties; and
(2) the servicer shall be deemed to have satisfied the duty
set forth in paragraph (1) if, before December 31, 2012, the
servicer implements a qualified loss mitigation plan that
meets the following criteria:
(A) Default on the payment of such mortgage has occurred,
is imminent, or is reasonably foreseeable, as
such terms are defined by guidelines issued by the
Secretary of the Treasury or his designee under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
(B) The mortgagor occupies the property securing the
mortgage as his or her principal residence.
(C) The servicer reasonably determined, consistent with
the guidelines issued by the secretary of the Treasury
or his designee, that the application of such qualified
loss mitigation plan to a mortgage or class of mortgages
will likely provide an anticipated recovery on
the outstanding principal mortgage debt that will exceed
the anticipated recovery through foreclosures.
(b) NO LIABILITY—A servicer that is deemed to be acting
in the best interest of all investors or other parties under
this section shall not be liable to any party who is owed a
duty under subsection (a)(1), and shall not be subject to any
injunction, stay, or other equitable relief to such party,
based solely upon the implementation by the servicer of a
qualified loss mitigation plan.
(c) STANDARD INDUSTRY PRACTICE.—The qualified
loss mitigation plan guidelines issued by the Secretary of
the Treasury under the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 shall constitute standard industry practice for
purposes of all Federal and State law.
(d) SCOPE OF SAFE HARBOR—Any person, including a
trustee, issuer, and loan originator, shall not be liable for
monetary damages or be subject to an injunction, stay, or
other equitable relief, based solely upon the cooperation of
such person with a servicer when such cooperation is necessary
for the servicer to implement a qualified loss mitigation
plan that meets the requirements of subsection (a).
35 Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury Action Needed
to Make the Home Affordable Modification Program More
Transparent and Accountable, U.S. Government Accountability
Office Report to Congressional Committees GAO-
09837 July 2009.
36 Making Home Affordable Program Report August 4, 2009
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/MHA_public_report.
pdf. See also Andrea Fuller, U.S. Effort Aids Only 9% of Eligible
Homeowners, New York Times August 4, 2009;
37 See generally Testimony of Diane E. Thompson, National
Consumer Law Center, U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs July 16, 2009.
38 Id.
39 See generally Congressional Oversight Panel, March 6, 2009
Report supra, pp. 44-55.
40 See e.g. cases recognizing affirmative defense to foreclosure
in lender’s failure to comply with FHA loss mitigation
guidelines: Ghervescu v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 2008
WL 660248 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2008); Wells Fargo Home
Loan Mortgage v. Neal, 922 A.2d 538 (Md. 2007); Fleet Real
Estate Funding Corp. v. Smith, 530 A.2d 919 (Pa. Super.
1987); FNMA v. Moore, 609 F. Supp. 194 (D.C. Ill. 1985); Associated
East Mortgage Co. v. Young, 394 A.2d 899 (N.J.
Super. 1978); FNMA v. Ricks, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 485 (1975).
41 Senate Bill 628 Engrossed Version—A, § 6.
42 Ryan Frank, Foreclosure Relief Bill Stalls in Oregon Senate, The
Oregonian, June 18, 2009 (http://www.oregonlive.com/business/
oregonian/index.ssf?/base/business/12452973212497
40.xml&coll=7); Oregon Legislation: Mandatory Mediation Compromise
to Emerge, United Trustee Association eNews June 5,
2009 (http://www.unitedtrustees.com/enews/461.php).
43 Oregon Enrolled Senate Bill 628.
44 Enrolled bills 4453, 4454, 4455 as signed by Governor
May 20, 2009, effective July 5, 2009.
45 Nevada Assembly Bill No. 149, effective July 1, 2009.
46 Nevada Supreme Court Rule 7(3), effective July 1, 2009.
47 LD 1418 §§ 3, 13, amending 14 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. §
38 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
6231-A).
48 The FDIC loan modification model is similar, but not
identical to the standard HAMP spreadsheet calculation. See
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/loanmodguide.
html.
49 LD 1418 §§ 3, 13, amending 14 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. §
6231-A
50 Id. at § 7.
51 Home Affordable Modification Program Supplemental
Directive 09-01 April 6, 2009. p. 14 https://www.hmpadmin
.com/portal/docs/sd0901.pdf
52 Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working
Toward a Solution: March Oversight Report, March 6, 2009, pp.
49–52. (available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
030609-report.pdf).
53 Information on the FDIC loan modification “loan mod in
a box” spreadsheet can be found at http://www.fdic.gov/
consumers/loans/loanmod/loanmodguide.html.
54 14 Me. Rev. Stat. § 6321-A.
55 The Michigan and California conference statutes set out
some very broad standards for loan modification guidelines
that are deemed acceptable. However, homeowners do not
receive the actual net present value calculation for their
loan. The standards themselves allow servicers considerable
discretion in considering a modification.
56 See, Note 122, infra.
57 See Nick. v. Morgan’s Foods, Inc.., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056
(E.D. Mo. 2000), affirmed 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2000) (sanctions
imposed for bad faith participation in ADR session);
43 A.L.R. 5th 545 (1996).
58 Under the administrative orders for the First, Eleventh,
and Nineteenth circuits the court may impose sanctions if
the lender breaches a settlement agreement.
59 Maine LD 1418,amending Maine Rev. Stat. § 6231-A.
60 See, Note 122, infra.
61 Nevada Assembly Bill No. 149, effective July 1, 2009.
62 See e.g., Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, (— P.3d —, 2009
WL 2633640 (Kan. Aug. 28, 2009) (MERS cannot make itself
a necessary party to a foreclosure action by labeling itself a
“mortgagee” in boilerplate language). See also Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, Inc. v. Southwest Homes of
Arkansas, — S.W.3d —, 2009 WL 723182 ( Ark., March 19,
2009) In re Jacobson, — B.R. —, 2009 WL 567188 * 5 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2009)Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan,
2009 WL 625560 (Ohio App. Mar. 12, 2009) In re Kang Jin
Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 770-71 ( Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) In re
Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516-17 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) HSBC
Bank USA, NA v. Yeasmin, 19 Misc.3d 1127(A), 866 N.Y.S.
2d 92 (Table) (N.Y. Sup. 2008) In re Nosek, 386 B.R. 374
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (imposing sanctions of $250,000 on
creditor for misrepresenting status of holder of note during
protracted litigation) In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp.
2d 650 (S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Parsley, 384 B.R. 138 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2007); Everhome Mortgage Co. v. Rowland, 2008 WL
747698 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2008); DJL Mortgage Capital,
Inc. v. Parsons, 2008 WL 697400 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13,
2008).
63 See e.g. F.R. Civ. P. Nos. 17, 19.
64 Nevada Assembly Bill No. 149, effective July 1, 2009.
65 Nevada Supreme Court Rule 7(3).
66 Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules New Mexico First
Judicial District,
http://firstdistrictcourt.com/Forms/doc/Plaintiff’s%20info
%20response.doc
67 Summit County Ohio Court of Common Pleas Rules:
http://www.summitcpcourt.net/
68 Seminole County Procedure for Mortgage Foreclosure
Hearings at http://www.flcourts18.org/PDF/Foreclosures/
Simmons_Foreclosure_Procedure.pdf.
69 N.Y. RPAPL § 1302
70 14 Maine Rev. Stat. § 6321 [check]
71 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.3204.
72 Home Affordable Modification Program, Supplemental
Directive 09-01 April 6, 2009 p. 18.
73 See e.g. Staff of Joint Economics Committee, 110th Cong.,
1st Sess., The Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact
on Wealth, Property Values and Tax Revenues, and How We
Got There (2007) http://jec.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction
=Reports.Reports&ContentRecord_id=c6627bb27e9c-9af9-
7ac7-32b94d398d27&Region_id=&Issue_id= _____, infra.
(projecting foreclosed home owners will lose $71 billion due
to foreclosure crisis, neighbors will lose $32 billion, and
state and local governments will lose $917 million in property
tax revenue).
74 See Appendix on Constitutional Issues, supra.
75 Franklin, Lucas, and Summit counties.
76 First, Eleventh, and Nineteenth judicial circuits.
77 Allegheny, Bucks, Northampton and Philadelphia counties.
78 N.Y. C.P.L.R. Rule 3408.
79 Congressional Oversight Panel, The Foreclosure Crisis: Working
Toward a Solution (March Oversight Report) March 6,
2009 at p. 15.
80 Id. at p. 18.
81 OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report, Disclosure of
National Bank and Federal Thrift Mortgage Loan Data,
April 2009.
82 Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Servicer
Reporting Requirements at https://www.hmpadmin.com/
portal/docs/hamp_servicer/hampreportingrequirements.pdf
83 State of Connecticut Judicial Branch Data Report July 1,
2008 though April 30, 2009..
84 Id.
85 First Judicial District of Pennsylvania Press Release June
30, 2009 (“First Judicial District Marks One-Year Anniversary
of Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion Program
as Approximately 1400 Philadelphia Homes Averted
From Sheriff Sale”).
86 David Rothstein and Sapna Mehta, Foreclosure Growth in
Ohio 2009 Policy Matters Ohio, March 2009 p. 2 (available at
www.policymattersohio.org).
87 Data provided by Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas June 26, 2009.
88 Data provided by “Franklin County Foreclosure Mediation
Project (FCFMP) Memorandum” dated August 10,
2009.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 39
89 Data provided by New York Office of Court Administration
July 13, 2009.
90 The New York data records strictly settlements reached at
conferences. it excludes settlements reached before and after
the settlement conferences even though the case was technically
involved in a conference proceeding at the time of settlement.
The data was provided with the further caveat that
not all courts within the designated counties were reporting
data in consistent or systematic ways.
91 Office of New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Foreclosure
Mediation Program Data Through June 30, 2009 (provided
August 26, 2009).
92 Maine Public law LD 1418 § 7 B.
93 The programs in the First, Eleventh, and Eighteenth judicial
circuits in Florida stay proceedings automatically while
a foreclosure is referred to mediation. The programs in
Bucks, Northampton and Philadelphia counties similarly
stay proceedings automatically while mediation is pending.
The automatic stays in Allegheny County Pennsylvania incorporate
a fixed time of 90 days to conclude mediation.
The Ohio county programs generally limit mediation to
cases in which the homeowner has filed an answer, appeared,
or made some formal request for mediation. Under
the Cuyahoga County program the stay is for 60 days, with
the court able to extend the time by separate order. The
Franklin County, Ohio program extends the time to answer
the complaint for 60 days in cases referred to mediation. Requesting
mediation under the Lucas and Summit counties
program in Ohio extends the time to file an answer, and proceedings
for entry of judgment are stayed until mediation
has been concluded.
94 Nevada 2009 A.B. 149 § 7.
95 See e.g. Nick. v. Morgan’s Foods, Inc.., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056
(E.D. Mo. 2000), affirmed 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2000) (sanctions
imposed for bad faith participation in ADR session);
43 A.L.R. 5th 545 (1996).
96 Court rules implementing Maine foreclosure diversion
statute add a $200.00 administrative fee to all foreclosure
actions filed on or after June 15, 2009. This fee is imposed in
addition to the filing fee upon all foreclosure action filings
in the state. The revenue generated by the fee will be used to
fund the diversion program. http://www.courts.state.me.us/
court_info/rules/fees.shtml#6 2009 Nevada Assembly Bill
No. 65 added a $50 new fee for recording a Notice of Default
and Election to Sell effective July 1, 2009., to be paid over
to account for foreclosure mediation http://www.nevada
judiciary.us/images/foreclosure/trusteebrocure.pdf
97 First and Nineteenth judicial circuits.
98 The Eleventh and Eighteenth judicial circuits.
99 See e.g. Ala. Code § 5-19-10; Iowa Code Ann. § 537.2507;
S.D. Codified Laws § 15-17-39.
100 See e.g. In re Lake, 245 B.R. 282 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000)
(Ohio common law prohibits enforcement of fees shifting
provision of notes and mortgages that were not fairly bargained
for); Spencer Savings Bank, SLA v. Shaw, 401 N.J.
Super. 1, 949 A.2d 218 (2008) (New Jersey Fair Foreclosure
statute prohibits claims for fees incurred prior to filing of
foreclosure complaint); In re Hatala, 295 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D.
N.J. 2003) (provisions of New Jersey court rule, not terms of
mortgage and note or lender’s actual expenditures determine
homeowner’s liability for fees); In re Schwartz, 68 B.R.
376 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (terms of Pennsylvania Act No. 6,
41 P.S. § 406 limit pre filing attorney’s fees related to mortgage
foreclosure to $50.00)
101 Home Affordable Modification Program Supplemental
Directive 09-01, April 6, 2009 p. 22 ( https://www.hmpadmin.
com/portal/docs/sd0901.pdf)
102 Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working
toward a Solution (March 6, 2009) p. 47.
103 Making Home Affordable: Introduction of the Second
Lien Modification Program (2MP), Supplemental Directive
9-05 (August 13, 2009). https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/
docs/second_lien/sd0905.pdf .
104 These are the Ninth and Eighteenth judicial circuits.
105 Osborne on Mortgages § 331 (2d ed. 1979). See generally
Poteat, State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage Debtor during the
Depression, 5 Law and Contemporary Problems, 517 (1938);
Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 Harvard L.
Rev. 1061 (1933); G. Glenn, Mortgages, Vol. II §§ 150 to 167
(1943); Powell on Real Property § 37.49 (1968 ed.).
106 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
107 The “Contracts Clause,” Article 1, Section 10 of the
United States Constitution provides that “No state shall . . .
pass any Law . . . impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”
The Constitutional Convention added this provision in reaction
to a spate of debtor relief laws recently enacted by the
states. The founders of the new national government perceived
these state laws as a threat to the country’s ability to
build credit and compete as a growing commercial nation.
See generally Samuel L. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the
Blaisdell Decision: a Historical Study of Contracts Clause Jurisprudence,
72 Or. L. Rev. 513, 517-518 (1993).
108 Id. 290 U.S. at 443-44.
109 Id. 290 U.S. at 438.
110 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
111 Energy Reserves, supra 456 U.S. at 411-412.
112 East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
113 Laue v. Proctorville Credit, 390 N.W. 2d 823 (1986). See generally
Robert M. Lawless, The American Response to Farm
Crises: Procedural Debtor Relief, 1988 Univ. of Ill. L. Rev.
1037 (1988); Roland C. Amundson and Lewis J. Rotman, Depression
Jurisprudence Revisited: Minnesota’s Moratorium on Mortgage
Foreclosure, 10 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 805 (1984);
Timothy D. Benton, Iowa’s Mortgage Moratorium Statute: A
Constitutional Analysis, 33 Drake L. Rev. 303 (1983-84); Note,
12 Real Estate Law Journal 366 (1984).
114 See Part I, supra.
115 See Note 40, supra. CAL.
116 922 A.2d 538 (Md. 2007).
117 Id. 922 A.2d at 553.
118 Id. 922 A.2d at 551
119 Treasury’s guidelines for the HAMP program, including
guidelines for its net present value test can be found at
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/index.html.
40 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
120 See Note 29, supra.
121 See Note 29, 30–31, supra.
122 See e.g. Hebert T. Tiffany & Basil Jones 5 Tiffany Real Property
§ 1556 (2008); 55 Am Jur. 2d Mortgages § 676; Milton
R. Friedman & James Charles Smith, Friedman on Contracts &
Conveyance of Real Property § 3:6.5 (2008) 59 C.J.S. Mortgages
§ 512 (2009); Northeast Savings v. Hintlian, 696 A.2d 315
(Conn. 1997); Sovereign Bank, FSB v. Kuelzow, 687 A.2d
1039 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997); Rosselot v. Heimbrock, 561 N.E.
2d 555 (Ohio Ap.. 1988); Woods v. Monticello Dev. Co., 687
P.2d 1324 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). See also Lo v. Jensen, 88 Cal.
App. 4th 1093, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (2001) (applying equitable
principles in non judicial foreclosure context); Gilroy
v. Ryberg, 266 Neb. 617, 667 N.W. 2d 544 (2003) (same).
123 See Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 446-47 (1934); Richmond Mortgage Corporation v.
Wachovia Bank, 300 U.S. 124, 129-130 (1937) Honeyman v.
Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539, 543-44 (1939); Gelfert v. National City
Bank of New York, 313 U.S. 221, 231-33 (1941). The Gelfert
court, which upheld a New York statute barring post foreclosure
deficiency claims, summed up this tradition as follows:
“We mention these matters here because they indicate
that for about two centuries there has been a rather continuous
effort through general rule or by appeal to the chancellor
in specific cases to prevent the machinery of judicial sales
from becoming an instrument of oppression. And so far as
mortgage foreclosures are concerned, numerous devices
have been employed to safeguard mortgagors from sales
which will or may result in mortgagees collecting more than
their due.” 313 U.S. at 232-33.
124 Gelfert v. National City Bank of New York, 313 U.S. 221,
233-234 (1941); Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 124, 543-44
(1937).
125 Id.
126 [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” U.S. Const. Amdt. 5, made applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g. Kelo
v. City of New London, 546 U.S. 469 (2005) (municipality’s
action to acquire private property for transfer to private entities
as part of planned community redevelopment program
was for a public use and permissible under takings
clause). Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) (environmental regulation that essentially deprives
real property owner of all economically viable use of
land can amount to the same as a physical appropriation of
the land under takings clause).
127 See e.g Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538
U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (noting distinction between analytical
standards for regulatory as opposed to physical takings);
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001)
(same).
128 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 130-134 (1978); see generally Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
supra, 533 U.S. at 633-34 (O’Connor concurring).
129 Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of
Roanoke, Virginia, 304 U.S. 502 (1938).
130 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Edgar A. Levy Leasing
Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 342 (1922).
131 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). See also Chicago Board of
Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1987)(ordinance
regulating charges and other obligations imposed
on landlords did not violate contracts clause and other constitutional
provisions); Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287 (3d
Cir. 1984) (rent control limits on lease termination can be
enforced as reasonable standard); Help Hoboken Housing v.
City of Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. (D.N.J. 1986) (sustaining ordinance
which imposed penalties for not renting properties);
Griffin Development Co. v. City of Oxnard, 39 Cal. 3d
256, 703 P.3d 339 (1985) (sustaining ordinance restricting
conversion of rental units to condominiums). San Marcos
Mobilehome Park Owners’ Assn. v. City of San Marcos, 192
Cal App. 3d 1492, 238 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1987) (reasonable rent
control procedures for fair return); Hutton Park gardens v.
Town Council of Town of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 350
A.2d 1 (1975) (same); Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 797 F.2d
1493 (9th Cir. 1986) (rent control procedures unreasonable
and overly confiscatory); Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F.
Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same).
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 41
Thanks
7 Winthrop Square, 4th Floor
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 542-8010
www.consumerlaw.org
STATE AND LOCAL
FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION
PROGRAMS
Can They Save Homes?
September 2009
NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW
CENTER®
State and Local Foreclosure
Mediation Programs:
Can They Save Homes?
Written By
Geoffry Walsh
Staff Attorney
National Consumer Law Center
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank Carolyn Carter, Margot Saunders, and John Rao and Arielle
Cohen of NCLC for valuable guidance, feedback, and editorial assistance in the preparation of
this report. Particular thanks to Juala Smythe, James Kwok, and Rick Jurgens for research and to
Julie Gallagher for graphic design.
This report was funded in part by the Open Society Institute. We thank them for their support but
acknowledge that the findings and conclusions presented in the report are those of the authors
alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Institute.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Geoff Walsh has been a legal services attorney for over twenty-five years and is presently a staff
attorney with National Consumer Law Center in Boston. Before that, he worked with the housing
and consumer units of Community Legal Services in Philadelphia and was a staff attorney with
Vermont Legal Aid. His practice has focused upon housing, foreclosure, and bankruptcy issues.
He has served as a panelist and instructor at trainings and legal education seminars on foreclosure
prevention and bankruptcy topics. He is co-author of NCLC’s recent report, Foreclosing a
Dream: State Laws Deprive Homeowners of Basic Protections (2009) and writes for NCLC’s
legal practice manuals, including Foreclosures, Foreclosure Prevention Counseling, Student
Loan Law and Consumer Bankruptcy Law and Practice.
Executive Summary v
The Promise of Foreclosure Mediation Programs v
Separating Facts from Fiction v
Recommendations for Improving Foreclosure Mediation Programs vi
Foreclosure Mediations Are Not a Substitute for Effective Federal Legislation
to Require Loan Modifications vii
Introduction 1
Variation in Foreclosure Mediation Programs and Authority to Set Them Up 1
The Goals of Foreclosure Mediation and How They Are Being Achieved 3
Other Federal Loan Modification Efforts 6
Preserving Servicer Control at the Federal Level 6
Incentives and Standards for Modification—the Making Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) 7
Foreclosure Mediation Programs Have the Potential to Enable the Making
Home Affordable Modification Program to Succeed 10
Bringing Standards to Foreclosure Mediation—Successes and Failures
in Recent State Legislation 11
Evaluation and Recommendations for Improving Foreclosure
Mediation Programs 12
Views from Advocates 12
The Existing Foreclosure Mediation Programs Lack Standards for
Servicer Accountability 13
Recommendations: Five Necessary Servicer Obligations 14
Recommendations: Enforcing Compliance With Servicer Obligations 20
Recommendations: Improving Homeowner Participation and Procedural
Aspects of Programs 24
Conclusion 29
Appendix: Constitutional Issues Related to State Foreclosure Mediation Laws 31
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Promise of Foreclosure
Mediation Programs
In the ongoing struggle to control the ravages of
the foreclosure crisis, mediation programs have
emerged as an increasingly attractive option.
Many consumer advocates and community
groups have supported the implementation of
foreclosure mediation programs and continue to
do so. In a little over a year, from mid-2008 to
mid-2009, more than 25 distinct foreclosure mediation
programs were launched in fourteen different
states. State legislatures, state supreme
courts, and local courts all played roles in creating
these programs.
Foreclosure mediations hold out the hope of
removing major obstacles that have hindered efforts
to slow the spread of the foreclosure epidemic.
In particular, the securitization of
mortgage debt has erected significant barriers between
homeowners and the owners of their mortgages.
When homeowners want to negotiate over
a loan modification or other alternative to foreclosure,
they often cannot find a person authorized
to negotiate with them. With homeowners
cut off from effective negotiations, foreclosures
move ahead and losses to investors mount with
each completed foreclosure. Today, the rate at
which loans are being modified remains extremely
low in relation to the high numbers of
ongoing foreclosures
Separating Facts from Fiction
In preparing this report we interviewed legal ser -
vices attorneys, court officials, and other advocates
who have been working directly with the 25
foreclosure mediation programs we considered.
Our review raised concerns about the kind of expectations
that these programs may be encouraging.
For example, there is as yet no data to
confirm that foreclosure mediation programs
anywhere have led to a substantial number of affordable
and sustainable loan modifications.
Such data would be very helpful in building support
for more mediation programs. However,
thus far this information is uniformly lacking.
Foreclosure mediation programs have the potential
to play an important role in preventing
needless loss of homes. However, we found that
the existing programs routinely fail to impose
significant obligations on mortgage servicers.
Without the imposition of these obligations, it is
unlikely that mediations will lead to fewer foreclosures.
The programs we considered often lack
mandatory rules and fail to impose sanctions for
non compliance with what minimal rules exist.
The programs do not require servicers to provide
information substantiating a right to foreclose.
They do not mandate analyses of loan modification
alternatives. Many set unreasonable procedural
barriers that restrict large numbers of
homeowners from participating.
Ultimately, under most of the existing foreclosure
mediation programs servicer discretion prevails.
If the programs continue to demand little
or no accountability from servicers, they will
likely go the way of other efforts to control foreclosures
that relied on voluntary compliance by
the lending industry. They will become another
piece of imagery the industry uses to support its
claims that voluntary efforts work, that statutory
and other government mandates for loan modifications
are unnecessary, and that jargon about
the benefits of communication can solve the
foreclosure crisis.
v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Servicer Discretion in Foreclosure
Mediation and Other Efforts to Control
Foreclosures through Voluntary Efforts
by Servicers
The popularity of foreclosure mediation programs
is built upon some major assumptions.
The arguments in support of the programs tend
to portray the lack of movement on loan modifications
primarily as a “communication” problem.
The assumption seems to be that servicers
want to modify loans, they want to make payment
terms more affordable for homeowners,
and they want to avoid foreclosures on a large
scale. According to this view, the problem has
been that homeowners simply have not been able
to find the right people to talk with and the right
setting for a talk.
While homeowners have definitely encountered
barriers in trying to communicate with
their mortgage holders, these barriers have
clearly not been the only impediment to more
loan modifications. To begin with, there is the
undeniable track record of the lending industry
over the past two years. Since the beginning of
the foreclosure crisis the industry has tried systematically
to defeat and evade every enforceable
obligation related to implementation of loan
modifications that anyone has attempted to impose
upon it. The industry has consistently fought
to preserve servicers’ discretion to refuse loan
modifications whenever they wished to do so.
Foreclosure mediation programs must be
viewed in the context of other federal and state
actions that were intended to encourage affordable
loan modifications. Early initiatives at the
federal level stressed cooperative efforts among
servicers and federal agencies. These programs
invariably allowed servicers to exercise complete
discretion in deciding whether to modify a particular
loan. As a result, very few loans were modified
under these programs. At the same time, the
industry opposed efforts to make loan modifications
mandatory. Earlier this year the mortgage
lending industry succeeded in a well-financed
campaign to defeat legislation that would have
required loan modifications in bankruptcy without
servicers’ consent.
With the industry’s encouragement, crucial elements
of accountability have been omitted from
the Treasury Department’s Home Affordable
Modification Program (“HAMP”). Now, over six
months after its inception, this new federal initiative
serves only a small percentage of eligible
homeowners. At the state level the lending and
servicing industries have opposed efforts to
strengthen mediation programs by requiring
that servicers document their loan modification
calculations.
Today most servicers operate under a duty to
comply with federal guidelines requiring that
they perform a loan modification review before a
foreclosure sale. HAMP and similar government
sponsored initiatives impose loan modification
obligations upon servicers responsible for more
than 80% of all home loans. Mediation programs
can play a vital role in ensuring that servicers comply
with these federal obligations. The data released
so far on servicers’ compliance with HAMP
guidelines reveals a pressing need for more oversight.
Mediation programs should play an important
role in this review. However, as most foreclosure
mediation programs are structured today,
few are capable of performing this role. Substantial
changes are needed before they will be effective.
Recommendations for Improving
Foreclosure Mediation Programs
Imposing Necessary Servicer Obligations
Court-supervised mediation programs will benefit
homeowners only if they impose meaningful
obligations on servicers. This report reviews a
number of these obligations and recommends
that programs impose the following requirements
on all servicers:
1. Require that the servicer give the homeowner a
document showing its affordable loan modification
calculation and net present value
calculation.
vi STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
2. Require that the servicer produce specified
documents, such as a pooling and servicing
agreement, loan origination documents, an
appraisal, and loan payment history.
3. Require that servicers comply with all mediation
obligations in good faith—negotiate in
good faith and be subject to sanctions for the
failure to do so.
4. Require that servicers establish proof of the
mortgage holder’s standing and status as the
real party in interest.
5. Require that the servicer document that it has
considered specific alternatives to foreclosure,
such as loan modifications, applications
for state and federal financial assistance
programs, workout agreements, short
sales, etc.
Enforcing Servicer Obligations
In addition, programs should document and enforce
compliance with these obligations by:
1. Not permitting a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure
to proceed unless a mediator or court
has certified the servicer’s compliance with the
five basic requirements set forth above;
2. Requiring documentation of all outcomes, including
the nature of loan modifications arrived
at through mediation.
Increasing Homeowner Participation
and Improving the Process
Assuming that there are meaningful servicer obligations
in place, then it becomes appropriate to
consider how to structure a program so that it
will bring in as many homeowners as possible.
The final part of this report reviews procedural
and structural options for increasing participation
in programs. The report recommends several devices
that can lead to effective participation by
the greatest number of homeowners. These recommendations
include:
1. Establish procedures for automatic participation
by homeowners subject to foreclosure
proceedings;
2. If participation is not automatic, allow requests
for mediation to be made up to the
time of a foreclosure sale;
3. Stay all foreclosure proceedings until a mediator
or court determines that the servicer has
complied in good faith with all participation
obligations;
4. Provide for direct court supervision over the
enforcement of servicer obligations to mediate,
including the imposition of sanctions
when necessary. Sanctions must include dismissal
of judicial foreclosure actions and orders
barring non-judicial proceedings;
5. Provide funding for outreach, housing counselors,
and qualified counsel for homeowners;
6. Prohibit the servicer from shifting to the
homeowner its attorney’s fees or other costs of
participating in the mediation process;
7. Require junior lienholders to be notified of
and allowed to participate in mediations.
State Authority
States clearly have the authority to impose the
servicer obligations and procedural requirements
outlined above. Implementing a program with
these features is well within the scope of the
states’ police power, particularly during a period
of economic crisis. Based on this report’s analysis
of constitutional issues, it is apparent that the
states have been vastly under-using their authority
to act in this area.
Foreclosure Mediations Are Not
a Substitute for Effective Federal
Legislation to Require Loan
Modifications
Finally we conclude that it would be a mistake to
pass up any opportunity to regulate servicers and
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS vii
lenders at the federal level based on a belief that
states will somehow deal effectively with the
problem of servicers’ who fail to implement sustainable
loan modifications. This is particularly
true with respect to ensuring that servicers comply
with their obligations under HAMP and similar
federal programs. Congress and federal agencies
have the primary responsibility for creating and
enforcing strong standards for these federal programs.
Servicers have already demonstrated their
ability to exert substantial control over state
mediation programs. At best, well structured
state mediation programs can play a limited role
as a check on servicers’ compliance with federal
standards. However, if there are no mandatory
federal standards requiring truly affordable loan
modifications, it is unlikely that state and local
governments will create effective enforcement
tools. Federal policy makers should not look to
states, and particularly to state and local mediation
programs, as a substitute for strong federal
mandates.
viii STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Introduction
As the foreclosure crisis deepened over the past
eighteen months and counter measures at the
federal level proved ineffective, state and local
governments struggled to come up with responses
of their own. Many advocates for homeowners
urged the adoption of foreclosure
mediation programs as reforms that could be implemented
promptly, often with considerable
community support. As a result of these efforts
there are now at least 25 foreclosure mediation
programs in operation in fourteen states around
the country. Programs requiring mediations or
conferences before foreclosure sales are underway
in several states with the most severe levels of
foreclosure, including California, Florida, Nevada,
Michigan, and Ohio.
Foreclosure mediation programs are still a relatively
new phenomenon. The oldest programs
have been in effect for just over one year. Meanwhile,
the implementation of new programs has
been accelerating. During the month of July 2009
alone, new statewide foreclosure mediation programs
began to operate in five states. At the local
level during the same month new programs went
into effect in states ranging from Pennsylvania to
New Mexico.
Variation in Foreclosure Mediation
Programs and Authority to Set Them Up
Foreclosure mediation programs have come in
many forms. They have appeared in both judicial
and non-judicial foreclosure states. In some programs
courts refer residential foreclosures to the
court’s existing alternative dispute resolution
system where parties follow established mediation
protocols. Other programs provide a special
court-supervised settlement conference for parties
to a foreclosure. Some programs do not involve
formal mediation or mediators at all. Instead, they
merely direct mortgage servicers to contact
homeowners to discuss settlement options before
the servicers proceed with foreclosures.
In states with primarily non judicial foreclosures
there are invariably judicial foreclosure
statutes still on the books. Although not frequently
used, these judicial foreclosure statutes
can create the basis for a court role in supervising
mediations in non judicial foreclosure states. For
example, mediation statutes may refer non judicial
foreclosures to the state judiciary’s alternative
dispute resolution system or provide for referral of
disputes arising during mediation to the courts.
Nevada and Michigan are non judicial foreclosure
states that recently implemented conference
or mediation legislation that provide for judicial
involvement under certain circumstances in foreclosures
that otherwise would proceed without
court involvement.
Programs Reviewed in this Report
For purposes of this report we will use the term
“mediation” very loosely to mean any program
that requires a mortgage holder or servicer to have
some contact with a homeowner for the purpose
of considering alternatives to foreclosure before
1
STATE AND LOCAL
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION
PROGRAMS
Can They Save Homes?
September 2009
proceeding to a foreclosure sale. The programs
themselves may use various terms to describe
these procedures, including mediation, foreclosure
diversion, conferences, or simply “meetings.”
They may or may not require personal
appearances by borrowers or lenders in one place
at the same time. Under certain programs a conference
can take place between a homeowner and
a servicer without third party oversight.
We have attempted to review program operations
and have conducted personal interviews
with individuals involved in all existing foreclosure
mediation programs. The 25 state and local
programs we reviewed are listed on pages 4 and 5.
An Appendix released simultaneously with this
report provides a detailed analysis of each of the
programs. We may have omitted some local programs.
For example, in Ohio there are a number
of smaller county programs that have adopted
variations on a state model foreclosure mediation
protocol. We have not included all of the
Ohio counties, focusing instead on four counties
with well established programs. We also do not
include programs in which the servicer’s participation
is voluntary. Thus, we do not include programs
in which both the servicer and the
homeowner may elect to opt out entirely. Finally,
there are new programs in development in a
number of localities, including in Pennsylvania,
and we do not yet have the final details on these
programs.
The authority to set up foreclosure mediation
programs has come from three basic sources.
First, state statutes have created many programs.
These include the programs now underway in
California, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New
York, and Oregon. Second, state supreme courts
have taken the lead in developing programs in
2 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
JUDICIAL AND NON JUDICIAL FORECLOSURES
The states are fairly evenly divided in whether they
require mortgage holders to go through a formal judicial
proceeding in order to foreclose against a
home. About half the states allow lenders to conduct
a foreclosure without direct court supervision.
These non-judicial foreclosures are called by various
names, including foreclosure by “power of sale” or
“foreclosure by advertisement.” In non judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions a state statute typically sets out
the procedures a lender must follow to conduct an
auction sale that leads to transfer of the property to
a high bidder. Because a lender does not initiate a
court proceeding to start a non judicial foreclosure,
the homeowner must file a lawsuit for an injunction
to stop the sale. Absent such a lawsuit by the homeowner,
the courts do not supervise non judicial foreclosures.
By contrast, a judicial foreclosure proceeds
as a civil lawsuit through the court system, with the
court entering a judgment for foreclosure, ordering
a sale, and typically reviewing a report of the sale.
In the following states judicial foreclosures are
the predominant method of foreclosure.
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Vermont, Wisconsin
In the following states non judicial foreclosures
are the typical method of foreclosure.
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona,
California, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming
In a few states, there is a mixed procedure that
combines elements of both:
Oklahoma, North Carolina, South Dakota
two states, New Jersey and Ohio. Finally, local
courts have acted on their own to create programs
in various localities in Pennsylvania, Florida,
Kentucky and New Mexico. In the latter type of
program the local courts act under a general
state statute on the judiciary or a state supreme
court rule that delegates substantial authority to
local courts to manage cases as they see fit.1
The Goals of Foreclosure Mediation
and How They Are Being Achieved
It is not surprising that foreclosure mediation
programs have been an attractive option at the
state and local level. Policymakers have emphasized
the need to modify mortgage loans as a way
to reduce the number of foreclosures, particularly
where loan balances exceed the current market
value of homes.2 Given the realities of today’s real
estate market, investors lose substantial value with
every foreclosure. For example, a national survey
of mortgages in foreclosure during November
2008 indicated that lenders were incurring losses
averaging $124,000 in each foreclosure.3 With the
loans in foreclosure having an average value of
$212,000, this meant that the lenders were losing
57% of their investment each time they completed
a foreclosure. Average losses on second mortgages
subject to foreclosures were nearly 100%.4
A June 2009 update of the same study found
that investors’ losses from foreclosures of first
mortgages had risen even higher, to 64.65% of
the value of the loans.5 At the same time servicers
were rarely modifying loans to make payments
more affordable to homeowners. According to
the same survey, in the relatively few instances
when servicers agreed to write off a portion of
loan principal in order to make payments more
affordable, the servicers wrote off amounts averaging
only $14,353. The loss severities from these
loan modifications averaged just 6.4% of the original
loan amounts. In the overwhelming majority
of cases lenders did not modify loans at all. They
pursued foreclosures instead, incurring average
losses of $143,987, or nearly two thirds of the
value of their investments.6 It would thus appear
obvious that if the homeowner and lender could
negotiate an affordable and sustainable loan
modification in place of a foreclosure, all parties
would almost always be better off.
The potential for incurring these overwhelming
losses would appear to give servicers and
homeowners much to talk about. Mediation programs
typically require the servicer’s attorney to
appear by phone or in person together with a representative
of the current holder of the mortgage.
The representative must have authority to modify
the loan. To the extent that mediations can facilitate
this direct communication, cutting
through the barriers created by securitization
and loan servicing bureaucracies, they should
perform a valuable service.
Because they have such great potential to promote
rational conduct as an alternative to massive
destruction of value, foreclosure mediation
programs have appeared as one of the few
bright spots in the otherwise gloomy media coverage
of the foreclosure crisis. The launching of
some programs has been accompanied by optimistic
forecasts of thousands of homes to be
saved. For example, in announcing the implementation
of the New Jersey foreclosure mediation
program in January 2009 the state Attorney
General’s office indicated that “planners anticipate
as many as 16,600 homeowners will participate
in the foreclosure mediation program this
year.”7 As will be discussed later in this report,
this estimate turned out to be wildly optimistic.
8 After Nevada’s assembly passed the
state’s foreclosure mediation bill by a 41–0 vote
in May 2009, the assembly speaker announced
that the law could keep 17,700 families from
losing their homes to foreclosure.9
Lack of Reporting and Evidence of Results
The growing popularity of foreclosure mediation
programs cannot be disputed. Yet, despite this
popularity, one fact is common to all the programs.
Although the goal of these programs has
been to produce long term settlements that will
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 3
4 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
SUMMARY OF 25 FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
California
Authority: Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2923.5
Structure: Unsupervised conference between servicer
and homeowner before filing notice of default in
non judicial foreclosure.
Eligibility: Servicer must attempt to initiate
conference in all residential foreclosures
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Connecticut
Authority: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-265ee
Structure: Court sponsored mediation in judicial
foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner must file appearance after
receiving summons and complaint
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Florida 1st, 11th, and 19th Judicial Circuits
Authority: Administrative orders by circuit chief
judges
Structure: Judicial foreclosures: formal mediations
managed by private non profit: Collins Center
Eligibility: Automatic referral of residential
foreclosures to mediation
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Florida 9th Judicial Circuit
Authority: Administrative order by circuit chief judge
Structure: Judicial foreclosure, servicer must schedule
formal mediation with certified mediator
Eligibility: Automatic unless servicer asserts
exemption
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Florida 12th Judicial Circuit
Authority: Administrative order by circuit chief judge.
Structure: Servicer to attempt phone conference with
homeowner
Eligibility: Automatic, homeowner need not formally
request.
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: none
Florida 18th Judicial Circuit
Authority: Administrative order by circuit chief judge
Structure: Formal mediation with court or parties
choosing mediatior
Eligibility: Residential foreclosures referred
automatically to mediation
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: none
Indiana
Authority: Senate Enrolled Act 492 effective July 1, 2009
Structure: Homeowner may ask to participate in
conference with servicer after served with
summons and complaint in judicial foreclosure.
Mediator optional, not required
Eligibility: Homeowner must notify court of intention
to request conference.
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Kentucky (Jefferson County—Louisville)
Authority: Local court’s general ADR authority
Structure: Notice of settlement conference with court
issued with each judicial foreclosure
Eligibility: Applies automatically to residential
foreclosures
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Maine
Authority: 14 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6321-A
Structure: Court sponsored mediations in judicial
foreclosure
Eligibility: Case referred to mediation upon
homeowner’s request
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: Mediations must
use FDIC loan modification calculation
Michigan
Authority: Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 3205, 3205a-3205e
Structure: Opportunity for homeowner to engage in
unmediated conference with servicer
Eligibility: Borrower can request conference and have
90 day pre foreclosure negotiation period before
non judicial foreclosure can begin
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: Servicer must
provide a loan modification calculation but does
not include net present value analysis
Nevada
Authority: Assembly Bill 149 effective July 1, 2009
Structure: referral of non judicial foreclosures to
court supervised mediation
Eligibility: Homeowner must elect participation
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: Servicer must provide
mediator with “evaluative methodology” used
to determine eligibility for loan modification.
New Jersey
Authority Program of New Jersey Judiciary Jan. 2009
Structure: Court supervised mediation in judicial
foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner must make timely election to
participate
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 5
SUMMARY OF 25 FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS (continued)
New Mexico
Authority: Administrative order of county court
Structure: Formal mediation of judicial foreclosures
administered as part of court’s ADR system
Eligibility: Homeowner must return a request for
mediation form
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
New York
Authority: N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3408
Structure: Mandatory court supervised settlement
conferences in judicial foreclosures
Eligibility: Applicable automatically to foreclosures
involving “high cost,” subprime, and
“non-traditional” loans.
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Ohio—Cuyahoga County (Cleveland)
Authority: County program adopted under state
supreme court guidelines
Structure: Formal ADR type mediation in judicial
foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner must request mediation and
court must approve request
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Ohio—Franklin County (Columbus)
Authority: County program adopted under state
supreme court guidelines
Structure: Court and county organize mediations
with certified mediators
Eligibility: Homeowner must request during limited
time frame
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Ohio—Lucas County (Toledo)
Authority: County program adopted under state
supreme court guidelines
Structure: Magistrate and court supervised
mediation in judicial foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner may request mediation after
receiving summons and complaint
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Ohio—Summit County (Akron)
Authority: County program adopted under state
supreme court guidelines
Structure: Court reviews, refers for ADR process
supervised by magistrate
Eligibility: Applicable to cases with answers filed
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Oregon
Authority: Senate Bill 628 effective July 1, 2009
Structure: Homeowner may have unsupervised
meeting with lender representative to discuss loan
modification
Eligibility: Homeowner must make timely request for
meeting
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Pennsylvania—Allegheny County
Authority: Administrative order of local court acting
under state statute authorizing local courts to
make administrative rules
Structure: Court supervised conciliation conferences
in judicial foreclosures
Eligibility: Homeowner must make timely request for
conference
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Pennsylvania—Bucks County
Authority: Administrative order of local court acting
under state statute authorizing local courts to
make administrative rules
Structure: Conciliation conferences before court
appointed mediators
Eligibility: Homeowner must make timely request to
for conference
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Pennsylvania—Northampton County
Authority: Local court acting under state law
authorizing local courts to make administrative
rules
Structure: Court supervised conciliation conferences
Eligibility: Case management order set automatically,
homeowner must certify met with housing
counselor
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
Pennsylvania—Philadelphia County
Authority: Administrative order of local court acting
under state statute authorizing local courts to
make administrative rules
Structure: Court supervised conciliation conferences
in judicial foreclosures
Eligibility: Residential properties automatically
scheduled for conciliation conference
Modification analysis/NPV disclosure: None
preserve homeownership for households facing
foreclosures, there is no concrete evidence showing
that any of these programs is truly achieving
this goal. Regardless of their location and structure,
none of the 25 existing foreclosure mediation
programs has offered any concrete data on the nature
of the outcomes it has achieved.
We do not know, for example, whether foreclosure
mediation programs bring about more loan
modifications than would occur in a given locality
if the program did not exist. We also know nothing
about the quality of loan modifications that
come about through these programs. In most localities
officials do not keep any data on outcomes.
Programs that release data on outcomes
do so only under the vaguest categories, typically
designed to place the programs in a favorable light.
Data on the manner in which a loan has been
modified is particularly important in assessing
the success of any foreclosure prevention effort.
The tendency of many loan modifications to increase
the homeowner’s monthly payment has been
well documented. In 2008, 58% of loan modifications
nationally either increased monthly payments
or left them unchanged.10 Modifications
that capitalize arrearages and raise payments redefault
quickly. For example, according to the
2008 data, about half the modified loans that
raised payments or kept payments the same redefaulted
within nine months of modification.11
More recent surveys of modified loans on a national
basis show payment reductions occurring
more frequently, while principal write-offs have
been almost non existent and declining overall as
a form of modification.12 We do not know how
modifications achieved through mediation programs
compare with these general national trends.
This lack of data raises a number of questions
about the role foreclosure mediation programs
are playing in the current crisis. Is the hope the
public has placed in them justified? Do they significantly
alter the balance of power that typically
allows servicers to dictate the manner in which a
foreclosure is resolved? Are the programs a distraction
from facing the need for substantive
changes to laws that might be truly effective in
leveling the playing field and creating sustainable
alternatives to foreclosure?
This report will address these questions, and
others. We will look first at mediation programs
in the larger context, considering features they
have in common with plans developed at the national
level to prevent foreclosures by encouraging
loan modifications. We will then look at state
and local foreclosure mediation programs to see
whether these initiatives are likely to bring about
results that are fundamentally different from
what has occurred so far as a result of the federal
efforts. To the extent there are weaknesses in existing
foreclosure mediation programs, the report
will consider how they can be strengthened
in order to play a more effective role in preserving
homeownership.
Other Federal Loan
Modification Efforts
Foreclosure mediation programs have not been
the only effort undertaken to encourage loan
modifications as an alternative to foreclosure. A
number of initiatives at the federal level were
launched with a similar objective.
Preserving servicer control at
the federal level
Voluntary Modification and
Refinancing—Hope Now and
Hope for Homeowners
Over the past two years policymakers at the federal
level promoted several programs designed to
control the rising tide of home foreclosures. For
the most part these efforts stressed voluntary cooperation
from loan servicers. The hope was that
servicers and investors would recognize their
own interests in choosing alternatives to value
destroying foreclosures. Instead, they would
make less costly loan modifications.
6 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Two highly publicized initiatives along these
lines were the HOPE NOW and Hope for Homeowners
programs. A provision to require loan
mod ifications regardless of servicers’ consent
appeared in proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code.
HOPE NOW. In late 2007, the Treasury Department
and HUD announced “HOPE NOW,” a voluntary
industry plan to modify home mortgages.
Applicable only to a small portion of subprime
borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages who
were current in their loan payments, the program
allowed servicers discretion to eliminate borrowers
even though they otherwise fit the narrow criteria.
Despite promises of millions of workouts,
the program failed. 13
Hope for Homeowners. In July 2008 Congress
created the “Hope for Homeowners” program,
intended to allow large number of homeowners
to refinance into FHA conforming fixed rate
loans. Publicity surrounding the implementation
of the program announced that it would save
400,000 homes14 Again, the program relied upon
voluntary efforts by servicers to assist homeowners
in making applications. In the first half year
of its operation a total of 373 applications were
processed and 13 approved.15
Modification of Home Loans in Bankruptcy. The
mortgage lending industry ran a well-financed
campaign to defeat legislation which would have
allowed bankruptcy courts to modify home mortgages
without mortgage holders’ consent.16 The
industry pursued this anti-modification agenda
despite the views of many prominent economists,
academics, and bankruptcy experts who argued
persuasively that widespread modifications imposed
through the courts were the only measures
likely to slow down the loss of homes in the foreclosure
crisis. Proponents of the legislation made
numerous concessions to the servicing industry
in the course of the legislative process. Yet, the industry
opposition persisted, leading to defeat of
the measure on April 30, 2009.
Incentives and Standards for
Modification—the Making Home
Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP)
The Adoption of the HAMP Program
In February 2009, the Obama Administration announced
its own plan to encourage loan modifications.
17 The Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) consists of Treasury Department
guidelines designed to encourage loan
modifications on a large scale. The program allocated
$75 billion in financial incentives for servicers,
investors, and borrowers who modify
loans.18 A separate program announced at the
same time, the Home Affordable Refinance Program,
focuses on incentives for refinancings into
FHA loans.19
On paper the HAMP program mandates certain
actions by participating servicers. Servicers
who have signed participation contracts with the
Treasury Department must conduct reviews for
an affordable loan modification for qualifying
homeowners who are in foreclosure or at imminent
risk of foreclosure.20 Significantly, if the review
shows that the homeowner qualifies for an
affordable loan modification under the program’s
standards, the servicer must modify the
loan terms.21 According to the Administration’s
estimates, by the end of 2012 the HAMP program
will save three to four million at risk homes from
foreclosure. Over 38 servicers, including the five
largest, are now signatories to HAMP contracts
and obligated to service loans and conduct foreclosures
in compliance with the program guidelines.
22 The GSEs and the Federal Housing
Agency (FHA) have implemented their own
streamlined loan modification programs with
guidelines similar to those of HAMP.23 The
guidelines for HAMP and the related GSE
programs now apply to more than 80 percent of
the home mortgages in the country.
How HAMP Is Supposed to Work
At the heart of the HAMP program is a requirement
that servicers conduct a formal “net
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 7
present value” calculation for each loan in
foreclosure to determine whether a loan modification
is required. The outcome of this net present
value test tells the servicer whether an
affordable loan modification will better serve the
mortgage holders’ financial interests than a foreclosure.
24 The securitization industry has favored
the use of these net present value models as a
means to arrive at the most informed decisions
on how to maximize recoveries for investors in
mortgage-backed securities.25 In early 2008 the
FDIC announced a model net present value program
and spreadsheet for use in the review of
loan modifications for IndyMac loans that it held
in receivership.26 This FDIC model serves as the
prototype for others, including, with certain
modifications, the net present value analysis required
under the HAMP program.
Under the HAMP guidelines participating servicers
must evaluate all borrowers in their portfolio
who are more than 60 days in default to see if
they are eligible for an affordable loan modification.
29 Servicers must also screen borrowers who
are current or less than 60 days delinquent if they
inquire about a modification and appear to be at
risk for imminent default.30 The guidelines further
require that a foreclosure sale be stayed
pending review for a loan modification. The stay
of sale must continue during the three-month
trial payment period before final confirmation of
a HAMP modification.31
A HAMP servicer may properly deny an affordable
modification only in specific circumstances
defined in the guidelines.32 For example, properties
that are not occupied as the owner’s principal residence
may be excluded. The property must be a
single family (1-4 units) property with a maximum
unpaid principal balance on the first mortgage of
8 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
THE HAMP “NET PRESENT VALUE” CALCULATION
The HAMP loan modification analysis uses a calculation
made up of two distinct parts.27 The first part
of the analysis runs data through a sequence of loan
modification options to arrive at a new affordable
monthly payment for the borrower. As applied in sequence,
these options include the capitalization of
arrears, an interest rate reduction in steps to as low
as 2%, extension of the loan repayment term, and
then forbearance of a portion of the outstanding
principal.28 Each option is applied in sequence until a
monthly payment for principal, interest, taxes and insurance
is reached that takes up no more than 31% of
the household’s current gross monthly income.
After the program has modified the loan terms as
needed to arrive at an affordable monthly payment,
it produces a dollar figure that tells the servicer the
“net present value” to investors of the loan as modified.
The net present value of the modified loan is
figured using a percentage discount. This discount
factors in the delay in receipt of the reduced scheduled
payments under the modified loan. It also takes
into account the possibility of a cure by the borrower
and the likelihood and cost of a re-default.
Once it has come up with a figure for the net
present value of the modified loan, the HAMP calculation
then compares this value with the estimated
recovery the investors will obtain if a foreclosure is
completed. In calculating the value to be received
from a completed foreclosure, the model takes into
account the current market value of the property
and typical foreclosure losses, including the cost of
delays in re-sale, the distressed REO value, and foreclosure
costs.
After completing all entries on the net present
value calculation, the servicer has two figures to
compare: the estimated loss investors will incur from
the loan modification and the estimated loss investors
will incur from a completed foreclosure. The servicer,
acting on behalf of investors, must choose the option
producing the smaller loss. The calculation format
allows for quick, streamlined analysis of the data
needed to make this decision. From the homeowner it
requires the input of limited information, primarily recent
income figures. From the servicer it requires some
readily available servicer-specific and industry-wide
data on costs and losses associated with loan modifications
and foreclosures. The calculation also factors
in data on the current market value for the property.
less than $729,750. The loan must have been
originated on or before January 1, 2009. Before
consideration for a loan modification the homeowner’s
payments toward the first mortgage
must be more than 31 percent of the homeowner’s
gross monthly income. A modification
for an eligible homeowner may not be required if
the terms of a controlling pooling and servicing
agreement between a servicer and an investment
trust prohibit the modification. However, in
order to claim this exception, the servicer must
first negotiate “to remove those obstacles” created
by the pooling and servicing agreement.33
If a foreclosure involves an eligible homeowner,
participating servicers must follow the
Treasury Department’s HAMP guidelines, including
completion of an approved net present
value calculation. Servicers must implement the
outcome of the net present value test. If the foreclosure
will produce a greater loss to investors
than the affordable loan modification, the
HAMP contract and guidelines require that the
servicer modify the loan.
Congress has specifically approved the use of
these types of net present value loan modification
models as the industry standard for residential
mortgage servicing. Section 129 of the
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009
provides that servicers comply with their duty to
investors by selection of the most reasonable option
shown under the HAMP or similar net present
value test.34
HAMP Implementation Problems and
Lack of Oversight
Neither the Treasury Department nor its agents
charged with implementing HAMP (Freddie Mae
and Freddie Mac) have provided adequate supervision
of servicers. Yet, it is servicers who play the
key role in admitting homeowners into the
HAMP program.35 During the first months of its
operation the HAMP program has been plagued
by persistent problems. The Treasury’s press releases
indicate that as of the end of July 2009
only 9% of the homeowners eligible for reductions
in payments under the HAMP program had
begun trial modifications.36 Although intended
to meet a pressing economic emergency, the full
implementation of the program has been delayed
by ongoing negotiations with servicer representatives.
Servicers have demanded that the program
include features that will ensure their control
over significant aspects of the loan modification
process. From the homeowners’ perspective the
primary benefit of the program appeared to be
that it obligated servicers to follow an objective
and transparent standard in evaluating a homeowner’s
eligibility for an affordable loan modification.
Unfortunately, servicers have thus far
succeeded in delaying the implementation of any
clear and verifiable standards. Others abuses have
been common.37
Many aspects of HAMP’s implementation
have been chaotic. Individuals who are eligible
for the program’s benefits because their servicer
signed a HAMP contract may not receive any formal
notice of this fact. Homeowners are not informed
of how they can be considered for a
modification. HAMP has no clear application
rules, and as yet there is no structure for effective
review of eligibility decisions. Government officials
have thus far acceded to major servicers’ demands
that their net present value calculations
be kept secret as “proprietary” information.
“Rules,” as the term is generally understood in
the context of federal agency law and government
benefit programs essentially do not exist
for the HAMP program.
Whether through design or as a result of bureaucratic
inertia, servicers’ practices have led to
widespread evasion of their obligations under
HAMP contracts.38 These practices have included:
Soliciting eligible homeowners to waive their
right to be considered for a loan modification
under the HAMP guidelines;
Offering homeowners loan modifications that
do not comply with the HAMP affordability
guidelines, including modifications with unaffordable
payments, impermissibly high interest
rates, and modifications for short time
periods not authorized by the guidelines;
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 9
Falsely informing eligible homeowners that
the servicer does not participate in the HAMP
program;
Proceeding with sales and commencing foreclosure
actions while delaying decisions on requests
for a loan modification;
Charging fees to consider or implement loan
modifications despite HAMP guidelines prohibiting
such charges;
Refusing to inform homeowners of the
grounds for denial of a HAMP modification,
including refusal to disclose how a payment
level was calculated, what NPV test was performed,
and failing to provide any documentation
related to denial or approval decision;
Altering terms of trial modifications when it is
time to implement the permanent modification;
Adding improper late fees and other post-default
fees;
Demanding excessive documents from homeowners
beyond what HAMP requires, and
denying modifications for lack of documentation;
Denying any review or appeal from denial decisions,
and failure to inform the homeowner of
decisions;
Extensive delays in deciding modification requests
or requiring homeowners to sign documents
on short notice without a chance for
review;
Failing to coordinate modification negotiations
with second lienholders.
Servicer practices like these have been endemic
since the announcement of the HAMP program.
If allowed to continue unchecked they may fatally
undermine HAMP’s most promising elements.
These servicer practices pose a significant
risk that HAMP will go the way of the other federal
efforts that depended upon servicers’ voluntary
efforts to control foreclosures.
Foreclosure Mediation Programs
Have the Potential to Enable the
Making Home Affordable
Modification Program to Succeed
Foreclosure mediation programs at the state and
local level can play a critical role in ensuring that
the HAMP program does not fail. So far the federal
government appears to be content with
glossing over the program’s chaotic implementation.
This chaos benefits servicers. The servicers’
goals are simple: they want to move foreclosures
as quickly as possible to sale, just as they always
have done. Confused homeowners and lack of
oversight are what servicers need to keep the current
pace of foreclosures going.
Servicers’ business models and staffing decisions
favor quick foreclosures over the labor intensive
and less lucrative work involved in
modifying a loan.39 The fee incentives under
which servicers are paid similarly favor foreclosures
over modifications.
An effective mediation program could identify
participating servicers and ensure that foreclosure
proceedings are stayed pending a review of
HAMP eligibility. They could require production
of net present value calculations, review data included
in them, and ensure that modifications
comply with HAMP guidelines. Mediation can
set the groundwork for a court to deny foreclosure
when a servicer violated the obligations of a
HAMP contract.40 For the overwhelming majority
of homeowners in foreclosure who are not represented
by attorneys, these checks on servicer conduct
can be critical. Finally, mediation programs
can be another resource for collection of data on
servicer practices related to the HAMP program.
On the other hand, if foreclosure mediation
programs cannot deal effectively with the blatant
errors occurring routinely in the implementation
of the HAMP program, the mediation programs
themselves will go a long way toward
demonstrating their own irrelevance. As will be
discussed in the following sections, many foreclosure
mediation programs are simply not
structured in a way that allows them to deal
10 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
effectively with uncooperative servicers. Judicial
oversight is often weak or simply non-existent.
Patterns of servicer control have fallen into place
over time. Still, in many instances the imposition
of some basic obligations on servicers and improvements
in structure of the programs could
make a difference. The next section of this report
will consider some recent legislative efforts to establish
these obligations.
Bringing Standards to
Foreclosure Mediation—
Successes and Failures in
Recent State Legislation
In July 2009 statutes creating mediation and conference
programs for foreclosures went into effect
in four states, Oregon, Michigan, Nevada,
and Maine. In each of these states the opportunity
arose during the legislative process to require that
before every foreclosure a servicer produce evidence
that it had conducted a formal analysis for
an affordable loan modification. The outcomes
of these efforts say much about the servicing industry’s
attitude toward loan modifications, the
HAMP program, and mediation systems.
As of March 2009, pending Oregon Senate Bill
628 mandated foreclosure mediations and required
that in mediations in which the homeowner
was not represented by counsel, the
mediation must produce a formal loan modification
analysis using a net present value spreadsheet,
either the FDIC spreadsheet or “a formula
that is consistent with the Making Home Affordable
guidelines issued by the United States Department
of the Treasury.”41 The Bill would have
effectively prevented a lender from using the
state’s non judicial foreclosure procedure if it
had rejected a loan modification shown to be feasible
under HAMP rules or a similar federal
guideline. Oregon’s financial lobby mounted a
vigorous campaign against this proposed legislation.
42 In the end, the industry succeeded in removing
all provisions of the Bill requiring
mediators to review loan modifications under
any objective or verifiable standards. The Bill as
enacted leaves the servicers with complete discretion
to apply any standards they wish in evaluating
a homeowner for a loan modification.43
The Michigan bill as originally passed by the
state’s House and Senate during the first half of
2009 required that the servicer produce a specific,
transparent loan modification model whenever
the parties had not arrived at a settlement. A conference
committee later amended the bill, striking
the requirement that the parties produce a
specific net present value spreadsheet in all cases.
Under the version of the bill that eventually became
law, the homeowner does not receive an assessment
of the cost of the modification
compared to the cost of a foreclosure, as the legislation
in its earlier version required.44
Nevada is another non judicial foreclosure
state that implemented a foreclosure mediation
program in 2009.45 As part of the implementation
of the new law, the State’s Supreme Court
promulgated a rule stating merely that the servicer
must “under confidential cover, provide to
the mediator the evaluative methodology used in
determining the eligibility or noneligibility of the
[homeowner] for a loan modification.” 46 It is not
clear what the term “evaluative methodology” as
used in the Rule means. The requirement for disclosure
only to the mediator is problematic, particularly
because mediation rules typically
require that all aspects of the mediation be kept
confidential. Whatever it is that the servicer must
disclose, the rule effectively keeps the homeowner
and the homeowner’s counsel from seeing it.
Unlike the three states described above, Maine
recently enacted a foreclosure mediation statute
with a provision that expressly requires documentation
of a complete loan modification
analysis prior to foreclosure.47 The Maine law
requires that parties to a mediation complete the
FDIC’s net present value spreadsheet.48
The Maine mediator’s report must show that
the parties completed the spreadsheet, and the
positive or negative result of the test must be included
in the mediator’s report. 49 The new law
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 11
also requires ongoing public reporting of data
about the program, including the number of
loans restructured in mediation, the number of
principal write-downs, and the number of interest
rate reductions.50
Only one of the four states, Maine, succeeded
in imposing a requirement that effectively checks
a servicers’ compliance with a specific federal
modification program. Whether servicers control
the Nevada procedures will depend on the courts’
and mediators’ willingness to use their power to
impose sanctions. The Michigan program provides
only partial transparency and no direct
court supervision. The Oregon law provides no
transparency and no direct court supervision.
Evaluation and Recommendations
for Improving Foreclosure
Mediation Programs
Views from Advocates
In preparing this report we interviewed attorneys
and housing counselors who have appeared with
homeowners in nearly all the foreclosure mediation
programs that were in operation as of the
end of June 2009. Participants’ observations obviously
varied from program to program. None
were in a position to estimate the number of
homes that may have been saved from foreclosure
through mediations. Housing counselors
generally found the programs more helpful than
did attorneys in the same jurisdiction. For housing
counselors the programs provided a structure
for negotiations. This structure saved time in
establishing lines of communication with servicers.
According to the counselors, some servicers
were more receptive to loan modifications
than others. From the housing counselors’ perspective
the degree to which the mediation
process affected the substantive results in a given
case was unclear.
Legal services attorneys who regularly represented
homeowners in foreclosures had mixed
views about the mediation programs. Attorneys
who were litigating substantive consumer claims
against lenders did not find the mediations particularly
helpful. Most mediation programs are
designed to focus on financial calculations for
workout agreements and loan modifications. The
programs are less well suited for the consideration
of complex consumer claims. Attorneys in
some locations found the mediations to be a
waste of time and would have preferred not to
participate in them at all.
Attorneys who found foreclosure mediation
programs helpful almost uniformly considered
their major benefit to be in giving the attorney
and the homeowner much-needed time to investigate
the facts of a client’s case. This respite led
to more informed decisions about potential legal
claims to assert.
Most foreclosure mediation programs require
servicers to designate an individual authorized to
settle a case and to have that person available for
negotiations. Attorneys and housing counselors
generally found this requirements helpful, although
enforced laxly. Many advocates reported
problems with servicers backing out of agreements
made by a person who participated in a
mediation session claiming to have authority to
negotiate on behalf of the mortgage holder. In
most mediation systems the person appearing
for the servicer could satisfy the “authorized representative”
requirement with a verbal assurance
of authority.
Advocates for homeowners reported that a
“take it or leave it” offer from a servicer satisfied
mediation requirements in most jurisdictions.
Occasionally the personal involvement of a judge
with a strong interest in the mediation program
could make a difference. In a few programs individual
judges took an active role in making servicers
produce documents such as payment
history records and loss mitigation protocols.
Judges or mediators sometimes ordered sessions
continued several times until the servicer produced
the requested documents. More often, the
programs did not routinely require servicers to
produce documents, or accepted at face value servicers’
statements that certain documents, such
12 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
as detailed payment records or loan origination
documents, were not available.
In statewide mediation programs advocates
described a significant lack of uniformity in procedures
from county to county and court to
court. In statewide programs some courts freely
tolerated token participation by lenders, while in
neighboring counties courts adhered to stricter
standards for appearances, production of documents,
and good faith participation. Here again
the personalities and interests of individual
judges seemed to play a decisive role in creating
these differences. Some judges invested enormous
time and personal energy in their court’s
program. Many other judges viewed the programs
as a docket control matter and took little
interest in their day to day functioning.
Attorneys and housing counselors working with
all programs reported mixed results in obtaining
loan modifications through mediations. Virtually
no one reported agreements to write off any loan
principal. To the extent servicers agreed to loan
modifications that reduced payments, these
modifications most often involved interest rate
reductions after capitalizing arrears, sometimes
combined with a term extension. Forbearance of
principal seldom occurred. The systems servicers
used to arrive at these loan modifications were arbitrary.
Few servicers seemed familiar with the
HAMP program guidelines. No advocates reported
seeing any net present value spreadsheets.
Few servicers provided any form of detailed explanation
for a refusal to modify a loan in a particular
way. Servicers often claimed that there
were barriers to modification under pooling and
servicing agreements. However, these servicers
did not produce the agreements, and mediation
systems were not helpful in making them do so.
The Existing Foreclosure Mediation
Programs Lack Standards for
Servicer Accountability
Based on the interviews with participants in
the 25 existing foreclosure mediation programs
and review of the procedures in use, it is clear
that most of these programs place few meaningful
obligations on servicers. Many do little to
hold servicers accountable for decisions to foreclose.
They do not require that servicers demonstrate
that they considered loan modifications
under a reasonable and objective standard. Servicers
effectively control the terms of discussion
in most programs.
In this section we will focus on five specific servicer
obligations and two basic program requirements
that can bring some accountability to a
foreclosure mediation program. We will also look
at how various existing programs are dealing
with these issues and outline measures the programs
could take to address them more effectively.
The criteria we will consider are:
1. The mediation program should require that
the servicer give the homeowner a document
showing its affordable loan modification calculation
and net present value calculation
under one of the recognized federal guidelines.
2. The mediation program should require that
the servicer produce specified documents,
such as a pooling and servicing agreement,
loan origination documents, an appraisal, and
payment history.
3. The mediation program should require that
servicers comply with all mediation obligations
in good faith—negotiate in good faith and be
subject to sanctions for the failure to do so.
4. The mediation program should require that
servicers establish proof of the mortgage
holder’s standing and status as real party in
interest.
5. The mediation program should require that
the servicer document that it has considered
specific alternatives to foreclosure, such as
loan modifications, workout agreements, short
sales, and applications for refinancings and
other forms of financial assistance available
under federal and state programs.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 13
In addition, programs should document and
enforce compliance with these obligations by:
1. Forbidding a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure
to proceed unless a mediator or court has
certified the servicer’s compliance with the five
basic requirements set forth above, and
2. Documenting all outcomes, including the nature
of loan modifications arrived at through
mediation.
Recommendations:
Five Necessary Servicer Obligations
The obligations placed on servicers need to be
clear and objective. They should not be dependent
of the predilections of an individual judge or
mediator. They should be straightforward
enough so that they can be enforced in cases in
which the homeowner has no attorney.
1. Does the Program Require That the
Servicer Give the Homeowner a
Document Showing its Affordable
Loan Modification and Net Present
Value Calculations?
The obligation to calculate a modified loan with
affordable payments and to offer the modified
loan to the homeowner now applies to about 85%
of the home mortgages in foreclosure today. As
discussed above, the HAMP program guidelines
require that participating servicers refrain from
foreclosure sales while they calculate the modified
loan for each borrower.51 After calculating
the modified loan, the servicer must determine
whether the modification passes a “net present
value” test. This test compares the estimated loss
the investors will incur from the affordable loan
modification with the estimated loss the investors
will incur from the completed foreclosure.
HAMP guidelines require that the servicer
implement the loan modification if it will be less
costly to investors than a foreclosure.
Under the terms of the HAMP contracts that
most servicers have signed with the Treasury Department,
the servicers receive financial incentives
to implement loan modifications. At the
same time the servicers are obligated to offer and
implement the loan modifications for all homeowners
who qualify under the net present value
test. An exception applies only when a contractual
agreement, a “pooling and servicing agreement,”
between the servicer and an investment
trust prohibits the modification. Although this
kind of barrier can exist, true restrictions on
modifications in pooling and servicing agreements
are fewer than many servicers have
claimed.52 The obligation to calculate the affordable
loan modification applies not only to servicers
who have signed formal HAMP contracts
with the Treasury Department; similar mandatory
loan modification requirements apply to
loans serviced for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
and for federal agencies, including the FDIC,
FHA, and the VA.
Existing foreclosure mediation programs have
had ample opportunity to adapt their rules to
take into account the obligations that most servicers
now have under the new federal loan modification
programs. The mediation programs should
be requiring that servicers show how they are fulfilling
their obligations to modify loans. Ensuring
compliance with HAMP can give a clear focus to
mediations. As discussed above, the federal entities
charged with implementing the loan modification
programs have not been providing effective oversight.
Foreclosures are taking place in violation
of federal program rules. Without additional and
strict oversight at the state and local levels where
these improper foreclosures are taking place, the
HAMP program will not fulfill its promise of preventing
millions of foreclosures.
Despite the clear need for a mediation rule requiring
that servicers show their compliance with
HAMP guidelines, surprisingly few programs
have actually implemented such a rule. Of the 25
existing foreclosure mediation programs, only
the Maine program obligates a servicer to produce
a physical copy of an affordable loan modification
calculation and net present value test.
14 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Maine’s statute requires production of a loan
modification and net present value spreadsheet
completed under the FDIC “loan mod in a box”
model. This calculation is similar to and provides
much of the same data as the requirements
under the guidelines of HAMP and other GSEs.53
Only the Maine program requires that a lender
consider a loan modification in a manner that allows
for objective review by the homeowner and a
mediator. The servicer must use the calculations,
assumptions, and forms that are established by
the FDIC and published in its program guide.54 The
mediator’s report at the conclusion of each mediation
must show that the parties completed the net
present value worksheet under the FDIC loan modification
program. If the foreclosure action is not
settled or dismissed, the report must include the
outcome of the net present value worksheet.
While the Maine program focuses on production
of the FDIC loan modification calculation,
no foreclosure mediation program specifically
mandates production of a HAMP calculation. As
described above, industry lobbyists successfully
opposed the creation of such a requirement
when it was proposed for statutes in Oregon and
Michigan. Except for Maine, servicers under all
other foreclosure mediation programs retain
complete discretion to review loan modification
requests under any standard they wish, or under
no standard at all. 55 An effective mediation program
should mandate the use of a recognized
loan modification model with a net present value
test for all cases, not just for those involving
HAMP or a related federal program. This will
focus the mediations on the considerations that
are truly relevant to the financial interests of investors
and homeowners.
2. Does the Program Require That Servicers
Produce Specified Documents, Such as
Pooling and Servicing Agreements, Loan
Origination Documents, an Appraisal,
and Loan Payment History?
An effective negotiation environment requires
that the parties have access to objective, verifiable
data on all relevant topics. Only with such information
available can there be a record of what
the parties considered and did not consider.
While many programs set out specific documentation
requirements for homeowners, few impose
similar obligations upon servicers. Homeowners
must often complete multi-page forms, sometimes
under oath, documenting their income, liabilities,
and assets, and list other alternatives for
assistance they have considered. When homeowners
do not comply with these documentation
requirements, they typically lose the right to participate
in the mediation program.
A common complaint from homeowners participating
in mediation programs is that servicers
do not produce even basic payment history
records and other basic loan documents. A typical
scenario is for the lender to wait for the borrower’s
proposal, then verbally reject it. The
servicers often assert that the homeowner cannot
“afford” a particular settlement option. Homeowners
find themselves disqualified from various
options for not meeting some undisclosed and
amorphous standard.
Many programs place no obligation on lenders
to produce relevant documents before or at a
conference. This is true for the statewide conference
programs in California, Connecticut, and
New Jersey. Similarly, the programs in the
Twelfth and Eighteenth, judicial circuits of
Florida and local programs in Kentucky, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania set no explicit guidelines requiring
lenders produce any specific documents
for conferences or sessions. The absence of these
requirements leaves homeowners without a basis
for asserting that a servicer participated in bad
faith. Servicers feel no real incentive to participate
in good faith.
Several programs take a more balanced approach,
although their requirements are far from
comprehensive. The recent administrative orders
for several judicial circuits in Florida require that
servicers bring a copy of the applicable pooling
and servicing agreement to mediation if the servicer
contends that the agreement affects its abil-
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 15
ity to implement any settlement option. A court
rule for the mediation program in Santa Fe, New
Mexico requires the servicer to complete an information
form ten days before the mediation. The
form requires a listing of loan data, including the
dates of all loan assignments, whether recorded
or not, and a statement of options for settlement
the lender will consider.
The new Indiana statute requires that the
lender bring to the settlement conference a copy
of the original note and mortgage, a payment
record substantiating the default, an itemization
of all amounts claimed due, and any other documents
the court determines are needed. The Nevada
rules for foreclosure mediations require
that the servicer provide a current appraisal. As
discussed above, the Maine and Michigan
statutes require production of documentation
related to the calculation of the homeowner’s eligibility
for a loan modification. The Maine
statute requires the disclosure of a complete net
present value analysis, while the Michigan law allows
a more general partial disclosure. The Cuyahoga
County, Ohio mediation program provides
a “lender form” for servicers to complete. This
form includes payment history and other lender
data, but allows the lender to substitute an information
form of its own.
Foreclosure mediation programs cannot depend
on a few servicers who may voluntarily disclose
necessary documents. Nor can they rely on
the occasional judge who has a penchant for enforcing
standards. Most homeowners will be appearing
for mediations without counsel of their
own. Therefore, mediation programs need to
publish clear checklists of documents that servicers
must produce. The list must include the
complete net present value spreadsheet or data
entry field, and any loan modification eligibility
calculation for a government program related to
the loan. The list must include the note and mortgage,
the complete payment history, any applicable
loss mitigation guidelines, the HUD 1 and
Truth in Lending disclosures from the original
transaction, and a current appraisal. As discussed
below, the servicer must also produce documents
establishing the standing and real party in interest
status of any foreclosing entity, as well as documentation
of the designated representative’s
authority to settle for a trust owning the underlying
obligation. There are already mediation programs
that require servicers to produce one or
more of these documents. An effective program
should mandate a comprehensive list and enforce
production of all the listed items.
3. Does the Program Require That
Servicers Negotiate in Good Faith and
Mandate Sanctions for the Failure
to Do So?
Any effective foreclosure mediation program
must apply a requirement for good faith participation
to all servicers. The consequences for not
complying with program obligations must be
meaningful. Dismissal of judicial foreclosure actions
should follow when servicers show bad
faith by not complying with program rules.
Statutes governing non-judicial foreclosures
should bar transfer of title without a mediator’s
certification of the servicer’s good faith compliance
with mediation obligations.
Requiring lenders to show good faith in foreclosure
proceedings is not a novel idea. A good
faith standard has always applied to mortgage
holders who seek to foreclose. For centuries the
courts have exercised their authority to apply a
“clean hands” standard and other equitable considerations
in determining whether a mortgage
holder could foreclose.56 Similarly, courts have
power to enforce standards for good faith participation
in settlement conferences and in any alternative
dispute resolution proceeding. Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embodies
this requirement for federal courts, and all or
most state courts have similar rules.57
Most existing foreclosure mediation programs
do not incorporate an express requirement for
good faith participation into their rules. Programs
without a good faith requirement include
those for California, Connecticut, New Jersey,
16 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
New York, and Indiana. Similarly, the local programs
in New Mexico, Kentucky, Ohio and Pennsylvania
have no such requirement. At most,
these programs provide for the possibility that a
servicer’s judicial foreclosure action may be dismissed
if the servicer fails to appear or send an
authorized representative to a mediation session.
Even upon the servicer’s failure to appear, most
programs provide only that dismissal of the foreclosure
is an option that may be considered at
that point. For example, several Florida programs,
58 the local programs for Cuyahoga and
Franklin counties of Ohio, and the programs in
Allegheny and Northampton counties in Pennsylvania
provide for optional consequences at the
court’s discretion if the servicer does not appear.
The recently implemented Maine and Nevada
foreclosure mediation programs are the only
ones that expressly impose a good faith requirement
on lenders. The Maine statute provides that
the parties and attorneys in a mediation must
“make a good faith effort to mediate all issues.”59
A Maine court may impose “appropriate sanctions”
if a party or attorney fails to attend or to
make a good faith effort to mediate all issues.
The mediator’s report to the court must indicate
whether a party failed to negotiate in good faith.
Given that the Maine statute mandates use of a
specific loan modification model and requires
that the session address reinstatement of the
mortgage, modification of the loan, and restructuring
of the debt, the statute facilitates the development
of a record that can lead to the
imposition of sanctions in appropriate cases. The
mediation record could also support the homeowner’s
equitable defense to foreclosure in an ongoing
judicial proceeding.60
The Nevada mediation statute requires that a
servicer file a certification of completion of mediation
before it may proceed with a non-judicial
foreclosure.61 The certificate must include the
mediator’s finding that the parties acted in good
faith and that the mediation was properly terminated.
Without this certification, the trustee may
not proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure sale.
The Nevada statute also provides that the mediator
must prepare and submit to the court’s mediation
administrator a petition and recommendation
for the imposition of sanctions if the lender does
not participate in the mediation in good faith.
The mediator must seek sanctions if the servicer
does not bring required documents to establish
standing, or does not have a representative authorized
to modify the loan available at all times
during a session. The Nevada statute specifically
grants the court reviewing a motion for sanctions
the authority to grant appropriate orders, “including,
without limitation, requiring a loan
modification in the manner determined proper
by the court.”
State courts act well within their authority in
imposing sanctions against servicers who obstruct
court-sponsored proceedings. Taken together,
the Maine and Nevada statutes show an
effective way to structure the imposition of sanctions.
The Maine statute defines good faith to include
compliance with the requirement to
demonstrate completion of an appropriate affordable
loan modification analysis. A servicer
that has not produced physical evidence of this
analysis will have participated in mediation in
bad faith. Under the Nevada statute, instances of
servicer bad faith in mediation must be referred
to the court for sanctions. As a sanction the court
can modify the loan in an appropriate way. This
combination of substantive standards and remedies
for enforcement can be an effective counterbalance
to servicer evasion of obligations under
HAMP and other federal modification programs.
4. Does the Program Require That Servicers
Establish Proof of the Mortgage Holder’s
Standing and Status as Real Party in
Interest?
An attractive feature of foreclosure mediation
programs has been the expectation that they will
help homeowners cut through the barriers created
by securitization of home mortgage obligations.
Mediation programs typically require that servicers
appear in person or by phone, through a
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 17
person “with authority” to negotiate a settlement.
While this requirement has a definite appeal,
in practice the obligation is often satisfied
by mere verbal assurances that an individual is
authorized to negotiate a settlement on behalf of
the owners of the obligation. Beyond these verbal
assurances, most programs require little in the
way of documentation to substantiate the claim.
As a result, complications may arise when it is
time to finalize or enforce agreements reached
through mediation. Other programs simply do
not enforce the appearance requirement at all.
Mediation programs often fail to address a
more significant issue than the question of
whether a designated person has authority to negotiate.
This is the question of whether the entity
that claims to own the obligation actually does
own it. If the entity that authorizes a representative
to negotiate on its behalf is not in fact the
owner of the obligation, the authorization is
meaningless. For many unrepresented homeowners
proceeding through mediation, issues of the
standing and real party in interest status of the
foreclosing party are never considered.
In judicial foreclosures the courts have inherent
authority to review questions of standing and
real party in interest pertaining to the parties
who appear before them. This authority clearly extends
to alternative dispute resolution and other
proceedings that take place under the courts’ supervision.
Similarly, state legislatures and state
agencies have ample authority to define who may
use the state’s non-judicial foreclosure mechanism.
Today, with multiple assignments of mortgage obligations
and multiple securitizations often related
to the same debt, the legislatures and courts
are scrutinizing the status of parties who claim
the right to enforce mortgage obligations.62 Questions
of standing often go to the court’s jurisdiction.
If the entity bringing the foreclosure does
not in fact own the obligation, the court may require
the true owner to be joined as a party.63
Without standards and requirements to establish
that the proper party is pursuing the foreclosure,
there is a risk that mediations will give the
judicial seal of approval to foreclosures against
unrepresented homeowners who have little understanding
of these issues. This is unfortunate
because mediations could serve the opposite purpose.
They could set clear requirements to establish
the standing of all parties seeking to foreclose.
A few existing mediation programs have
adopted procedures to address potential standing
questions. Under the Nevada law the beneficiary
of a deed of trust must bring to the mediation
the original or a certified copy of the deed of
trust, the mortgage note and each assignment of
the deed of trust or mortgage note.64 The Nevada
Supreme court’s rules implementing the mediation
statute set out further requirements for the
certification of loan documents and verification
of lost notes in connection with mediation.65
Two local court mediation programs have instituted
detailed requirements to show standing.
These are the programs in Santa Fe, New Mexico
and Summit County (Akron) Ohio. The Santa Fe
program rules require servicers to provide copies
of all filed and unfiled assignments in connection
with the mediation.66 A court-created Summit
County Ohio foreclosure mediation program requires
that plaintiffs file a “certificate of readiness”
with the court.67 This certificate requires
production of copies of all assignments made
since origination, with a declaration of custody
and control of the original note and mortgage
and the availability of documents for inspection
upon order of the court. All assignments and
name changes must bear a date prior to the filing
date of the complaint.
Requirements under other programs, if any
exist at all, are much more limited. Courts in
Seminole county in Florida’s Eighteenth Judicial
Circuit require lenders to file the original note
with the clerk before any hearings or else satisfy
lost note requirements under state law.68 While
the Cuyahoga County rules require the lender to
fill out a form disclosing all assignments and
explaining why any documents are missing, the
rule allows lenders to substitute forms of their
own. Under the Indiana statute the plaintiff
18 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
lender must bring to the settlement conference a
copy of the original note and mortgage.
Maine and New York recently enacted statutes
that amend their foreclosure laws to require that
pleadings or documents filed in land records
contain some general information related to the
lender’s standing to foreclose. These laws were
enacted simultaneously with the mediation statutes
in each state and apply to all foreclosures.
The New York law applicable to high cost loans,
requires that the plaintiff aver in the complaint
that it owns and holds the note and mortgage,
or has been delegated authority by the owner to
foreclose.69 The Maine statute requires that the
plaintiff commencing a foreclosure action “shall
certify proof of ownership of the mortgage and
note and produce evidence of the mortgage note,
mortgage and all assignments and endorsements
of the note and mortgage.”70 A requirement
similar to this Maine provision should
apply to all servicers in foreclosure mediation
programs. 71
5. Does the Program Require That the
Servicer Document its Consideration of
Specific Alternatives to Foreclosure,
Such as Loan Modifications, Workout
Agreements, Short Sales, and
Applications for Refinancings and Other
Forms of Financial Assistance Available
Under Federal and State Programs?
As discussed above, the HAMP program creates
obligations, not just to consider loan modifications,
but to implement them. For homeowners
who do not meet the program’s eligibility requirements
for a loan modification, the HAMP
guidelines still direct the servicer to “explore
other foreclosure prevention alternatives prior to
resuming or initiating foreclosure.”72
In addition to mandating consideration of
HAMP eligibility, mediations can set agendas.
They can require that lenders review all options
to avoid foreclosures and document that they
considered these options in each case. Under
their police power states have inherent authority
to set these requirements, particularly when
foreclosures are undermining state and local
economies.73 While states may not postpone foreclosures
arbitrarily or indefinitely, their authority
to regulate foreclosure procedures certainly encompasses
mandating serious, not token, consideration
of alternatives to foreclosure.74
Serious consideration of alternatives does not
occur when a homeowner is required to make a
proposal, which a lender can simply reject without
explanation before it proceeds with a foreclosure.
Many existing foreclosure mediation
programs operate on essentially this model. For
example, the statewide programs in New Jersey
and New York do not mandate that parties consider
specific alternatives to foreclosure. Local
court-operated programs in Ohio,75 Florida,76
Pennsylvania,77 New Mexico, and Kentucky have
no such requirement. In some programs the servicer
may be required to respond to a proposal of
the homeowner. In rare instances the servicer
must make a proposal of its own, but most program
guidelines do not mandate that the servicer’s
proposal address any specific options. The
programs fail to place the servicer’s exercise of
discretion within any objective framework.
A few foreclosure mediation statutes describe
a very general purpose for the program. For example,
the New York statute requiring settlement
conferences for cases involving high cost loans
states that the purpose of the conferences is to
consider “whether the parties can reach a mutually
agreeable resolution to help the defendant
avoid losing his or her home, and evaluating the
potential for a resolution in which payment
schedules or amounts may be modified or other
workout options may be agreed to, and for whatever
other purposes the court deems appropriate.”
78 The Indiana law states that the purpose of
conferences is to “attempt to negotiate a foreclosure
prevention agreement.” A servicer who adamantly
refuses to consider any options to avoid foreclosure
would arguably fail to comply with the spirit of
these statutes. Otherwise, these general statements
of purpose have limited usefulness.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 19
The guidelines published by the Cuyahoga
County, Ohio program state that lenders should
consider loss mitigation options listed on a form
provided by the court, but lenders are free to use
their own model forms and standards, and there is
no requirement for disclosure of how those options
were considered. The Brevard County Florida Administrative
Order provides a model foreclosure
mediation agenda. The agenda lists options that
parties may consider at a session. However, the
only requirement is that the servicer consider one
option from the list, which includes repayment
forbearance, loan modification, short sale, deed
in lieu of foreclosure, or consent to judgment.
A few foreclosure mediation programs have set
out more specific guidance for options the parties
must consider. Connecticut’s statute provides
that “[M]ediation shall . . . address all issues
of foreclosure, including, but not limited to, reinstatement
of the mortgage, assignment of law
days, assignment of sale date, restructuring of
the mortgage debt and foreclosure by decree of
sale.” Under the Florida Eighteenth Judicial Circuit
program the servicer’s representative must
be authorized to make agreements on “alternatives
to litigation, including refinancing, partial
forgiveness of debts, approving sale to third parties,
clarifying amounts owed, requirements to
reinstate or discharge the loan, requesting a deed
in lieu of foreclosure, procedures for protecting
premises and establishing mutually agreeable
date for relinquishing possession.”
The Maine statute provides more specific direction
for the conduct of foreclosure mediations.
The law mandates the use of a wellestablished
loan modification and net present
value model. In addition, according to the
statute, the mediation “must address all issues of
foreclosure, including but not limited to reinstatement
of the mortgage, modification of the
loan and restructuring of the mortgage debt.”
Coupled with the law’s express requirement for
the servicer’s participation in good faith, the
Maine law creates a basic framework for serious
consideration of issues.
State laws can go further than the Maine
statute and mandate that servicers produce documentation
of consideration of a series of options
to avoid foreclosure. The programs should
impose sanctions for failure to produce this documentation.
The documentation should show,
for example, the data the parties considered in
evaluating potential workout and forbearance
agreements and what factors were evaluated in
looking at a short sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure.
Programs can require that the servicer document
efforts to assist the homeowner through
various federal, state, and local programs designed
to assist homeowners with refinancing
and other financial assistance. An appropriate
check list would show a triage of the options
ranging from those most likely to preserve homeownership
to those that allow for minimizing
long term financial consequences for borrowers
who are not keeping their homes. Requiring that
lenders clearly document the reasonable consideration
of all loss mitigation options before they
are allowed to proceed with a foreclosure is a
valid and necessary exercise of a state’s police
power.
Recommendations: Enforcing
Compliance with Servicer Obligations
1. Does the program forbid a judicial or
non-judicial foreclosure from proceeding
unless a mediator has certified the
servicer’s compliance with the
requirements listed as 1–5, above?
A final requirement should tie together the list of
obligations discussed above. Compliance with
the servicer obligations in mediation should be a
condition to allowing a foreclosure to proceed.
This requirement can be enforced in both judicial
and non judicial foreclosure states. In judicial
foreclosures the mediation is often characterized
as a referral from the regular trial docketing system
to an alternative dispute resolution program.
This referral should not terminate until
20 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
the mediator or other presiding official certifies
that the parties have complied in good faith with
their duties under the mediation rules. Similarly,
in non judicial foreclosure states, the mediator
should be authorized to issue a certificate indicating
that the mediation has terminated with
good faith participation by the parties and compliance
with all mediation rules. The servicer
should be required to file such a certificate before
proceeding with a non judicial foreclosure sale.
A non judicial foreclosure sale conducted without
such a certification would not convey valid
title to a purchaser at the sale.
2. Does the program document outcomes,
including the nature of loan modifications
arrived at through mediation?
a. The Need for Data on Outcomes
None of the existing foreclosure mediation
programs has kept reliable and complete data on
the outcomes of participating cases. This lack of
data can be problematic for several reasons. First,
it impedes self correction. Without accurate data
on outcomes, those responsible for the programs
can not know what works and what does not
work, and make adjustments accordingly. For
example does making homeowner participation
automatic as opposed to requiring homeowners
to opt in to mediation produce
significantly more affordable loan modifications?
Does mandating that servicers produce
various documents make a difference? A number
of programs, such as those in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut, have received funds for
outreach and other aspects of their mediation
systems. If this funding is justified by verified
positive results, these outcomes should inform
decisions of other states that are considering
funding similar programs.
Foreclosure mediation programs can also play
an important role in providing a needed check
on data about servicers’ compliance with the
HAMP program. Over the coming months we
will likely see inconsistent data offered by government
officials and servicers describing how
the federal programs are being implemented,
whether they are successful, and how many
homeowners they helped. The mediation programs
will be in a unique position to provide a
further control on this data based on actual
modification results.
Deficiencies in the data about loan modifications
and other loss mitigation actions have not
been limited to foreclosure mediation programs.
For example in its recent report on foreclosure relief
actions, the Congressional Oversight Panel
reviewed the state of data on loan modifications
and found the lack of reliable information nationwide
to be “distressing.”79 In the Panel’s view,
this lack of data has been a significant barrier to
formulating sound policy responses to the foreclosure
crisis. The Congressional panel summarized
its review of existing data as follows:
The result is that no comprehensive private or government
source exists for accurately tracking loan delinquencies
and loss mitigation efforts, including
foreclosures and modifications on a complete, national
scale. No federal agency has the ability to accurately
track delinquencies and loss mitigation efforts
for anything more than 60% of the market. The existing
data are plagued by inconsistencies in data collection
methodologies and reporting and are often simply
unverifiable. Worse still, the data being collected are
often not what is needed for answering key questions,
namely what are causing mortgage defaults and why
loan modifications have not been working.80
Following the Congressional Oversight Panel’s
urging, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) developed tracking systems for loan modifications.
These agencies review data for institutions
responsible for about 60% of home mortgage loans
nationally. The data from these surveys will be released
in quarterly reports, the first having appeared
in April 2009.81 These reports track loan
modification numbers and record general facts
about the nature of modifications. The surveys
record loan modification data focusing on several
categories of changed terms, including the
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 21
percentage interest rate reduction, the extent to
which a loan repayment period was extended, the
amount of principal forborne, and the degree to
which the arrearages were capitalized.
The HAMP program has its own reporting requirements
that apply to servicers.82 These reports
require servicers to provide extensive
information about loan modification activities.
Since most servicers are already under an obligation
to prepare this type of data, mediation programs
would not be requiring any additional
work from servicers if they require that they provide
similar data in connection with mediations.
The minority of servicers who do not participate
in HAMP or similar federal programs can
track data from cases in their systems using categories
similar to those used by the OCC and
OTS. This would require little more than a simple
checklist about characteristics of loan modifications
that would take a few minutes to
complete for each case. The OCC and OTS also
collect follow-up data on redefaults at quarterly
intervals after the modification. A foreclosure
mediation program that wished to demonstrate
its beneficial impact could record and publicize
follow-up data along these lines as well.
Data under the HAMP guidelines and OCS/
OTS metrics can be recorded in general categories.
Therefore, there cannot be any significant objections
raised on confidentiality grounds if foreclosure
mediation programs require that participants
record basic loan modification data in accordance
with these systems that are already being implemented
nationally to record the same data.
b. The data collection on outcomes by
existing programs is inadequate.
Statewide programs in California, Indiana,
Michigan, and Nevada have no formal systems
for tracking even the most basic data on the
outcomes of mediations or conferences. Most
local programs in Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
similarly use only the most general systems
for tracking numbers of cases and outcomes. The
Connecticut statewide program and a few local
programs, such as those in Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, Brevard County, Florida, and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania have kept some statistics on numbers
of cases mediated and outcomes. However
the categories under which they record outcomes
are so broad as to provide no concrete information
about the nature of settlements.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has released
figures covering the ten- month period from July
1, 2008 to April 30, 2009.83 According to its report,
during this time 21,251 foreclosures cases
were filed in the state. Of these, 16,851 involved
owner occupied properties eligible for mediation.
During the time in question, 5778 eligible homeowners
requested mediation. Mediations were
completed in 2545 cases. Of the completed mediations,
the report indicates that 1065, or 41% resulted
in loan modifications. Put another way,
loan modifications resulted in 6.3% of the foreclosure
cases eligible for mediation.
The Connecticut data does not define how the
terms of the 1065 modified loans were changed.
We do not know the degree to which these modifications
increased or decreased payments or increased
or decreased principal indebtedness. The
nature of loan modification needs to be defined
clearly so that comparisons will make sense. For
example, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) Mortgage Metrics Report for the first
quarter of 2009 indicated that in its national survey
of mortgages there were 844,389 mortgages
in foreclosure in the quarter. According to the
Report, lenders modified mortgages in 185,156
of those cases during the quarter.84 This would
represent loan modifications in about 22% of the
cases in foreclosure. As noted above, Connecticut
was reporting a rate of 6.3% of the loans in foreclosure
modified in mediations completed over a
ten month period. This is a level significantly less
than the national average for cases in foreclosure
as reported by the OCC/OTS data.
There can be several possible explanations for
this divergence. Due to conditions of its housing
market, it may have been harder to obtain a loan
modification in Connecticut than elsewhere in the
country. The systems may define the pool of
22 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
eligible mortgages differently. It is also likely that
OCC/OTS and the State of Connecticut courts
define loan modifications in different ways. The
OCC and OTS appear to be using a broad definition
of modification, which may include temporary
interest rate reductions. As indicated above, the
OCC/OTS database represents approximately
60% of residential loans nationwide and does not
purport to be an accurate statistical sample of all
mortgages. On the other hand, the Connecticut
data appears to represent all residential foreclosures
in the state. Ultimately, these data disparities
highlight the inconsistencies of much of the
national and local data on loan modifications.
During the first year of its operation Philadelphia’s
foreclosure diversion program did not
kept track of loan modifications, either by numbers
or by type. Residential foreclosures have been
filed recently in Philadelphia at the rate of about
6000 a year. In a June 30, 2009 press release the
Philadelphia court indicated that over the previous
year 4690 homeowners participated in its
foreclosure diversion program.85 According to the
press release, a sheriff sale was averted or the case
was removed from the sheriff sale list in 1400 of
those cases. These 1400 cases are considered successful
outcomes. However, the reported category
of cases with a sheriff sale averted or in
which the case was removed from the sheriff sale
list encompasses cases in which the underlying
foreclosure lawsuit was not dismissed. The figure
includes cases considered settled, including those
with agreements other than loan modifications.
For example a settlement may involve allowing a
foreclosure judgment entered in the case to remain
while the homeowner attempts to comply with a repayment
agreement. Under such an agreement the
lender may retain the right to enforce the judgment
by re-listing the property for sale in the same
foreclosure case upon a future default. Under the
categories used by the Philadelphia court, it is
not possible to tell loan modifications from repayment
agreements in the 1400 cases reported
as settled favorably for the homeowner. Nor is it
possible to know anything about the nature of
any loan modifications included in the group.
The Cuyahoga County Ohio foreclosure mediation
program has likewise provided limited
data for cases it handled during its initial year of
operation. Lenders filed approximately 14,000
foreclosure cases in Cuyahoga County during
each of the past two years.86 Under the Cuyahoga
County foreclosure mediation program homeowners
must request mediation. The court reviews
initial requests, and based on consideration of financial
and other data, may or may not refer a
case to mediation. Cases referred to mediation are
scheduled for a pre-mediation session and then
a formal session. The data for July 2008 to June
25, 2009 for Cuyahoga County were as follows:87
Requests for mediation 2914
Found unsuitable for mediation 441
Found suitable for mediation 2473
Had pre-mediation session 1575
Had full mediation 484
Settled 240
Dismissed for lender non appearance 58
Returned to foreclosure because
homeowner did not comply with
mediation rules 380
The figure for cases settled under the Cuyahoga
County program does not provide any information
on the nature of settlements.
Franklin County (Columbus), Ohio has a well
established foreclosure mediation program that
began to operate at the end of 2008. Approximately
9,000 foreclosure cases were filed annually
in the county over each of the past two years.88
The Franklin County program recently released
data for cases handled over the first half of 2009.
During this period there were 870 cases referred
to mediation, of which 863 were found suitable
for mediation. As of the end of June 2009, 566 of
these referrals were listed as pending, scheduled,
or rescheduled. In terms of outcomes, the report
lists 44 cases as having settled with a “loan modification/
loan workout.” The report lists many other
categories of outcomes, including “loan reinstatement
or full agreement” (19 cases), “forbearance
agreement” (24), and “partial agreement” (4).
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 23
Overall, this data is not clear on the number of
loan modifications reached or on the content of
the modifications.
New York has not been keeping statewide data
on its statutory mandatory conferences for foreclosures
involving subprime and other high cost
mortgages. Some limited data covers the New
York City boroughs, Nassau and Suffolk counties,
and the Buffalo and Syracuse areas for the
period from late January 2009 to mid June
2009.89 This data indicated that over this period
and in these courts there were conferences scheduled
for 2890 cases. Homeowners did not appear
in 1182 of these conferences. A total of 173 cases
settled at the conferences.90 Here, again, the data
does not track anything specific about outcomes.
New Jersey has averaged approximately 60,000
foreclosures in each of the past two years. The
New Jersey foreclosure mediation program
released data on numbers and outcomes of mediations
for the period from January 13, 2009
through June 30, 2009.91 Mediations (including
pre-mediations) were completed in 854 cases
statewide during this period. Of those 854 cases,
no settlements were reached in 390. Of the 445
cases described as settled in mediation, the report
lists 281 as allowing the homeowner to avoid
foreclosure and remain in the home. Of the rest,
35 involved settlements with agreements to
move, and 129 were settlement of unknown content.
The designation for settled cases involving
retention of the home likely includes loan modifications,
but the precise numbers and type of
modifications were not described in the data released.
A number of cases (1342) remain pending
with housing counselors and some of these may
eventually be subject to mediation.
Aside from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Columbus,
other foreclosure mediation programs have not
released even partial data on outcomes. Several
statewide and local programs are still new at this
time, and some of these may still decide to implement
systems for tracking outcomes. Other existing
programs may in the future develop more
detailed tracking systems.
The Maine foreclosure mediation statute contains
a requirement that data be submitted to the
state legislature on a regular basis so that the
program can be evaluated and modified as
needed. The information to be reported includes:
“The results of the mediation process, including
the number of loans restructured, number of
principal write-downs, interest rate reductions
and number of homeowners who default on
mortgages within a year after restructuring, to
the extent the court has information available.” 92
While the Maine statute directs that data on
numbers and types of modifications be tracked,
it does not on its face require data on the degree
of reduction occurring for each category. For example,
the statute seeks data on numbers of loan
modifications with interest rate and principal reductions.
It does not require data on the percentage
reduction in interest rates or the amount of
principal forborne or written off. The HAMP and
OCC/OTS metrics described above do require reporting
of this additional data. All of this information
can be recorded by foreclosure mediation
programs in order to evaluate their performance.
Recommendations: Improving
Homeowner Participation and
Procedural Aspects of Programs
It is certainly possible to design a foreclosure mediation
program so that it will encourage as
many homeowners as possible to participate in it.
High participation rates may lead to better outcomes
for more homeowners. However, this may
not always be true. If the procedures styled as
“mediation” leave servicers in substantial control
of the process, then sending large numbers of
homeowners, particularly unrepresented ones,
through these procedures may not preserve
homeownership for more individuals over the
long term. For example, an unsupervised conference
mechanism could easily become a system
for servicers to obtain waivers of rights from pro
se homeowners. If homeowners end up losing
statutory redemption rights or rights to fair market
appraisals when they participate in confer-
24 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
ences with servicers, these homeowners may be
better off in the long run not participating.
To the extent that mediations apply mandatory
standards and can protect homeowners from
overreaching by servicers, then procedures designed
to increase participation by homeowners
will likely keep more families in their homes. This
section will look at procedural aspects of foreclosure
mediation programs and consider which
features are likely to increase homeowner participation.
Again, reaching these considerations assumes
that there is some positive value to the
homeowner’s participation in the program at all.
The existing foreclosure mediation programs
come with a wide variety of structures. For example,
some programs apply automatically to all
owner-occupied homes in foreclosure. In other
programs the homeowner must take some formal
action to “opt in” to the mediation program.
For programs which require the homeowner to
take some affirmative step to opt in, the length of
time a homeowner has to exercise the option
varies. Once a homeowner is participating in a
program, the question of a stay of foreclosure
procedures becomes crucial. In some programs a
stay is automatic, while in others the homeowner
must actively seek out a stay from the court
pending mediation. These procedures are discussed
in more detail below.
1. Does the Program Establish Procedures
for Automatic Participation by
Homeowners Subject to Foreclosure
Proceedings?
a. Programs in which homeowner participation
is automatic.
Several mediation programs refer foreclosure
cases to an alternative dispute resolution system
automatically upon the filing of a complaint. In
these programs the servicers must certify in the
initial filing whether the case involves an owneroccupied
property. Certification that the property
is owner occupied triggers the application of
the foreclosure mediation rules. A number of
local court-initiated programs follow this general
practice. These include the programs in
Louisville, Kentucky, in four Florida judicial circuits
(the First, Eleventh, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth),
in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and in
Northampton and Philadelphia counties in Pennsylvania.
The New York State conference procedure
for high cost loans employs a similar system.
The automatic inclusion of residential foreclosures
in some type of conference system can
occur in non judicial foreclosures as well as in judicial
foreclosures. For example, while the phone
conference obligation under the California
statute has no meaningful substantive component,
the requirement applies across the board to
all residential foreclosures.
b. Programs which exclude homeowners who
do not opt in.
At the other end of the spectrum are programs
that set up certain procedural requirements for
homeowners to follow if they wish to participate
in a conference or mediation. Compliance with
these procedural thresholds is often mandatory.
If homeowners do not follow the procedures, they
do not participate. The statewide programs established
in Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Michigan,
Nevada, New Jersey, and Oregon employ this device.
The local programs in most Ohio counties
and in Allegheny and Bucks counties in Pennsylvania
set similar requirements.
The rules for these programs in which homeowners
must “opt in” typically include a requirement
that the court, a clerk, a housing agency,
the lender, or a trustee serve the homeowner with
a notice at the commencement of the foreclosure.
The notice describes the nature of the mediation
or conference opportunity that is available. The
notice may direct the homeowner to housing
counselors, a hotline, or a pro bono legal office.
It may include information on how to exercise
the option to have a conference with a lender
representative. The homeowner must complete
and send in the form as directed by a certain date.
In some programs the filing of an answer or a verbal
request is enough to secure the homeowner’s
right to participate. Under other systems, such as
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 25
the one for Bucks County, Pennsylvania, the
homeowner must contact a housing counselor,
who in turn submits the request.
2. Can Requests for Mediation Be Made Up
to the Time of a Foreclosure Sale?
Setting a time limit for submitting the request to
participate in a mediation may significantly limit
the number of participants. When programs set
time limits, the deadlines vary widely from program
to program. The range includes: Bucks
County, Pennsylvania (ten days from service of
summons and complaint), Michigan (14 days
after date notice sent), Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
(20 days from when notice received),
Connecticut (fifteen days after return date of
summons and complaint), Oregon (30 days from
date of notice), Indiana (30 days from date of
service), Nevada (30 days from date of service).
The Ohio counties generally require some action
by the borrower within a set time period, such as
before an answer is due.
Restrictions on participation in mediations
can take forms other than time limits. For example,
in several Ohio programs a judge or other
court official may conduct an initial review of a
request before making a referral for mediation.
Under the Maine and New Jersey guidelines the
procedures for opting in are more flexible. In
Maine the homeowner must file an answer, appear,
or otherwise request to participate in mediation.
In New Jersey there is not a fixed time limit
for making a written request for mediation.
However, under the New Jersey law foreclosure
proceedings are not stayed automatically by the
mediation request.
Creating these types of opt-in hurdles may
produce a set of homeowners who are strongly
motivated. These may be homeowners with the
financial resources to benefit the most from mediation
options. At the same time, these limitations
on access may unreasonably exclude homeowners
who simply misunderstand court procedures or
irrationally fear them. With some encouragement,
these homeowners might choose at some
point to participate. At a minimum, it is safe to
say that automatic inclusion of homeowners is
more likely to produce a greater number of
homeowners who will be in a position to learn of
their legal rights in the foreclosure and make informed
decisions about whether to follow up
with appearances and calls.
3. Are All Foreclosure Proceedings Stayed
Until a Mediator Or Court Determines
That the Servicer Has Complied in Good
Faith With All Participation Obligations?
A stay of entry of judgment and a stay of the foreclosure
sale are essential if servicers are to take
foreclosure mediations seriously. Without a stay,
foreclosure mills will proceed along at their automated
pace and sell the home. Mediation programs
implement stays of proceedings in various
ways. In some programs the homeowner’s eligibility
for mediation triggers a stay. In other programs
the homeowner must make a formal
request for a stay. In the latter type of program,
absent such an order, foreclosure proceedings
may go ahead. Programs also vary in the duration
of a stay. Some programs stay proceedings for the
duration of mediation or until a homeowner fails
to appear for a scheduled session, while others
set a fixed time by which mediation must be completed
and the stay will terminate. Occasionally,
if there are multiple sessions, a continuance
order must be entered at the end of each session
in order to clarify that the stay is continuing
until the next scheduled meeting.
Programs that refer foreclosures to alternative
dispute resolution upon the filing of a complaint
typically stay proceedings as long as there is a reasonable
basis for continuing the mediation
process. Under the Maine statute the court will
not enter judgment until mediation has concluded.
In Connecticut proceedings are stayed
pending mediation, although the defendant’s
time to file an answer is not stayed. The Indiana
statute provides for a stay of proceedings for 90
days to allow for conferences to take place. At the
local level, most court-initiated foreclosure mediation
programs provide for some form of automatic
stay of proceedings.93
26 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
The statewide programs in New Jersey and
New York and the local programs in Santa Fe,
New Mexico and Louisville, Kentucky, do not
provide for an automatic stay or delay of proceedings.
In these jurisdictions borrowers must
apply to the courts or a sheriff for a stay if mediation
is not completed by a pleading deadline or
the sale date.
In programs in non-judicial foreclosure states,
such as those in Oregon, Michigan, and California,
there is no court imposed stay of a legal proceeding.
Instead, the statutes require a delay of a fixed
period—thirty, sixty, or ninety days—before the
servicer may proceed with the next step in a nonjudicial
foreclosure. In Nevada, the trustee may
not proceed with a non judicial foreclosure sale
until the mediator certifies that the parties acted
in good faith and could not reach an agreement.94
4. Does the Court Have Direct Supervison
Over the Enforecement of Servicer
Obligations, Including the Power to
Impose Sanctions?
A number of programs styled as mediation or
conference programs do not involve any direct
court supervision over the interactions between
servicers and homeowners. These include the
programs in California, Michigan, Indiana, and
Florida’s Twelfth Judicial Circuit. These programs
do little more than require a servicer to
provide a statement that it attempted to contact
the homeowner to work out a settlement. Servicers
and their attorneys have unfettered control
over any procedures mandated by these programs.
For this reason the programs do not provide
any meaningful structure for serious
consideration of alternatives to foreclosure.
To be minimally effective a mediation program
must authorize some neutral official to impose
sanctions upon servicers who do not
comply with specific obligations under the program.
For example, someone acting in an official
capacity must have authority to require servicers
to comply with their obligations. A judge, court
official, or mediator must be able, consistent
with due process, to impose sanctions that include
dismissal of a judicial foreclosure action,
an injunction against non-judicial foreclosure,
and monetary sanctions. There is ample precedent
under F.R. Civ. P. 16 and similar alternative
dispute resolution rules for courts to impose
sanctions for a party’s non-compliance with mediation
rules.95
A common complaint of advocates working
with mediation programs is that servicers delay
responses and do not turn over documents, sometimes
proceeding with sales during these extended
delays. In addition to making stays of foreclosure
automatic, mediation programs must set clear
deadlines for servicers to respond to proposals
and produce documents. Cases must be dismissed
upon non-compliance with deadlines.
5. Is There Funding for Outreach, Housing
Counselors and Qualifed Counsel for
Homeowners?
Some states, including New York and New Jersey,
have authorized considerable financial support
for foreclosure mediations. This includes funding
for housing counselors, outreach, and in the
case of New Jersey, to pay for attorneys to represent
homeowners in foreclosure cases. Yet, both
the New York and New Jersey programs have garnered
relatively low levels of homeowner participation
so far. The low turnout may be due to
a number of factors, including some structural
restrictions on homeowners’ access to both
programs. For example, the New Jersey program
lacks an automatic stay of foreclosure proceedings
and requires that homeowners affirmatively
opt in to the program. The New York program
does not apply to all residential mortgage foreclosures.
On the other hand, public funding for counselors
and outreach, when combined with structural devices
that encourage homeowner participation, will
likely produce better participation rates. For example,
the local government funding for outreach
and counseling under the Philadelphia
program, combined with automatic participation
and stays of foreclosure sales, has likely contributed
to the high rate of participation there.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 27
Where there is a strong commitment to expanding
eligibility and bringing in as many
homeowners as possible, it is likely that expenditures
for outreach and counseling will produce a
higher turnout. However, if the programs place
no obligations on servicers, funding designed to
bring more homeowners into mediation may
produce few long term benefits for homeowners.
The Availability of Counsel for Homeowners
Having attorneys represent homeowners in foreclosure
mediations can help in a number of ways.
The presence of an attorney for the homeowner
can deter overreaching by servicers’ attorneys and
ensure that homeowners do not waive important
legal rights. Court directives to waive conflict
rules and allow limited attorney appearances in
mediations can increase the numbers of volunteer
attorneys available to assist homeowners.
However, limited appearances by inexperienced
attorneys may not provide substantial assistance
for homeowners in the long run. The best option
is obviously to have available free or low cost
counsel who are experienced in representing
homeowners in foreclosures and who can remain
as counsel for the homeowner throughout the
proceeding.
In most jurisdictions there are few attorneys
with the experience necessary to provide full representation
to homeowners in foreclosure, and
this situation is not likely to change during the
current foreclosure crisis. Housing counselors
and relatively inexperienced pro bono attorneys
will be appearing with homeowners in the vast
majority of mediations. Given this fact, having
strict standards for the conduct of the mediation
sessions, including procedures that can be reduced
to unambiguous checklists, forms, and
spreadsheets, will be helpful.
6. Are Servicers Prohibited from Shifting to
the Homeowner Attorneys’ Fees Or
Other Costs of Participating in the
Mediation Process?
Most foreclosure mediation programs do not
charge a fee to homeowners for participating in
the procedures. This is true for the statewide programs
in California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New
York, Maine, and Michigan, as well as for the local
court programs in New Mexico, Kentucky, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania. However, a few programs have
set payment requirements for homeowners. In
Nevada the borrower and the lender must each
pay $200 toward a total mediation fee of $400.
No mediation will be initiated if the borrower
does not pay his or her share of the costs on time.
Some programs, such as those in Maine and Nevada,
have added surcharges to the fees for filing
foreclosure complaints or notices of default as a
means to finance the mediation programs.96
Two Florida mediation programs are managed
by the Collins Center, a non-profit organization.
These programs require that the lender make an
up-front payment of $750 to be applied to mediation
expenses upon the filing of the complaint.97
Two other Florida programs set advance payment
fees for lenders of $250 and $350.98 The administrative
orders in these Florida districts
specifically allow the costs to be taxed as part of a
judgment against the homeowner should the
foreclosure proceed to a judgment.
The charges for mediation costs can be a deterrent
to participation for low income homeowners.
However, a related cost issue raises more serious
concerns. In almost all foreclosure mediation
programs servicers can shift their own attorney’s
fees incurred in mediation to the homeowner.
Servicers and their attorneys often treat the expenses
of mediation as simply another collection
cost to be charged to the borrower. None of the
programs appear to place a limitation on this
practice. Advocates report that servicers often
make express references to fee shifting liability in
the course of mediations. This has a clear impact
on homeowners’ willingness to stick with mediations,
particularly when repeated continuances
are needed due to servicers’ delays in producing
documents or responding to proposals.
States clearly have the authority to limit the
attorney’s fees shifting terms of consumer contracts.
99 State common law and statutory provisions
have placed limits on amounts and timing
28 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
of attorney’s fees shifting in connection with
mortgage foreclosures.100 All states should prohibit
fees shifting in connection with the foreclosure
mediation programs. Homeowners should
not have to fear that each continuance for the
lender to comply with its obligations will add
hundreds of dollars to their mortgage debt.
HAMP guidelines prohibit servicers charging
homeowners for any costs of implementing a
loan modification under the program.101 If the
mediation focuses upon implementing a loan
modification through a participating servicer,
the HAMP rule should be an additional basis for
prohibiting fees shifting.
7. Is There a Requirement That Junior
Lienholders Be Notified of and Allowed
to Participate in Mediations?
The presence of junior mortgages has been a
common obstacle encountered in modifying first
mortgages and in negotiating other settlements.
A second mortgage holder may be the same entity
that holds the first mortgage, or it may be a
completely separate entity. For some types of
mortgages, such as Alt -A loans, as many as half
the loans in this category included a second
mortgage at the time of origination.102
First lienholders may be reluctant to agree to
modifications that involve concessions from
them while second lienholders are unaffected.
From the homeowner’s perspective, the continuing
financial burdens from a second mortgage
may make re-default on a modified first mortgage
more likely.
The Treasury Department, through its HAMP
program, has announced a program for second
mortgages that allows either modification or “extinguishment”
of the second lien.103 The HAMP
second mortgage modification standards follow
a waterfall similar to the first lien modification
program. The Treasury Department provides
subsidies to servicers, investors, and homeowners
in connection with modifications of second liens.
The program also authorizes payments of a small
portion of the underlying debt in return for a second
lienholder’s agreement to extinguish its lien.
Most existing foreclosure mediation programs
have not established procedures for routine inclusion
of second lienholders in sessions and
conferences. A few programs have established
some minimal procedures for notification to second
mortgagees. The administrative orders for
two Florida circuit court programs provide that
junior lienholders who have not been defaulted
in the judicial foreclosure proceeding will be notified
of mediation hearings.104 The Louisville,
Kentucky administrative order expressly permits
junior lienholders to participate. Under the
Maine statute, the mediator may include any entity
deemed necessary for effective mediation.
The Nevada statute requires that the trustee notify
anyone with an interest in the property of the
homeowner’s election to mediate
Mediation rules should establish a clear requirement
that holders of second mortgages be
notified of all proceedings involving the property.
Second mortgage holders should be permitted
to participate in mediations. When a first
mortgage loan is modified can be the ideal time to
try to get rid of the second mortgage. The second
lien holder might be willing to accept pennies on
the dollar now when the likely alternative is to
lose everything if a foreclosure proceeds.
Conclusion
Our review of the status of foreclosure mediation
programs has shown that there can be a danger in
viewing them as an alternative to legislation that
directs servicers and mortgage holders to make
affordable loan modifications. For example,
bankruptcy code amendments allowing courts to
modify mortgages through reduction of principal
would markedly increase the numbers of affordable
modifications. Federal legislation setting out
clear directives for enforcement of the HAMP program
would be far more effective that expecting
state and local mediation systems to oversee enforcement
of this federal program.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 29
In the absence of strong federal legislation,
state foreclosure mediation programs could play
a role in enforcement of guidelines under the various
federal loan modification programs, including
the HAMP program. They can provide a
framework for more effective implementation of
these federal programs. In the overwhelming majority
of cases homeowners facing foreclosure
will not have attorneys who can assist them in
protecting their rights under the HAMP program.
Mediations using simple and quick net
present value calculations should be able to identify
cases that are clearly inappropriate for foreclosure.
Mandating mediation for all residential
foreclosures and scrutinizing all cases under
these tests can help to minimize unnecessary
foreclosures. Mediations have the added benefit
of requiring the appearance of a party responsible
for securitized loans. If there is a clear expectation
that courts will enforce sound equitable
standards, this should deter the responsible parties
from moving forward before a court with blatantly
wasteful cases.
Despite the potential to do so, the existing
foreclosure mediation programs have yet to establish
that they can exert any significant control
over servicer conduct. The performance of these
programs does not support hopes that voluntary
efforts by servicers will somehow slow the surge
in foreclosures. Thousands of preventable, irrational,
and highly destructive foreclosures are
being completed every week in the United States.
Continuing to treat this epidemic as primarily a
communication problem will ensure that it continues
unabated.
30 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Recent state regulation of
foreclosures has not approached
its full constitutional potential
Foreclosures have traditionally been the subject
of state regulation. There is little likelihood
that in the near future some new federal foreclosure
law will come to the rescue of distressed
homeowners and supplant the state laws that
now regulate foreclosures. Unfortunately, since
the onset of the current foreclosure crisis state
legislatures have done little to revise archaic foreclosure
procedures in ways that would reduce the
loss of homes. The nine foreclosure diversion
statutes enacted during 2008 and 2009 were
some of the few new state laws enacted in response
to the foreclosure crisis that were ostensibly
directed at modifying foreclosure procedures
for the benefit of homeowners. State courts and
legislatures have much greater power than they
have chosen to assert in this field.
No one would dispute that the current level of
home foreclosures has created a severe economic
crisis. Faced with this emergency, states have substantial
authority to enact remedial legislation to
protect the vital interests of their citizens and of
the state itself. State regulation can take the
forms of both modification of foreclosure procedures
and the creation of new substantive rights
for homeowners facing unreasonable and unfair
foreclosures. As will be discussed below, appropriate
foreclosure mediation laws can incorporate
many of these needed reforms, both
procedural and substantive.
States’ Police Power and Mediation
Procedures—Stay of Foreclosures
In the exercise of the state’s police power the
legislatures and courts of a state have the authority
to stay foreclosures for substantial periods of
time. The law on this point has been well settled
for more than half a century. For example, Depression
era statutes typically authorized stays of
foreclosure sales and extensions of post-sale redemption
periods for several years.105 Most states
enacted some form of moratorium legislation
during the early years of the Depression. Few of
these statutes were ever challenged on constitutional
grounds. When challenged, nearly all were
upheld as valid exercises of the states’ police
power in the prevailing economic crisis.
In a landmark decision Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell106 the United States Supreme
Court rejected a challenge to a Minnesota foreclosure
moratorium law brought under the Contracts
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.107 The Minnesota
statute allowed homeowners to petition a
court for a stay of foreclosure for up to two years.
Under the same law courts could also toll the
running of the post sale redemption period for
up to two years. According to the Blaisdell Court,
the state had authority to modify contract rights
in this manner under its police power. The potential
for states to act in this capacity had to be recognized
as an implied condition to any contract:
“[T]the reservation of the reasonable exercise of
the protective power of the State is read into
all contracts.”108 Protecting all citizens from an
31
APPENDIX
Constitutional Issues Related to
State Foreclosure Mediation Laws
economic emergency was thus a permissible basis
for limited impairment of private parties’ contract
obligations. Under the Blaisdell court’s test,
the pertinent question in assessing the validity of
an exercise of the police power became “whether
the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate
to that end.” 109
The Supreme Court revised its formulation of
the applicable Contracts Clause test in a 1983 decision,
Energy Reserves Group, Inc., v. Kansas Power
& Light Co.110 Here the Court rejected a Contracts
Clause challenge to a Kansas statute that set
price caps on intrastate natural gas sales. As articulated
in this decision, the Court’s current formulation
has three steps:
1. Is there in fact a substantial impairment of the
creditor’s contractual rights?
2. If yes, the state must have a significant and legitimate
public purpose behind the regulation,
such as remedying of a broad and general
social or economic problem.
3. If this is a significant and legitimate public
purpose, the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities
of the contracting parties must
be based upon reasonable conditions and of a
character appropriate to the public purpose
supporting the legislation.111
Under this standard, if a state law satisfies the
second and third prongs of the above test, a court
will uphold the law despite a substantial impairment
of contractual rights under the first prong.
The Energy Reserves test thus acknowledges that
state laws may impair substantive contract obligations
in a proper exercise of the police power.
Prior decisions had characterized state laws as acceptable
only when they regulated procedural
“remedies,” while unacceptable state laws impaired
substantive contact obligations. The price
controls imposed by the Kansas statute at issue
in Energy Reserves clearly regulated substantive
contract terms and did not merely alter enforcement
procedures. Thus the courts have retreated
from the strict remedy/obligation dichotomy.
The standards defined by the Blaisdell and Energy
Reserves rulings allow states to fashion laws
that stay foreclosures for extended periods of
time. For example, in 1945 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a New York foreclosure
moratorium law that had been in effect
since 1933.112 The New York law effectively stayed
foreclosures based on non payment of loan principal.
The law provided for some form of courtsupervised
payments by the homeowner during
the pendency of the stay. Typically the payment
would consist of some combination of interest,
taxes and insurance. Otherwise, for an extended
period of time the law substantially altered the
lender’s rights to collect regular contractual payments
and to foreclose.
Foreclosure moratorium laws enacted during
the nineteen-thirties typically required some payment,
such as a fair rental value, taxes and insurance,
or interest. These payment amounts were
generally subject to court review, with the stay
conditioned on the homeowner’s continuing to
make the payments. The court-ordered payments
were invariably less than the contractual amount
that the homeowner would otherwise be obligated
to pay.
In a time of economic crisis, states clearly have
the authority to set conditions on foreclosures,
including authorizing the delays necessary for effective
mediation. The stays of foreclosures that
extended over many years during the 1930s were
intended to delay foreclosures until the real estate
market improved. Foreclosure sales were
producing scandalously low prices. It was hoped
that an improved market would bring higher
prices or allow borrowers to refinance to avoid
foreclosure.
A stay of foreclosures pending court-supervised
mediations adds another strong rationale
for a delay of foreclosure sales—the role of the
mediation itself as an effort to arrive at a beneficial
outcome for all parties. Minnesota’s
Supreme Court, for example, flatly rejected a
Contracts Clause challenge to a mandatory foreclosure
mediation statute applicable to farm
properties during the 1980s.113 The court found
32 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
the impairment of contracts to be no more significant
than the extensive limitations imposed
by the 1930s Minnesota moratorium law upheld
in the Blaisdell decision.
As discussed elsewhere in this Report, many of
the current foreclosure mediation programs
defer significantly to servicers’ and mortgage
holders’ interests in the way they limit stays of
foreclosure pending a mediation. If there is no
stay or a very limited delay pending a mediation,
a servicer has little incentive to take the process
seriously. Setting fixed time limits, such as sixty
or ninety days has a similar effect. Servicers can
focus on the clock rather than on any obligation
imposed by a mediation rule.
The creditors’ demands for short time limits
for homeowners to request mediation seems to
be motivated by a fear that homeowners might
request mediation at a late stage in the foreclosure
proceeding, and this would encourage delay.
Given that legislation staying foreclosures for
several years has been held constitutional, the incidental
delays caused by a mediation at any time
before a foreclosure sale do not seem substantial.
When stays until the end of mediation are automatic,
servicers who comply promptly with their
obligations under the mediation law will not face
any unreasonable delay.
States’ Police Power and
Mediation—mandating consideration
of specific options and requiring
documentation
State legislatures and state courts not only have
broad authority to stay foreclosures. They can
also compel effective mediation under standards
that promote accountability. These standards
must require that the parties consider distinct
options and document that they have done so.
States have a legitimate interest in minimizing
the number of home foreclosures. They can set
standards to ensure that foreclosure is an option
of last resort. Mediation programs can be effective
tools for enforcing compliance with these requirements.
Unfortunately, most foreclosure
mediation programs do not obligate the parties
to consider anything.114 Many set standards that
are so general that they invite servicers to make
token “take it or leave it” efforts. Legislation or
court rules can require procedures that are much
more meaningful and require proof of consideration
of specific options.
Most servicers are now obligated by federal law
to perform a net present value analysis before
they proceed with a foreclosure. It is appropriate
for a mediation program to give teeth to this requirement
by requiring that a servicer explain
why it will not implement an affordable loan
modification that protects investors better than a
foreclosure. This is particularly true when the
servicer has signed a contract with the federal
government obligating it to implement the modification.
Further, there is no reason why a mediation
program cannot mandate this type of
analysis for all cases, regardless of whether the
servicer is signatory to a HAMP contract.
To be effective, a mediation program must
also require that the servicer produce documentation
showing the net present value calculation
related to the proposed foreclosure. Typically
this will require a disclosure of data submitted
for the calculation, often a spreadsheet or other
data entry record. Recent initiatives in Maine,
Nevada, and Michigan have set requirements for
some form of disclosure along these lines. However,
to date only the Maine program requires
complete disclosure of a specific net present
value test. The other programs allow servicers to
evade disclosure of this analysis with impunity.
Servicing guidelines for various government insured
and direct loan programs also set preconditions
to foreclosure. To the extent that servicers
and mortgage holders must comply with obligations
under any government program, including
compliance with FHA, RHS, and VA rules, mediation
programs can require that servicers document
compliance with those duties as well.
There are other documents that can be essential
to an effective mediation, and programs
must require that servicers produce them. As discussed
in section II, supra, these documents can
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 33
include appraisals, pooling and servicing agreements,
and documents necessary to establish
that that the foreclosing entity has standing to
foreclose. Requiring that servicers produce these
documents does not impair any contract rights.
The requirement comports with the state’s interest
in minimizing the numbers of foreclosures. It
is thus well within the state’s constitutional authority
to establish requirements to consider options
and produce documents.
States’ Police Power and
Mediation—mediation’s role in
enforcing bars on foreclosure
Mediation rules can set clear, mandatory standards
that a servicer must comply with as a condition
to the exercise of a right to foreclose.
Mediations can play a critical role in enforcing
the federal program guidelines that preclude
foreclosures by non complying servicers. In addition,
mediation programs can set the stage for
the application of courts’ inherent equitable
powers to limit foreclosures that are unfair and
unreasonable. Analytical tools such as net present
value tests can be produced through mediation.
These will highlight the cases in which
courts need to exercise their equitable powers to
bar a foreclosure. The following sections will consider
in more detail the impact foreclosure mediations
can have in preventing foreclosures that
violate equitable standards, both in relation to
government programs and as a matter of traditional
state law.
1. Barring foreclosure upon noncompliance
with rules of government
programs—the role for mediation
Federal agencies insure or originate home loans
through a number of programs. These include
programs under the Federal Housing Agency
(“FHA”), the Rural Housing Service (“RHS”—a
subdivision of the U.S.D.A.), and the Veterans
Administration (“VA”). In these programs the
federal agencies may hold the loans themselves,
as in the case of many RHS loans, or they may supervise
the activities of private mortgage holders
who own the insured loans. Federal agencies
such as FHA promulgate regulations that direct
activities of the insured private mortgage holders
and their servicers. The regulations often require
servicers to engage in specific loss mitigation activities
before they foreclose on a government insured
mortgage. For example, under the FHA
program servicers must provide written notices
to homeowners of certain options for avoiding
foreclosure. Under the RHS program the mortgage
holder may not foreclose without offering
the homeowner the opportunity to apply for a
moratorium, which is a temporary suspension of
the obligation to make payments.
Over the past 35 years there have been many
court rulings on the question of whether courts
may bar foreclosures when a government agency
or private mortgage holder owning one of these
government related loans seeks to foreclose without
complying with the federal agency’s loss mitigation
rules. Most courts have barred foreclosures
when mortgage holders have not complied with
these servicing regulations.115
In the recent decision in Wells Fargo Home Loan
Mortgage v. Neal, the Maryland Supreme Court affirmed
the continuing validity of this analysis.116
The homeowner in Neal contended that his servicer
had not performed certain loss mitigation
actions before accelerating his loan. These actions
included setting up a face-to-face meeting
between the borrower and lender before accelerating
the loan. The court agreed with the homeowner
that, under the doctrine of clean hands,
the servicer could not declare a default or accelerate
the loan until it “complies with the statutory
and regulatory imperative to pursue loss mitigation
prior to foreclosure.”117
As in many similar decisions involving allegations
of servicers not following FHA loss mitigation
rules, the Neal court applied general principles
of equity to bar the foreclosure. In upholding an injunction
to stay the non-judicial sale, the Neal court
stated:
34 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
A mortgagor seeking to raise a violation of the HUD
loss mitigation regulations as a defense to foreclosure
. . . is not required to pay his or her debt in full in
order to be granted an injunction. This is because,
under the principles of equity, a mortgagee’s commencement
of a foreclosure proceeding on an FHAinsured
mortgage, without first having adhered to the
mandatory HUD loss mitigation regulations, may
invalidate the mortgagee’s declaration of default.118
The HAMP program guidelines announced by
the Treasury Department in March 2009 placed
significant obligations upon servicers. These obligations
are at least as pervasive as those that
apply to servicers of FHA insured and similar
government- related loans.119 A servicer who has
signed a HAMP participation agreement must
comply with program guidelines and review
homeowners’ circumstances to see if they qualify
for affordable loan modifications. Participating
servicers must evaluate borrowers who are more
than 60 days in default for an affordable loan
modification.120 They must use an approved net
present value test. Servicers must also screen borrowers
who are current or less than 60 days delinquent
if they inquire about a modification and
appear to be at risk for imminent default. While
evaluating a homeowner for a HAMP modification,
the servicer must refrain from proceeding
to a foreclosure sale.121 A sale must not take place
during the three-month trial payment period
under the program.
Foreclosure mediation programs clearly could
assist in implementing the HAMP program effectively.
To do this, the programs must set certain
requirements. For example, servicers must be required
to disclose their roles as participants in
HAMP. Meaningful sanctions must be imposed
on servicers who misrepresent their status under
the servicer contracts. The mediation rules must
mandate that participating servicers produce the
net present value calculation required under the
HAMP guidelines. The mediator must refuse to
conclude the mediation for servicers who are participating
in HAMP but cannot document the required
affordable loan modification calculation
and net present value analysis. Either directly
through its scheduling powers or by referral to a
court, a mediator must have oversight powers
that can lead to a bar on foreclosing against a
homeowners who is eligible for a HAMP modification
or whose eligibility is under review.
2. Barring foreclosure on general equitable
grounds—loans outside the government
housing programs
As discussed above, courts have frequently barred
foreclosures when lenders did not comply with
loss mitigation rules established by government
housing programs. For loans that are not directly
subject to any governmental loss mitigation rules,
mediation can still play an important role in deterring
unfair foreclosures. There is a long tradition
of courts exercising a supervisory role over foreclosures
of property interests. When they deemed
it appropriate, courts have denied the harsh remedy
of forfeiture in order to prevent unfairness
and overreaching by lenders.122 The U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions upholding state laws that limited
foreclosing lenders’ remedies emphasized repeatedly
that the state legislatures did nothing more
than formalize a centuries- old practice of review of
the fairness of foreclosures by state courts.123
The tools for calculating the relative values of
foreclosures and loan modifications are new
mechanisms that add some precision to a review
of the fairness of foreclosures. When servicers
pursue foreclosures that are not in the best interests
of investors based on the net present value
analysis, courts should step in to prevent the
foreclosures. This may raise a potential constitutional
question: Does a servicer’s pursuit of a
demonstrably unwise and destructive financial
option implicate a contract right protected under
the Contracts Clause? This question moves into
uncharted territory of constitutional law.
Prior Supreme Court decisions upholding state
laws that limited mortgage holders’ deficiency
claims suggest that actions by state courts and
legislatures to bar blatantly unfair foreclosures
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 35
may not conflict with the Contracts Clause.124
Many state statutes limit or prohibit deficiency
claims after a foreclosure sale. These statutes effectively
limited lenders’ recovery to the value of
the security property. However, according to several
decisions of the Supreme Court, state
statutes that limited lenders’ deficiency claims
did not impair any significant constitutionally
protected property interests of lenders. Rather
the statutes merely placed reasonable limits on
the recovery of speculative monetary gains.125
In enacting anti-deficiency statutes the states
balanced the borrowers’ interest in being free
from burdensome debt repayment obligations
against the claims of lenders to a full monetary
recovery under their notes and mortgages. In the
Supreme Court’s view, the state law’s imposition
on lenders was a reasonable exercise of the police
power during an economic crisis. Whether implemented
by courts using their inherent equitable
powers or by state legislatures, limits on wealth
destroying foreclosures should be seen as a
proper exercise of states’ police power during the
current foreclosure crisis.
It may also be argued that barring foreclosures
when an affordable loan modification is a better
option for investors implicates the Takings
Clause of the Fourteenth amendment.126 The
Takings Clause jurisprudence recognizes two
types of “taking” by governmental action. One
form of taking occurs when the government
physically takes over property. The other involves
a “regulatory” taking.127 Control over foreclosures
potentially implicates a regulatory taking
of property rights.
In assessing the propriety of a regulatory impairment
under the Takings Clause, the courts
look at two factors: (1) the degree to which the
governmental action interferes with distinct “investment
backed expectations” of the owner, and
(2) the character of the government action, including
the purpose served128 Like the rule applied
for the Contracts Clause, the Takings
Clause analysis relies upon a standard of reasonableness:
is the goal of the state regulation reasonable
and are the regulatory burdens imposed
to meet that goal reasonable?
State action barring lenders from foreclosing
when the results of a net present value test show
that the monetary harm to investors from foreclosure
will exceed the cost of an affordable loan
modification should not violate the Takings
Clause. Many of the modification programs, such
as those used under the HAMP program and by
the FDIC, do not force lenders to write off any secured
debt. At most, under these programs a part
of the secured debt will be set aside and secured
by a separate non-interest bearing lien. Under a
Takings Clause analysis, preserving the lender’s lien
and allowing foreclosure upon a future default in
payments should be adequate safeguards to protect
the secured lender’s property interest.129
By way of analogy, in decisions dating back to
the World War I era, courts have rejected challenges
to rent control laws brought under the
Takings Clause.130 Rent control laws impose substantial
restrictions on property owners’ rights.
For example, the laws may bar owners from terminating
leases, recovering possession of their
properties, and collecting the full market rent
they would otherwise obtain. Nevertheless, in
most cases the courts have rejected Takings
Clause challenges to rent control laws and similar
types of property regulation so long as the
laws included reasonable protections to determine
the fair return on investment.131
36 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Notes
1 See e.g. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 325(e); Florida Rule of Judicial
Admin. No. 2215(b)(2). The Florida Supreme Court commissioned
a task force to evaluate restructuring its decentralized
system of circuit court foreclosure mediation
programs. The Florida Supreme Court Task Force’s Final Report
and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure
Cases (August 17, 2009), recommends moving toward a more
uniform statewide system.
2 e.g., Cheyenne Hopkins, Modification: Tentative Steps Toward
a Regulatory Consensus, American Banker (Nov. 27, 2007); The
Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on Wealth, Property
Values and Tax Revenues, and How We Got Here, Report and
Recommendations by the Majority Staff of the Joint Economic
Committee (October 2007); Remarks of FDIC Chairman
Sheila C. Bair, American Securitization Form (ASF)
Annual Meeting (June 6, 2007). Statement on Loss Mitigation
Strategies for Servicers of Residential Mortgages (Sept.
2007), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/
2007-38a.pdf; Associated Press, Paulson to Mortgage Industry:
Help Curb Defaults (Oct. 31, 2007), available at http://
money.cnn.com/2007/10/31/real_estate/paulson_housing.ap/;
American Securitization Forum, Streamlined Foreclosure and
Loss Avoidance Framework for Securitized Subprime Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Loans, Executive Summary (Dec. 6, 2007),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp706.htm.
3 Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner:
The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modification,
41 Connecticut Law Rev. 1107 (2009). Electronic copy
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325534 at 14
4 Id.
5 Alan M. White, June 25, 2009 Columbia Collateral File
Summary, Valparaiso University Law School, available along
with other monthly updates at http://www.valpo.edu/law/
faculty/awhite/data/index.php .
6 Id.
7 Statewide Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program Launched
Press Release Office of the Attorney General of New Jersey,
Jan. 6, 2009 http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases09/
pr20090109a.html
8 From January 2009 through June 2009 the program completed
854 mediations. See p. 23, supra.
9 Las Vegas Review-Journal May 6, 2009 Mortgage Mediation:
Bill Shifts to Senate http://www.lvrj.com/news/44445017.html
10 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Office of
Thrift Supervision, OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report
Fourth Quarter 2008 (April 2009) p. 7.
11 Id at p. 8.
12 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Office of
Thrift Supervision, OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report
First Quarter 2009 (June 2009) p. 25 (54.10% of modifications
during first quarter 2009 reduced payments; less than
2% of modifications wrote off any principal); Alan M. White,
July 27, 209 Columbia Collateral File Summary Statistics,
Valparaiso U. School of Law (data covering period June 25,
2009 to July 27, 2009) http://www.valpo.edu/law/faculty/
awhite/data/jul_09_summary.pdf ( 65% of loan modifications
reduced payments, frequency of principal write-offs
declined from previous survey periods).
13 HOPE NOW press releases claimed servicers made
2,911,609 “workouts” between July 2007 and November
2008. Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working
Toward a Solution: March Oversight Report, March 6, 2009,
pp. 38 (available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
030609-report.pdf). The majority of these “workouts” were
repayment agreements that increased homeowners’
monthly payments. Id. No hard data was ever provided on
the loan modifications under the program, and other data
have shown that most of the modifications during this period
increased payments for borrowers, which led to substantial
redefaults.
14 Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working
Toward a Solution: March Oversight Report, March 6, 2009, pp.
43 (available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
030609-report.pdf).
15 Id.
16 See generally Stephen Labaton, Ailing, Banks Still Field Strong
Lobby at Capitol, New York Times, June 4, 2009.
17 U. S. Department of Treasury, Making Home Affordable Fact
Sheet, March 4, 2009 (available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/housing_fact_sheet.pdf); see generally
Report to Congressional Committees, Troubled Asset Relief
Program: Treasury Actions Needed to Make the Home Affordable
Modification Program More Transparent and Accountable, U.S.
Government Accountability Office No. GAO-09-837 (July
2009).
18 U. S. Department of Treasury, Making Home Affordable Fact
Sheet, March 4, 2009 (available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/housing_fact_sheet.pdf).; Report to
Congressional Committees, Troubled Asset Relief Program:
Treasury Actions Needed to Make the Home Affordable Modification
Program More Transparent and Accountable, U.S. Government
Accountability Office No. GAO-09-837, July 2009 p. 9.
19 See HAMP refinance program description: http://www
.makinghomeaffordable.gov/refinance_eligibility.html.
20 HAMP program guidelines and directives, Servicer Participation
Agreement, and FAQ available at https://www.hmpadmin.
com/portal/programs/hamp_servicer.html.
21 See Home Affordable Modification Program Supplemental
Directive 09-01 April 6, 2009. p. 14 https://www.hmpadmin
.com/portal/docs/sd0901.pdf
22 HAMP Servicer Performance Report Through July 2009
(August 4, 2009) at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/
tg252.html; Testimony of Herbert M. Allison, Assistant Secretary
for Financial Stability before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, July 16, 2009.
23 Fannie Mae guidelines at https://www.efanniemae.com/
sf/mha/mhamod/ ; Freddie Mac guidelines at http://www
.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/service/mha_modification.html;
FHA/HUD guidelines at www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/
letters/mortgagee/files/09.23ml.doc.
24 See HAMP NPV Model Overview at https://www.hmpadmin
.com/portal/docs/hamp_servicer/npvoverview.pdf; HAMP
Reviewing and Interpreting NPV Test results at https://
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 37
www.hmpadmin.com/portal/support/training.htm
25 American Securitization Forum, Statement of Principles,
Recommendations, and Guidelines For the Modification of
Securitized Subprime Residential Mortgages June 2007. p. 6
(“In evaluating whether a proposed loan modification will
maximize recoveries to the investors, the servicer should
compare the anticipated recovery under the loan modification
to the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a
net present value basis. Whichever action is determined by
the servicer to maximize recovery should be deemed to be in
the best interests of the investors.”
26 FDIC Loan Modification in Box overview and guidelines
at http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/loanmod
guide.html
27 https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/docs/npvoverview
28 In a major concession to servicers, the HAMP program
does not require reduction of principal or a write-down of
any part of the debt. The program may require forbearance
of a portion of the amortizing principal—allowing lenders
to retain a non interest bearing lien for any forborne principal.
This forbearance creates a future balloon payment due
at the end of the loan term or upon sale or refinancing.
29 HAMP Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra at p.4.
30 HAMP Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra p. 5–6.
31 HAMP Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra. p. 14 https://
www.hmpadmin.com/portal/docs/sd0901.pdf
32 Id at p. 2–3.
33 Id. at p. 4.
34 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009). The Act provides: Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, whenever a servicer of residential
mortgages agrees to enter into a qualified loss
mitigation plan with respect to one or more residential mortgages
originated before the date of enactment of [the Act],
including mortgages held in a securitization or other investment
vehicle—
(1) to the extent that the servicer owes a duty to investors
or other parties to maximize the net present value of such
mortgages, the duty shall be construed to apply to all such
investors and parties, and not to any particular party or
group of parties; and
(2) the servicer shall be deemed to have satisfied the duty
set forth in paragraph (1) if, before December 31, 2012, the
servicer implements a qualified loss mitigation plan that
meets the following criteria:
(A) Default on the payment of such mortgage has occurred,
is imminent, or is reasonably foreseeable, as
such terms are defined by guidelines issued by the
Secretary of the Treasury or his designee under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
(B) The mortgagor occupies the property securing the
mortgage as his or her principal residence.
(C) The servicer reasonably determined, consistent with
the guidelines issued by the secretary of the Treasury
or his designee, that the application of such qualified
loss mitigation plan to a mortgage or class of mortgages
will likely provide an anticipated recovery on
the outstanding principal mortgage debt that will exceed
the anticipated recovery through foreclosures.
(b) NO LIABILITY—A servicer that is deemed to be acting
in the best interest of all investors or other parties under
this section shall not be liable to any party who is owed a
duty under subsection (a)(1), and shall not be subject to any
injunction, stay, or other equitable relief to such party,
based solely upon the implementation by the servicer of a
qualified loss mitigation plan.
(c) STANDARD INDUSTRY PRACTICE.—The qualified
loss mitigation plan guidelines issued by the Secretary of
the Treasury under the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 shall constitute standard industry practice for
purposes of all Federal and State law.
(d) SCOPE OF SAFE HARBOR—Any person, including a
trustee, issuer, and loan originator, shall not be liable for
monetary damages or be subject to an injunction, stay, or
other equitable relief, based solely upon the cooperation of
such person with a servicer when such cooperation is necessary
for the servicer to implement a qualified loss mitigation
plan that meets the requirements of subsection (a).
35 Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury Action Needed
to Make the Home Affordable Modification Program More
Transparent and Accountable, U.S. Government Accountability
Office Report to Congressional Committees GAO-
09837 July 2009.
36 Making Home Affordable Program Report August 4, 2009
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/MHA_public_report.
pdf. See also Andrea Fuller, U.S. Effort Aids Only 9% of Eligible
Homeowners, New York Times August 4, 2009;
37 See generally Testimony of Diane E. Thompson, National
Consumer Law Center, U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs July 16, 2009.
38 Id.
39 See generally Congressional Oversight Panel, March 6, 2009
Report supra, pp. 44-55.
40 See e.g. cases recognizing affirmative defense to foreclosure
in lender’s failure to comply with FHA loss mitigation
guidelines: Ghervescu v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 2008
WL 660248 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2008); Wells Fargo Home
Loan Mortgage v. Neal, 922 A.2d 538 (Md. 2007); Fleet Real
Estate Funding Corp. v. Smith, 530 A.2d 919 (Pa. Super.
1987); FNMA v. Moore, 609 F. Supp. 194 (D.C. Ill. 1985); Associated
East Mortgage Co. v. Young, 394 A.2d 899 (N.J.
Super. 1978); FNMA v. Ricks, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 485 (1975).
41 Senate Bill 628 Engrossed Version—A, § 6.
42 Ryan Frank, Foreclosure Relief Bill Stalls in Oregon Senate, The
Oregonian, June 18, 2009 (http://www.oregonlive.com/business/
oregonian/index.ssf?/base/business/12452973212497
40.xml&coll=7); Oregon Legislation: Mandatory Mediation Compromise
to Emerge, United Trustee Association eNews June 5,
2009 (http://www.unitedtrustees.com/enews/461.php).
43 Oregon Enrolled Senate Bill 628.
44 Enrolled bills 4453, 4454, 4455 as signed by Governor
May 20, 2009, effective July 5, 2009.
45 Nevada Assembly Bill No. 149, effective July 1, 2009.
46 Nevada Supreme Court Rule 7(3), effective July 1, 2009.
47 LD 1418 §§ 3, 13, amending 14 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. §
38 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
6231-A).
48 The FDIC loan modification model is similar, but not
identical to the standard HAMP spreadsheet calculation. See
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/loanmodguide.
html.
49 LD 1418 §§ 3, 13, amending 14 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. §
6231-A
50 Id. at § 7.
51 Home Affordable Modification Program Supplemental
Directive 09-01 April 6, 2009. p. 14 https://www.hmpadmin
.com/portal/docs/sd0901.pdf
52 Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working
Toward a Solution: March Oversight Report, March 6, 2009, pp.
49–52. (available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
030609-report.pdf).
53 Information on the FDIC loan modification “loan mod in
a box” spreadsheet can be found at http://www.fdic.gov/
consumers/loans/loanmod/loanmodguide.html.
54 14 Me. Rev. Stat. § 6321-A.
55 The Michigan and California conference statutes set out
some very broad standards for loan modification guidelines
that are deemed acceptable. However, homeowners do not
receive the actual net present value calculation for their
loan. The standards themselves allow servicers considerable
discretion in considering a modification.
56 See, Note 122, infra.
57 See Nick. v. Morgan’s Foods, Inc.., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056
(E.D. Mo. 2000), affirmed 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2000) (sanctions
imposed for bad faith participation in ADR session);
43 A.L.R. 5th 545 (1996).
58 Under the administrative orders for the First, Eleventh,
and Nineteenth circuits the court may impose sanctions if
the lender breaches a settlement agreement.
59 Maine LD 1418,amending Maine Rev. Stat. § 6231-A.
60 See, Note 122, infra.
61 Nevada Assembly Bill No. 149, effective July 1, 2009.
62 See e.g., Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, (— P.3d —, 2009
WL 2633640 (Kan. Aug. 28, 2009) (MERS cannot make itself
a necessary party to a foreclosure action by labeling itself a
“mortgagee” in boilerplate language). See also Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, Inc. v. Southwest Homes of
Arkansas, — S.W.3d —, 2009 WL 723182 ( Ark., March 19,
2009) In re Jacobson, — B.R. —, 2009 WL 567188 * 5 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2009)Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan,
2009 WL 625560 (Ohio App. Mar. 12, 2009) In re Kang Jin
Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 770-71 ( Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) In re
Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516-17 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) HSBC
Bank USA, NA v. Yeasmin, 19 Misc.3d 1127(A), 866 N.Y.S.
2d 92 (Table) (N.Y. Sup. 2008) In re Nosek, 386 B.R. 374
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (imposing sanctions of $250,000 on
creditor for misrepresenting status of holder of note during
protracted litigation) In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp.
2d 650 (S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Parsley, 384 B.R. 138 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2007); Everhome Mortgage Co. v. Rowland, 2008 WL
747698 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2008); DJL Mortgage Capital,
Inc. v. Parsons, 2008 WL 697400 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13,
2008).
63 See e.g. F.R. Civ. P. Nos. 17, 19.
64 Nevada Assembly Bill No. 149, effective July 1, 2009.
65 Nevada Supreme Court Rule 7(3).
66 Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules New Mexico First
Judicial District,
http://firstdistrictcourt.com/Forms/doc/Plaintiff’s%20info
%20response.doc
67 Summit County Ohio Court of Common Pleas Rules:
http://www.summitcpcourt.net/
68 Seminole County Procedure for Mortgage Foreclosure
Hearings at http://www.flcourts18.org/PDF/Foreclosures/
Simmons_Foreclosure_Procedure.pdf.
69 N.Y. RPAPL § 1302
70 14 Maine Rev. Stat. § 6321 [check]
71 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.3204.
72 Home Affordable Modification Program, Supplemental
Directive 09-01 April 6, 2009 p. 18.
73 See e.g. Staff of Joint Economics Committee, 110th Cong.,
1st Sess., The Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact
on Wealth, Property Values and Tax Revenues, and How We
Got There (2007) http://jec.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction
=Reports.Reports&ContentRecord_id=c6627bb27e9c-9af9-
7ac7-32b94d398d27&Region_id=&Issue_id= _____, infra.
(projecting foreclosed home owners will lose $71 billion due
to foreclosure crisis, neighbors will lose $32 billion, and
state and local governments will lose $917 million in property
tax revenue).
74 See Appendix on Constitutional Issues, supra.
75 Franklin, Lucas, and Summit counties.
76 First, Eleventh, and Nineteenth judicial circuits.
77 Allegheny, Bucks, Northampton and Philadelphia counties.
78 N.Y. C.P.L.R. Rule 3408.
79 Congressional Oversight Panel, The Foreclosure Crisis: Working
Toward a Solution (March Oversight Report) March 6,
2009 at p. 15.
80 Id. at p. 18.
81 OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report, Disclosure of
National Bank and Federal Thrift Mortgage Loan Data,
April 2009.
82 Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Servicer
Reporting Requirements at https://www.hmpadmin.com/
portal/docs/hamp_servicer/hampreportingrequirements.pdf
83 State of Connecticut Judicial Branch Data Report July 1,
2008 though April 30, 2009..
84 Id.
85 First Judicial District of Pennsylvania Press Release June
30, 2009 (“First Judicial District Marks One-Year Anniversary
of Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion Program
as Approximately 1400 Philadelphia Homes Averted
From Sheriff Sale”).
86 David Rothstein and Sapna Mehta, Foreclosure Growth in
Ohio 2009 Policy Matters Ohio, March 2009 p. 2 (available at
www.policymattersohio.org).
87 Data provided by Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas June 26, 2009.
88 Data provided by “Franklin County Foreclosure Mediation
Project (FCFMP) Memorandum” dated August 10,
2009.
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 39
89 Data provided by New York Office of Court Administration
July 13, 2009.
90 The New York data records strictly settlements reached at
conferences. it excludes settlements reached before and after
the settlement conferences even though the case was technically
involved in a conference proceeding at the time of settlement.
The data was provided with the further caveat that
not all courts within the designated counties were reporting
data in consistent or systematic ways.
91 Office of New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Foreclosure
Mediation Program Data Through June 30, 2009 (provided
August 26, 2009).
92 Maine Public law LD 1418 § 7 B.
93 The programs in the First, Eleventh, and Eighteenth judicial
circuits in Florida stay proceedings automatically while
a foreclosure is referred to mediation. The programs in
Bucks, Northampton and Philadelphia counties similarly
stay proceedings automatically while mediation is pending.
The automatic stays in Allegheny County Pennsylvania incorporate
a fixed time of 90 days to conclude mediation.
The Ohio county programs generally limit mediation to
cases in which the homeowner has filed an answer, appeared,
or made some formal request for mediation. Under
the Cuyahoga County program the stay is for 60 days, with
the court able to extend the time by separate order. The
Franklin County, Ohio program extends the time to answer
the complaint for 60 days in cases referred to mediation. Requesting
mediation under the Lucas and Summit counties
program in Ohio extends the time to file an answer, and proceedings
for entry of judgment are stayed until mediation
has been concluded.
94 Nevada 2009 A.B. 149 § 7.
95 See e.g. Nick. v. Morgan’s Foods, Inc.., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056
(E.D. Mo. 2000), affirmed 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2000) (sanctions
imposed for bad faith participation in ADR session);
43 A.L.R. 5th 545 (1996).
96 Court rules implementing Maine foreclosure diversion
statute add a $200.00 administrative fee to all foreclosure
actions filed on or after June 15, 2009. This fee is imposed in
addition to the filing fee upon all foreclosure action filings
in the state. The revenue generated by the fee will be used to
fund the diversion program. http://www.courts.state.me.us/
court_info/rules/fees.shtml#6 2009 Nevada Assembly Bill
No. 65 added a $50 new fee for recording a Notice of Default
and Election to Sell effective July 1, 2009., to be paid over
to account for foreclosure mediation http://www.nevada
judiciary.us/images/foreclosure/trusteebrocure.pdf
97 First and Nineteenth judicial circuits.
98 The Eleventh and Eighteenth judicial circuits.
99 See e.g. Ala. Code § 5-19-10; Iowa Code Ann. § 537.2507;
S.D. Codified Laws § 15-17-39.
100 See e.g. In re Lake, 245 B.R. 282 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000)
(Ohio common law prohibits enforcement of fees shifting
provision of notes and mortgages that were not fairly bargained
for); Spencer Savings Bank, SLA v. Shaw, 401 N.J.
Super. 1, 949 A.2d 218 (2008) (New Jersey Fair Foreclosure
statute prohibits claims for fees incurred prior to filing of
foreclosure complaint); In re Hatala, 295 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D.
N.J. 2003) (provisions of New Jersey court rule, not terms of
mortgage and note or lender’s actual expenditures determine
homeowner’s liability for fees); In re Schwartz, 68 B.R.
376 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (terms of Pennsylvania Act No. 6,
41 P.S. § 406 limit pre filing attorney’s fees related to mortgage
foreclosure to $50.00)
101 Home Affordable Modification Program Supplemental
Directive 09-01, April 6, 2009 p. 22 ( https://www.hmpadmin.
com/portal/docs/sd0901.pdf)
102 Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working
toward a Solution (March 6, 2009) p. 47.
103 Making Home Affordable: Introduction of the Second
Lien Modification Program (2MP), Supplemental Directive
9-05 (August 13, 2009). https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/
docs/second_lien/sd0905.pdf .
104 These are the Ninth and Eighteenth judicial circuits.
105 Osborne on Mortgages § 331 (2d ed. 1979). See generally
Poteat, State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage Debtor during the
Depression, 5 Law and Contemporary Problems, 517 (1938);
Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 Harvard L.
Rev. 1061 (1933); G. Glenn, Mortgages, Vol. II §§ 150 to 167
(1943); Powell on Real Property § 37.49 (1968 ed.).
106 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
107 The “Contracts Clause,” Article 1, Section 10 of the
United States Constitution provides that “No state shall . . .
pass any Law . . . impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”
The Constitutional Convention added this provision in reaction
to a spate of debtor relief laws recently enacted by the
states. The founders of the new national government perceived
these state laws as a threat to the country’s ability to
build credit and compete as a growing commercial nation.
See generally Samuel L. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the
Blaisdell Decision: a Historical Study of Contracts Clause Jurisprudence,
72 Or. L. Rev. 513, 517-518 (1993).
108 Id. 290 U.S. at 443-44.
109 Id. 290 U.S. at 438.
110 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
111 Energy Reserves, supra 456 U.S. at 411-412.
112 East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
113 Laue v. Proctorville Credit, 390 N.W. 2d 823 (1986). See generally
Robert M. Lawless, The American Response to Farm
Crises: Procedural Debtor Relief, 1988 Univ. of Ill. L. Rev.
1037 (1988); Roland C. Amundson and Lewis J. Rotman, Depression
Jurisprudence Revisited: Minnesota’s Moratorium on Mortgage
Foreclosure, 10 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 805 (1984);
Timothy D. Benton, Iowa’s Mortgage Moratorium Statute: A
Constitutional Analysis, 33 Drake L. Rev. 303 (1983-84); Note,
12 Real Estate Law Journal 366 (1984).
114 See Part I, supra.
115 See Note 40, supra. CAL.
116 922 A.2d 538 (Md. 2007).
117 Id. 922 A.2d at 553.
118 Id. 922 A.2d at 551
119 Treasury’s guidelines for the HAMP program, including
guidelines for its net present value test can be found at
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/index.html.
40 STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
120 See Note 29, supra.
121 See Note 29, 30–31, supra.
122 See e.g. Hebert T. Tiffany & Basil Jones 5 Tiffany Real Property
§ 1556 (2008); 55 Am Jur. 2d Mortgages § 676; Milton
R. Friedman & James Charles Smith, Friedman on Contracts &
Conveyance of Real Property § 3:6.5 (2008) 59 C.J.S. Mortgages
§ 512 (2009); Northeast Savings v. Hintlian, 696 A.2d 315
(Conn. 1997); Sovereign Bank, FSB v. Kuelzow, 687 A.2d
1039 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997); Rosselot v. Heimbrock, 561 N.E.
2d 555 (Ohio Ap.. 1988); Woods v. Monticello Dev. Co., 687
P.2d 1324 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). See also Lo v. Jensen, 88 Cal.
App. 4th 1093, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (2001) (applying equitable
principles in non judicial foreclosure context); Gilroy
v. Ryberg, 266 Neb. 617, 667 N.W. 2d 544 (2003) (same).
123 See Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 446-47 (1934); Richmond Mortgage Corporation v.
Wachovia Bank, 300 U.S. 124, 129-130 (1937) Honeyman v.
Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539, 543-44 (1939); Gelfert v. National City
Bank of New York, 313 U.S. 221, 231-33 (1941). The Gelfert
court, which upheld a New York statute barring post foreclosure
deficiency claims, summed up this tradition as follows:
“We mention these matters here because they indicate
that for about two centuries there has been a rather continuous
effort through general rule or by appeal to the chancellor
in specific cases to prevent the machinery of judicial sales
from becoming an instrument of oppression. And so far as
mortgage foreclosures are concerned, numerous devices
have been employed to safeguard mortgagors from sales
which will or may result in mortgagees collecting more than
their due.” 313 U.S. at 232-33.
124 Gelfert v. National City Bank of New York, 313 U.S. 221,
233-234 (1941); Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 124, 543-44
(1937).
125 Id.
126 [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” U.S. Const. Amdt. 5, made applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g. Kelo
v. City of New London, 546 U.S. 469 (2005) (municipality’s
action to acquire private property for transfer to private entities
as part of planned community redevelopment program
was for a public use and permissible under takings
clause). Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) (environmental regulation that essentially deprives
real property owner of all economically viable use of
land can amount to the same as a physical appropriation of
the land under takings clause).
127 See e.g Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538
U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (noting distinction between analytical
standards for regulatory as opposed to physical takings);
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001)
(same).
128 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 130-134 (1978); see generally Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
supra, 533 U.S. at 633-34 (O’Connor concurring).
129 Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of
Roanoke, Virginia, 304 U.S. 502 (1938).
130 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Edgar A. Levy Leasing
Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 342 (1922).
131 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). See also Chicago Board of
Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1987)(ordinance
regulating charges and other obligations imposed
on landlords did not violate contracts clause and other constitutional
provisions); Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287 (3d
Cir. 1984) (rent control limits on lease termination can be
enforced as reasonable standard); Help Hoboken Housing v.
City of Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. (D.N.J. 1986) (sustaining ordinance
which imposed penalties for not renting properties);
Griffin Development Co. v. City of Oxnard, 39 Cal. 3d
256, 703 P.3d 339 (1985) (sustaining ordinance restricting
conversion of rental units to condominiums). San Marcos
Mobilehome Park Owners’ Assn. v. City of San Marcos, 192
Cal App. 3d 1492, 238 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1987) (reasonable rent
control procedures for fair return); Hutton Park gardens v.
Town Council of Town of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 350
A.2d 1 (1975) (same); Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 797 F.2d
1493 (9th Cir. 1986) (rent control procedures unreasonable
and overly confiscatory); Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F.
Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same).
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 41
Below Is The OnGoing Long Version Of Our Story Its Long And Evolving As We Speak
The Long Story As I Remember It
My 20 year battle
Well almost 20 years, My story starts in 1989 I bought a house in Milwaukie, Oregon It was a V.A. Assumed loan. I got the house for 7000.00 cash to the seller and assumed a V.A,L. For 40,000.00
During the next 8 years had made steady maint. Payments on my mortgage to Oregon Dept Of Veterans .
Off And On During This Time I had a girlfriend live with me.
But we did not get along very well the most of the time.
Finally in late `1996 I Asked her to move out.
Which she gladly complied after I Offered to financially help her get moved, Like Rent ,Deposits,Utilities, Moving Truck Ect.
Which I gladly agreed. So Life Is Good Living Alone,
Young Bachelor Construction Carpenter Fairly Good Job back in the building boom days.
Then one day a knock at the door. Its a sheriff and he has court papers.
The ex-girlfriend Apparently thinks she deserves 20,000.00 Dollars
for her part of equity in my house, Because she also worked at a job sometimes, And claimed she paid bills in the home, And Including but not limited to mortgage payments, Off And On.
So I Had to hire a lawyer, And meet her in court. To make a long story short, The judge Awarded Her 10,000.00 So I Had to pay that and
2500.00 dollars for my lawyer. Well I Did not have $ 10,000.00
hid away anywhere, So I Went to look for a refinance of my house to fund this payoff At The time I Owed about probably 38,000.00
on a 80,000.00 house But with just o.k.credit, I never took proper care of my credit when I was young I didn`t think I Would ever need it
and just didn`t care much. Being raised on the family farm that had raised generations of family before me, Credit was not a way of life for us if it was I knew nothing about it. Other than buying used pickups thru my teens and early adult life, And Had A Few slow pays over the years.
But Like I SAID I Just did not care. Too bad I Was raised in a way that allowed me to be like that. I`m sure paying for that now.
Any way I Ended up landing at beneficial finances door.
Worst Thing that happened in my WHOLE LIFE.
And I Truly mean that.
I Told them my situation, And gave them my numbers,
What I Owed, how much I Had to come up with.
They even gave me some money.
I Asked for 15,000.00 10,000.00 for the girlfriend
And 10,000.00 for me I take care of some much needed home repairs.
And upgrades And 2500.00 of my money went to pay my lawyer from the court case, As he leaned my house for the cash at the same hearing.
So that leaves me with a high estimate of about 60,000.00
Cash out that I Took against my house, As beneficial finance paid off the loan to Oregon Dept. Of Veterans for my mortgage and that was close to $ 40,000.00 thats a high estimate but just to be careful here
And I did later receive a payoff notice from Oregon Dept. Of Veterans
They told me my house was worth at least 85,000.00 - 90,000.00
And I Asked them if they had it appraised, They stated just a drive by appraisal. And That they used old county records.
Boy was I Happy to get that load of bills off my back. Finally my house was mine again, And a little money to fix it up. Life Is good.
Believe it or not I Never read those loan papers For another 5-6 years
Just Put them away. I never in my wildest dreams figured someone as smart as a loan company would ever think of doing anything except have my best interests in mind, And look out for me. Besides I probably could not understand the documents if I had too. Little did I know.
Skip ahead about 1.5 years I'm getting married , Yes Me.
So before we get married I want to talk to my new wife about putting her name on the house. Just in case anything ever happens to me, Never Know... So I take her down to beneficial finance and introduce her to these wonderful mortgage bankers that are going to fix us up.
And they said you guys need to fix up that house now you could be having a family soon.
How about we rewrite your loan put your new wife on the loan, And you guys can have some more cash to work on the house.
So We Said lets check it out,
In the The Meantime I Had been paying all my mortgage payments on time all along, So my credit was great with them couldn't be any better
especially since I still had some equity left (come to find out)
And they ran the credit on my new wife , They realized between us we were making about 85,000.00 a year both had good jobs for long time on same jobs.
So they drew up a new loan package for us
When I did read the first loan documents that I had signed to pay off my x girlfriend, I Was floored, And remember thinking what happen to my $40,000.00 house? I ONLY WISH I would have studied those documents when I got that loan because now all of a sudden I Owe $92,782.00
But I COULD ONLY ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT $60,000.00,
what happened to the other $30,000.00 of my equity I Still do not know.
I Found this out when me and my new wife signed loan docs.
To get her put on the house, And we borrowed more money .
I Was going to put a addition on the house. So This is my second refinance with beneficial in about 1.5 years I now owe them
102,80.00 on my 40,000.00 house
Plus the new loan they told us had to be in the form of a credit line that we could just use the money as we need it. That credit line was to be for $7500.00 leaned by a second mortgage on my house,
Beneficial people explained thats they way all people do it
I Remember feeling uneasy about being in all this debt, After just getting married and starting our life together. But was reassured by the lenders at beneficial that property values were raising way faster than I was borrowing money, And not to worry they had their eye on me,
And I Was doing just fine all the right moves.
But Still I`m thinking I owe $118,000.000 When just a few years ago
I Only owed about $40,000.00 for the exact same house.
Well things went normal for a little over a year Its 1999 now and we are expecting our first child my son Dakota was born January 8 1999.
I Was kinda feeling like moving to a bigger house
our house was getting smaller as we begun to fill it up with family stuff
but my wife really likes it here so being the carpenter I am I
decided on a major house over haul. So I started planning what we wanted and how much it would cost.
Being we spent our credit line on a new car as we had nothing that would haul a baby, we had 2 pickups and a corvette 2 seater cars all of them. So we bought a suv for hauling our precious cargo.
Beneficial had been sending letters for a long time telling us how we already qualified for more cash on our home loan all we had to do was call.
So We Decided to do a full addition to this house, And not have to move.
So Thats what I did
We Only qualified for about a little less than $7000.00 not counting
The closing cost which were more than the cash we borrowed, But I figured, I could easily do the job for that as I only had to pay for materials only due to me being a carpenter.
And I decided I did not like the way this was heading,
And I`m not borrowing no more money on our house,
Especially From beneficial finance I did not like the amounts of charges they were getting away with, For doing seems like no work to earn this money.
Every time we refinanced it was about $12,000.00 for the closing costs
My ignorance really costs us some money. And now find out cost us our home.
I now at this time we owe them 133,000.00
I`m thinking how did this happen? The most we ever got out of all this money was total I figure $19,000.00 and thats estimating on the high side, Just to be safe, the rest about 114,000.00 is their charges and fees minus the original 40,000.00 for the VAL Payoff that means Beneficial has hit me for $64,000.00 in charges and fees in about 2.5 years
Over the years they always refuse to furnish us with a account
History statement, As I have been trying to get it forever, I Have requested it at least 10 times in writing, They just ignore our request.
Then the worst thing possible happened, I Broke my neck in 2001
put me out of work permanently
Beneficial always charged me for this expensive insurance, But When I
Inquired about it after my injury, They said I Was not covered for that kind of coverage. Only Life Insurance
I Actually have some of the documents, To this day but I Cannot tell what is says the documents seem to contradict themselves.
Without even saying much we did get into financial troubles
during the following few years, With me without any income for over a year, until my ssi kicked in it was really a struggle
We had to learn a whole new lifestyle, And it was not easy
And life has been worse than bad ever since.
Some how we managed to keep our family together, And after spinal
surgeries and countless therapies I am walking on my own 2 feet
and have somewhat use of my hands. It Could have been a lot worse.
About six months after my injury beneficial got in touch with us about all the late payments on our account, (We were lucky to make them at all) But They acted like they were doing us a huge favor and put us in their hardship program.
This is where they take any late charges and or missed payments
and put them on what they say on the back end of the loan.
What they failed to mention was that from that day on our
mortgage is in never ending default status, And you are charged late fees for every payment you make for then on.
So absolutely nothing goes to your principle and you will be lucky if you even cover the daily interest.
Now we were in Beneficial
hell, With no way out.
So I Decided the only way out was to refinance and try to get our loan away from these vultures.
This as I Learned was not going to be easy if beneficial had anything to say about it. As they put us in forever default status on our mortgage.
Really made it difficult to get any lender to even talk to us.
About the only thing we had going for us was. My wife had been on the same $40,000.00 a year job for 15 years thats good stability.
And after we did the addition to the house, (and I`m not bragging but it really turned out nice)
It raised our value we now appraised at 243,000.00 and we owe beneficial just about 133,000.00 so were sitting on about $100,000.00
in equity So after getting turned down about 20 times I Was able to find someone who believed in us and agreed to do the refinance.
They contacted beneficial and got a rough estimate for a payoff.
And assured me it could work. I JUST HAD TO GET MY HOUSE AWAY FROM THEM (beneficial) So they begun the process of escrow ,title searches, credit checks, and all that stuff I Wish I Knew more about 10 years earlier.
Ready to close :
so on the closing day we are ready
to go sign the papers.
And I Got a call just before we were leaving the house. To go to the signing, I`m already nervous and excited at the same time.
Its the new mortgage guy on the phone.
He said beneficial added a bunch of costs and fees . To our mortgage payoff, CANNOT DO THE DEAL, PUTS us to high LTV. SORRY.
I`m just speechless and sick to my stomach.
The next day I Called beneficial, And asked them how they could do this kind of business, And I REQUESTED A FULL DISCLOSER, As to our fees and costs and a general account activity record from the start until this day. They Kept asking me If I was requesting a official payoff?
And said I Had to do that through a mortgage broker.
I Stated just send me the daily account activity
I got the same response nothing.
So I Dont know what to do because that refinance was going to pay off all our property taxes as we were 3 years behind with me not working and living only on my wife's pay it was hard to come up with the taxes every year for 3 years approx 4500 dollars. And the refi was going to cover all that
I Was really counting on this refi to maybe change some of our not too good luck lately.
(Summer 2006 ) But it did not work.
The next year the property taxes have to be paid the county has actually
filed a lean of foreclosure on our house.
So I immediately get in touch with the county tax people and told them of our problem and told them of my possible cure for this problem.
Which was to try one more time to get refinanced.
The county seemed not overly concerned about it really,
I`m sure they would like to have the taxes paid but did not seem like they were pushing to foreclose, They just wanted me
to keep them posted on any progress. In fact offered me a payment plan
If I needed it , But I Declined at this time because I Knew a refinance
is what I had to get or I Was going to lose my house to beneficial,
Now Looking back the payment plan might have saved me I don't Know.
That part had already taken a place in my mind.
The way the default status was on my mortgage because of that hardship program its was only in my mind designed to eat up my equity.
All beneficial had to do was wait me out, And it was theirs,
Not that my house is special to anyone but me .
No its just thats the way they operate they are all about winning in the biggest way possible. As long as they win. You Have to realize they have hardly 60 thousand invested in this 240 thousand they plan to take.
So Its not about my house, But The way they see it its doing business.
Their way. And if they ruin some body`s credit and in turn even ruin some body`s life. That`s part of doing business. Whats one person
credit or lively hood got to do with their money? To Them just a small problem, That their system fixes automatic .They Know once they get you on the hardship program. That will in turn fix your credit so no other lender will even look at you.
And if they have too to get you on this program they have another trick they used on me several times, That is to not record your payments until they could record them late, Actually hold recording of on time payments. And Actually make them late. This puts your payment not large enough to cover the late charges you did not even know you had.
Therefor making your payment short on money to cover all charges
For that month, Putting you in default often without you even knowing.
Why should you know, All you know is you made your payment on time.
These people make my blood boil
These people keep you in financial prison, With only a good lawyer and a early understanding
Of what they are doing to you will you get away from them .
My Last Chance
in the Spring of 2007 I Was reaching a hopeless situation
I was notified by Beneficial Finance that they had spent
25,000.00 That`s 25 thousand to settle my property taxes.
I WAS LIVID I Called them to ask why it was so much?
The guy on the phone never got his name he would not tell me said he did not have to, Told me although
They were at this time still accepting my monthly payments
They need to take care of these extra charges Totaling
Almost 30 thousand Dollars, With taxes and lawyers fees
And other costs, I Reminded him I had this problem
solved a year ago and they ruined the refinance This did not need to happen at all
I At the time asked him for a total accounting once again of my account
From start to the present day, He said no problem.
We will get that right out to you.
Then asked me if I could make a payment right now on the phone
And I Knew my regular payment was about due.
So I AGREED TO A PAYMENT PLUS 250.00 Extra for to pay down on these extra charges.
May 2007 3 weeks later we get a currior delivered formal forcloser notice
delivered to our house, We were devastated our home of 18 years was being taken away, The place I Rebuilt with my own hands.
They claimed in the notice we had not made a payment since the past December, That would be 5 months,
In actual I was actually 250.00 dollars ahead because of the extra money
But later found out we had actually been months behind without knowing it, Because of the Hardship program had put almost all our
payments to catchup interest, Is what I Was told.
Because I HAVE STILL NOT RECEIVED A TOTAL ACCOUNTING OF MY ACCOUNT. OVER 4 YEARS I HAVE BEEN DEMANDING.
SO I Had no way of knowing the real status of my account.
And here I am 120 days away from my home being sold by the sherriff.
Now I MUST DO SOMETHING
We had a computer for a few years , but I always kinda shyed away from it because I was just ignorant, But Now I`m
Desperately ignorant. So I Start using this computer.
I`ve got to do something, Soon I Find a local guy named George Thompson
he saves people that are in my situation.
Thats his specialty, I Called him and he agreed to come over take a look
So George came over looked at the paperwork we had about the mortgage,
And about the property taxes and ran our credit , It showed what I expected , Beneficial had us in default status for the last 4 years
With arrearages, That meant what I Expected that all my payments
Must have been going to late charges its hard to believe 875.00
every month was not enough to cover even the late fees.
George said he would crunch the numbers and get back to me.
A FEW DAYS WENT BY
And George called and said he could make it work I Signed permission slips
and faxed them to him to pull our info.
The tricky part was our damaged credit , It put our LTV Pretty low
Thats loan to value thats how much you can borrow compared to how much your property is worth.
People with the best credit can borrow at a higher % of LTV
Than someone with damaged credit ours was at 75%
barely getting us paid off and the extra charges Beneficial
was charging really made me angry but I Could not
convince George THAT THEY WERE INFLATED.
He said something like you cannot fight that.
This really pisses me off, sorry for the language I still get mad this very minute.
To me thats just whats wrong with this system no body will make them be honest nobody.
In my mind these people have illegally taken me for at least 60-70
thousand dollars, And I`m suppose to sit back shut up and let them do it?
I Really have trouble with this.
If You counted dollar borrowed to dollar paid back, Just forget the interest for the sake of this conversation,
I HAVE LONG AGO PAID THIS HOUSE OFF MAYBE TWO TIMES.
But instead im owing more than twice I ever borrowed after almost 15 years of steady paying,
And now in forecloser, This stinks
Obviously I Have had a few problems but always tackeled them straight up never tried to dodge anyone, And payed what I could and putting my family through a life of having almost nothing, So we could have a good place to call home.
Back To George :
George told me I Needed a professional Appraisal as the last on I got was over a year old and we needed all the help we could get
as in values raising (remember those days?)
So I Dug up the cash and paid 350.00 for a appraisal
The House came in at 235,000.00 barely enough to make it work.
Because the way Georges program works is he gets you the loan for just 1-2 years short term, his company pays off your mortgage all your bills that are on title, then you are also required to borrow enough money to put in a special account that auto pays your payments for the life of the loan the 1-2 years, That way their money is guaranteed to be paid back
they in turn file helpful reports to the credit bureaus on your behalf then at the end of the loan you are setup to get conventional financing, Because your damaged credit is looking better with the 1-2 years of great payment history . A Great program if you have the equity to fund it.
And with our appraisal and LTV We barely squeaked by , Once again the dishonesty with how much beneficial actually paid on my taxes is what made it so close, If they had been made to be honest I Would not be in this situation at all.
THATS WHAT HURTS THE MOST TO THIS DAY..
So Closing This deal With George
Its getting close to our sheriffs sale date about 3 weeks away now
so I called George And checked up on our progress ,
He said everything is just about in place, He got the
final payoff amount from Beneficial and everything looks great.
But warned me he still had to call them the day of the closing to get exact numbers so there is no way they can protest the payoff.
As interest is adding up daily.
I Said great and George Said good when is a good day for your wife to be home from work and we will close the deal right at your house,
George said he could bring a notary with him, And make
everything easy.
So I told him the day I think it was about 4-5 days away.
Finally the day for closing is here. My wife took the day off and we decided after we were done we would go out for a nice lunch to celebrate this long nightmare is finally over.
About a hour away George called I Knew when the phone rang
I just had a bad feeling when I saw his name on my caller I.D.
SOMETHINGS WRONG
He said he has been haggling with them all morning and they raised the payoff amount, Up too high to make it work at our loan to value.
But If I could somehow come up with about 5k dollars we might be able to pull it off. And thats with him waiving most of his fees.
I Told him if I had access to 5 thousand dollars I would have paid the taxes myself when they were due.
Just before we hung up he said good luck and if you find a way to come up with 5k dollars to call him we could still do it.
I Thanked him for all his hard work and said goodbye.
That Night I Was more depressed than I had ever been in my life.
All I Had been through , Breaking my neck loosing my $50,000.00 a year job, thinking how are we going to move all this stuff out of this house
So many thoughts.
My son is going to really hate me for moving him away friends he has played with all his life, How will I Tell him.
I felt like I Really failed him as a Dad.
I Thought about my wife , How I Have let her down,
Promising when I Married her I Would always take care of her.
Instead I`m a half crippled 46 year old loser, Cannot even take care and protect our home.
And I Was wishing if only I Could turn back time and get a chance to redo this chapter I Would never do another loan with anyone without reading every part of every page. That Part is easy to wish but impossible to change.
If I only had a lawyer to turn the tide on beneficial .
Then I Started thinking about Beneficial, I Thought about why they can
get away with all these dishonest business practices, Its unbelievable to me that they are allowed to do this, I KNOW FOR A FACT THEY PADDED THE AMOUNT THEY PAID ON THE PROPERTY TAXES. That little part alone is what killed the loan with George. IF Those figures were honest ,We would be refinanced away from them right now. And making our payments count towards our equity LIKE ITS SUPPOSED TO BE.
How did I ever get us into this?
Is There Anything Left I Can still do to help us ?
That night I Did not even go to bed , I Stayed up all night reading on the computer, Reading about the people all over the country that
Beneficial has put the screws to, Many of the cases were similar to ours.
I read where some people were able to file Bankruptcy and save their house through the bankruptcy courts.
For some reason this felt dirty to me , I Felt like I was somehow cheating
But I only had to remind my self of what beneficial is doing to me.
Recording payments late to ruin my credit,Putting me on a hardship program that strips your equity on a daily basis without telling you the real results, hiding my acount info by not giving me records only they have, So I Will not even know until its too late to save my home,
Padding my taxes and extra charges bill, to make refinancinng un doable for most people,
Intentional ruining my credit so I cannot refinance with any other company. These Things have just about ruined my life.
I can only dream what life might be like if I WOULD HAVE NEVER WALKED IN THE DOOR OF BENEFICIAL FINANCE...
And I had a normal mortgage like other people, I know my family would be better off thats a understatement.
And I Dont want to come across as some want something for nothing
whiner, Who never paid my bills and looking for a free ride,
Thats simply not the case. This has been too much of a nightmare
To do on the purpose of trying to get out of paying a bill.
I Very much want to pay my mortgage, But also I want to get credit for it.
My time could have been spent much better and the supression my family has gone through is painfull, Always afraid to even go on a vacation because we cant spend the money due to making extra ½
payments most months due to threats of loosing our home.
Only to find out the payments did not even go to the principal. Or who knows where they went we have no records.
This angers me so much I Decided after reading and thinking
all that one night until daylight. I Was either going to roll over and let them win or I Was going to use every tool I Could afford to fight them as long as I can..
I Decided to fight, If For nothing else maybe I could warn others about these and other lenders who have no intention of letting you have your pursuit of happiness.
I HAD NO MONEY TO FIGHT WITH
My first problem hit me right out of the gate, To fight a huge
corporation like Beneficial, And what I Mean by fight is to make them tell the truth, And give me my dam statement.
So I Was forced to do what I did not want to do .
After a free consultation with a lawyer.
I told him my story and what I was facing , a sale date of less than 12 weeks away. And although I have a lot of old mortgage documents.
That Show info on 3 refi`s in 1.5 years but I Have no records of in office transactions or statements of any kind,
To Be Continued
Update I HAVENT POSTED FOR A WHILE
Its October 1 and nothing has changed much,
Today a lady from beneficial called it wasn`t a very fruitfull talk as I Broke my own rules and I GOT MAD at her for saying it was all my fault for not stopping benneficial from breaking the law with these loans by not signing the documents in the first place. Had I NOT SIGNED
I would not be in this spot I`m in?%$#@ no shit. So I Hung up on her . The I decided to go to the court house i wanted to check the records of the refinances, to see just where all the money went to.
Well I Got a little suprise there were 5 refinances in 1.5 years not 3 like i thought Or at least 5 deed recordings.
But I have to go back because I ran out of time I forgot about my sons school bus and had to get home to meet him.
If you are not real good about going thru micro film it takes a while to first find all the files then search the film and print them out. But i`m curious because the 2 i did get printed there is no hud settlement sheet on either file, Now why did they pull those out before they sent them to the recorder? Strange cant wait to check the rest. At this point I`m looking for money to hire a lawyer i got just about 35 days left till sale date i think i want to see the blue ink I signed with on the deed , Now that those settlement pages are missing. will up date soon.